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*These papers were delivered at the 1947 annual general meeting of the Canadian Historical Association. The chairman of the programme committee was J.-C. Falardeau of Laval University.

Four other papers which were given at the same meeting could not be published in this *Report* for reasons of space. "*Le Canadien* upon the Defensive, 1806-10" by Albert Faucher has appeared in the September issue of the *Canadian Historical Review*. Arrangements are being made to publish later the following: "Two Ways of Life: The Essence of Our Traditions" by A. R. M. Lower; "Royal Commissions and Canadian Agricultural Policy" by Vernon Fowke; and "The Liberal Party in Alberta, 1905-1921" by L. G. Thomas.

SOME RECENT VIEWS OF THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE

By KENNETH M. SETTON
The University of Manitoba

IN this paper I propose to discuss with you, as my title indicates, some recent works dealing with the period we have long known as the Italian Renaissance and to consider with you some of the more important contributions which have been made in late years to our understanding of this period. Mostly, of course, I shall speak of books and articles published in the last decade, although in some few cases I shall go even farther back than two decades in order to rescue, for this occasion at least, some very valuable studies which have not found their way, for one reason or another, into the modern current of Renaissance bibliography. When I make mention of the Renaissance, you will understand that I mean thereby the fourteenth, fifteenth, and, sometimes, the sixteenth centuries.

Contemporary historians of the Renaissance may be simply and conveniently divided, like so many things, into three classes: there are those who affirm the existence of the Renaissance as a rebirth or revival of man's mind and spirit, based in some important and constructive fashion upon the recovery of ancient culture; secondly, there are those who flatly deny any such renaissance and see only continuity in the historical process and only evolution in the gradual changes in European thought and society from the later middle ages to early modern times; and, thirdly, there are those who try to reconcile these divergent views by asserting that there is some truth in the pro-Renaissance position, but that its chief advocates have exaggerated the importance of Graeco-Roman art, literature, and philosophy in effecting a transformation, in the period under discussion, of man's attitude towards himself and the world in which he lives.

Scholars have debated the Renaissance concept and its various implications in its economic, social, and sociological aspects; its scientific, philosophical, and religious interests, purposes, and beliefs; its artistic and humanistic contributions to modern culture; and, finally, in its political, governmental, and diplomatic innovations and achievements. Roughly, very roughly, in the order in which I have named these fields of research (and I shall be extremely superficial in dealing with some of them), I should like to attempt a general bibliographical survey of recent works on the Italian Renaissance and the points of view put forward by their authors in the battle of definition and evaluation which still rages over what our understanding is to be of the period from about 1300 to about 1600. Obviously I can refer to only a few half dozens of outstanding or representative works, but an interest in the Renaissance, in Italy and elsewhere, can be pursued in the bibliographical guides and the thousands of books and articles listed each year in the April number of *Studies in Philology*,¹ and in the annual bulletins prepared by Professor S. H. Thomson on the *Progress of Medieval and Renaissance Studies in the United States and Canada*, which after a lapse of three years will shortly resume publication.

The researches of social and economic historians of the period from the early fourteenth to the later sixteenth centuries have undermined a good deal the old pro-Renaissance position, for they have demonstrated with

¹Chapel Hill, N.C.

especial clarity the coincident decline of medieval, and the gradual rise of modern, institutions, social patterns, and dominantly significant ideas and attitudes. As representative, almost typical, of several recent studies in the economic and social background of the Italian Renaissance, I should like to begin with Professor Alfred von Martin's *Sociology of the Renaissance*,² a work less original than at first glance it may appear to be, but certainly more important than its rather infrequent citation in the literature of the past decade might seem to suggest. Von Martin seeks to depict the sociology of the Renaissance in terms of Max Weber's concept of the ideal type; the influence upon his work of Jakob Burckhardt is very apparent (although his emphases are rather economic than political), and he draws heavily upon the studies, as he acknowledges, of Sombart, Gothein, Doren, Simmel, Caspar, and Engel Janosi. In his analysis of the *bourgeois* "type" of the Renaissance the historical sociologist has made some telling points, even if the critical reader cannot always accept their validity, and some of his generalizations are instructive, even if one sometimes feels the need to qualify them. Since, however, some of these views are basic to an understanding of much recent work in the history of Renaissance philosophy and science, politics, and even art and letters, I should like to be allowed at the outset to consider them at some slight length. In connection with Von Martin's brief study I should like also to deal with another work which traces the transition from feudal to *bourgeois* society, but with different emphases and interests: this is the more formidable and important work of Franz Borkenau, *Der Übergang vom feudalen zum bürgerlichen Weltbild: Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie der Manufakturperiode*.³ Although Borkenau stresses the close interconnections between economic and social forces, on the one hand, and religious, philosophical, and scientific ideas on the other, he has not attempted an historico-sociological investigation, but rather depicts for us the relationship, in medieval and early modern times, between science and industrial techniques and society and civilization in general; he analyses contemporary economic and political theory, traces the development of scientific method, and brings us face to face, in effective fashion, with various theological and philosophical problems from St. Thomas to Gassendi, Hobbes, and Pascal. The scope of his work is thus extensive, and only the first third of it is relevant to the intellectual and social history of the Renaissance, but after Von Martin's slender volume it is well to read Borkenau, for the latter adds colour, perspective, and detail to some of Von Martin's sketches.

It has long been an historical truism that as one passes in review the history of the later thirteenth and earlier fourteenth centuries one detects in the rise of the *bourgeoisie* new forces and social mutations that prove to be destructive of the authority of the clergy and the chivalry of Europe.⁴ The historical sociologist like Von Martin has helped us to appreciate the

²Alfred von Martin, *Sociology of the Renaissance* (London, 1944), translated by W. L. Luetkens from *Soziologie der Renaissance*, first published in German in 1932, now in Karl Mannheim's International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction.

³Paris, 1934. Schriften des Instituts für Sozialforschung, IV, herausgegeben von Max Horkheimer.

⁴Borkenau, *Der Übergang vom feudalen zum bürgerlichen Weltbild*, has emphasized the importance of this phenomenon in the intellectual history of Europe from the fourteenth century to the seventeenth (45, 54, 78, 89-90, 97 ff.). For additional bibliography on the same subject, see Lynn White, Jr., in *American Historical Review*, LII, 1947, 422-3, note 4.

truth of the truism. The mores of an agrarian society, medieval society, are inevitably conservative; they tend to be dominated by religious precept and prejudice; but change and peculiarity may flourish in an urban community, unnoticed and even encouraged. In the transition from medieval agrarian to Renaissance urban society money, like the philosopher's stone, transmuted into new substances the social bases of the medieval community.⁵ In a manorial village a man depended upon the group for its help and its services, and life apart from the group into which he was born was something he could not contemplate. Money, however, in an urban society purchases all necessities and all services, and leaves the individual his independence of any reciprocal obligations to those who perform these services for him, and leaves him also his time and strength for the gratification of whatever personal ambitions and aspirations he may entertain. Medieval society stood on the land and was close to the soil. Renaissance society walked in the town and was footloose. The power of the high *bourgeoisie* was the power of money. Money is a most flexible instrument; it operates ubiquitously; it solves all problems but death, and death is no problem. The clergy and the feudality depended for their continued dominance upon the continuance of the conditions that had given them that dominance, upon the tripartite division of society into those who prayed and those who fought and those who worked (with their hands), as described by medieval theorists who saw in this social structure the ordinance of God. The high *bourgeois* did not fit into this scheme. Inevitably they became hostile to the concept of noble blood; they refused to recognize the contemporary organization of society as the work of God; they rejected the medieval *summa socialis*; and for birth and title they sought to substitute intelligence and enterprise. In the ensuing struggle the chivalric virtues of noble blood and reckless courage were no match for the *bourgeois* virtues of money and of intellect.

More truly Aristotelian than the Church, the *bourgeoisie* trusted in the entelechy, so to speak, of their own individualism—whatever individualism may be—and proceeded therefrom to the elaboration of new social values which might be consonant with their desires for personal power and for fame. The process was a gradual one; there was no critical moment in the history of this development. This so-called new individual had to be strong and self-reliant, for his interests and responsibilities were ceasing to be corporate and were becoming personal. The high *bourgeoisie* became completely rational, calculating, and measured the means, we are informed, solely by the end, without reference to ethical and religious standards. Hitherto, for centuries, the Church had had almost a monopoly of reason, although it was forever restrained in the operation of its reason by its faith in revelation. When, however, in the eyes of the later nominalists, St. Thomas failed to reconcile faith and reason, and when Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, Marsiglio and John of Jandun, Wyclif, John Hus, and others publicized, in theology and in politics, the consequences of that failure, ideological support was furnished, by the centrifugal and individualist tendencies of nominalism, to a position into which, largely unconsciously perhaps, the typical high *bourgeois* had fallen. Thus, in a remarkable

⁵Cf. H. Koht, "Le Problème des origines de la Renaissance" (*Revue de synthèse historique*, XXXVII, 1924, 112-13).

manner, nominalism aided the growth of capitalism and contributed to the dissolution of the medieval social and intellectual hierarchy.⁶

The *bourgeois* respected order and management. He hated violence and contemned the thoughtless extravagance of the feudal noble. He was not much inspired by emotion; he was not much bound by tradition. In Italy the state itself, in the brutal economic and military competition of the high middle ages, came to meet its problems in the same spirit. In the beginning chapters of his famous *Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* (first published in 1860), Burckhardt emphasized that the Norman-Hohenstaufen kingdom of Sicily and southern Italy provided, on a large scale, a model from which the *condottieri* of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries could cut their cloth to make garments smaller, to be sure, but very similar in pattern. Power was attained and maintained by meeting problems in a practical and rational manner; administration was efficient, and the administrators were not sentimental; justice was tempered by expediency; and small worry was spent on constitutional precedent or feudal contract.⁷ "The state itself," says Von Martin, "was now becoming a capitalist entrepreneur." In Florence, Genoa, Milan, and, above all, in the Serene Republic on the lagoons of the Adriatic, politics were soberly guided in the interests of commerce and power. The *bourgeois* virtues were admirably exemplified in the statesmen of the Serenissima—shrewd, just, and methodical, not inhumane, sometimes generous, never rash, rarely sentimental. They wanted wealth, for wealth was power and security; but the capitalist spirit is an impatient one, and time soon became a prized commodity. In the more strictly medieval period, when wealth and power resided in the possession of land, time was not at a premium; to the clergy and the nobility the life of their classes appeared to be without end; but there were no means of saving and mobilizing their resources, no way of increasing and accumulating wealth of agrarian origin. But with time the *bourgeois* could increase his wealth and so his power; he was very restive, so much to do and so little time. It is with this social and psychological background in mind, we are told, that one should understand the great interest in clocks in Europe from the fourteenth century on. Clocks in Italian towns struck twenty-four hours a day. There are several classic passages in the humanists which are frequently cited to illustrate this state of mind: Carraccioli laments the amount of time spent in church in the kingdom of Naples, and, five centuries before Mr. Sinclair Lewis discovered Babbitt, Gianozzo Manetti saw God as the supreme business man; Lorenzo Valla's respect for the reciprocity of contractual obligation was so great that he affirmed it was wrong to serve even God without the expectation of proper remuneration; and Leon Battista Alberti regarded prosperity as a manifestation of God's pleasure in the righteous management of affairs: "a kind of cooperation between grace and personal efficiency was assumed."⁸

⁶Cf. Borkenau, *Der Übergang vom feudalen zum bürgerlichen Weltbild*, 37-9, 99, 111.

⁷Cf. Albert Brackmann, "Der mittelalterliche Ursprung der Nationalstaaten" (*Sitzungsberichte der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, philos.-hist. Klasse*, 1936, 133 ff.). One may be forgiven his amusement at Brackmann's reference (132) to "diese normannisch-nordische Staatenform" (in speaking of the English monarchy under Henry I).

⁸Von Martin, *Sociology of the Renaissance*, 17. See also Hans Baron, "A Sociological Interpretation of the Early Renaissance in Florence" (*South Atlantic Quarterly*, XXXVIII, Oct., 1939, 437-8).

Any sociological analysis of Renaissance society must include some consideration of the Church. Recent investigators have emphasized, as one of the larger ironies of history, that the Avignonese papacy was itself, together with the bureaucratic state, the chief solvent of what nostalgic neo-scholastics today regard as the unity and harmonious composition of medieval society.⁹ In the fourteenth century the officials of the Apostolic Camera included financiers who sought new and exploited old sources of revenue with an enterprise perhaps unparalleled in the service of any state in contemporary Europe. In an era of rising prices it became ever more costly to meet the spiritual and secular responsibilities of the Church; as the newly organized collectorates made more effective the collection of funds throughout Europe, the Church became a consumer of goods on an enormous scale; prices rose still higher, and the Church found the problem of income one of almost perennial crisis. But the history of the fourteenth-century papacy remains to be written; it is only in the last forty years that any substantial portion of the Avignonese archives has been published. Almost a dozen of the chief French medievalists of our time—G. Mollat, Auguste Coulon, Paul Lecacheux, Eugène Déprez, J.-M. Vidal, Georges Daumet, and others—have made available to us, for the first time, thousands of documents illustrating every aspect of church history in the fourteenth century.¹⁰ A row of huge and handsome volumes now awaits some von Ranke and Pastor to write, from their respective points of view, the history of the papacy in one of its most critical and fascinating periods.

It must not be thought that medieval chivalric ideals had no influence upon the Italian Renaissance. In Italy, unlike northern Europe, the nobility moved into the towns where they became almost assimilated with the high *bourgeoisie*. In Florence, for example, the Ricasoli were a feudal family; the Acciajuoli were *bourgeois*; they became linked by marriage: "As the estates intermixed, so did their outlooks, the military daring of the noble and the economic calculation of the bourgeois."¹¹ This combination of courage and brains brought great fame and great fortune to Venice, Genoa, and Florence, but the heroic age of early capitalism came gradually to an end in the fifteenth century. With the possession of wealth made in commerce and in industry there came the desire to preserve it; the *bourgeoisie* became conservative; they aped the nobility, and sought alliances with noble families. The fourteenth-century *bourgeoisie* had been republican in sentiment; it had desired, for its own betterment, social and political change; and fourteenth-century humanists like Giovanni Boccaccio and Coluccio Salutati had been the publicists of this *bourgeois* republicanism.¹² But with the fifteenth century came a *bourgeois* distrust of the humanist; the *bourgeois* forgot his earlier interest in ancient republicanism; now, above all, he desired a stable society, feared civil strife, and looked to despot, pope, or monarch to protect him and his possessions. The

⁹Von Martin, *Sociology of the Renaissance*, 78.

¹⁰*Lettres des papes du XIV^{me} siècle* (Paris, 1900).

¹¹Von Martin, *Sociology of the Renaissance*, 48.

¹²One of the last important literati of the Renaissance republican in sympathy was Leonardo Bruni Aretino, whose *Historiarum Florentini populi libri xii*, written in the first half of the fifteenth century, has been recently studied anew by Wallace K. Ferguson, who has noted Bruni's strong affinities with the "Florentine burgher humanism of an earlier generation" (*American Historical Review*, XLV, 1939-40, 8-9).

humanist was only too conscious of his impotence when left to stand alone; he climbed into the ivory tower whence he fulminated against *bourgeois* philistinism. Seeing now small practical purpose in his studies, the humanist made a virtue of cultural irrationalism. He pursued art for the sake of art. But the humanist who could preach republicanism in the fourteenth century could preach absolutism in the fifteenth. The *bourgeois* had become an aristocrat, and the humanist who would enjoy his support must now glorify aristocratic ideals. The humanist made the adjustment, for he much preferred the luxury and security of the court at a despot's country seat to the hardship and independence of the ivory tower, which might be only a garret in town, for if the republican ideals of a Brutus were dying in Florence, the charm and patronage of a Maecenas were very much alive in the nearby villa of Careggi. The affinity we have thus seen between the early capitalist and the feudal noble is not at all strange, for it is always well to bear in mind that capitalist society was and is an aristocratic society, in Renaissance Italy and in later times, almost as aristocratic, in fact, as the clerico-feudal society which it gradually displaced. About the year 1500, with this social feudalization of the high *bourgeoisie*, there came a revival of the chivalric ideals of, say, the year 1250, softened and refined by humanist learning, and at the Italian courts of the late-Quattrocento and the Cinquecento the prince's wife and the great courtesan presided over a little world which had tired of the earlier *bourgeois* values of rationality, utility, and quantity: "chivalry itself had by now become a 'work of art'."¹³ Blue blood again comes to possess a mystic power; a new era has dawned for the aristocracy of Italy and of Europe; and it lasts until the new resurgence of the *bourgeoisie* in the eighteenth century.

Such is the sociological history of the Italian Renaissance as sketched for us by Alfred von Martin and his confrères; its chief emphases devolve around the influence of economic forces upon society; its debt to Marxian speculation will be readily perceived; and its simplicity of explanation will not content those who regard the determinant and constitutive forces in society as being many and varied. Franz Borkenau has dealt more especially with the intellectual and philosophic history of late medieval and early modern times (aspects of our subject to which we shall turn shortly); the themes of his work are less easy to summarize in brief compass, but his premises prescind from conclusions of the sort Von Martin has arrived at. There have been many penetrating observations of the growth and character of Renaissance society made in recent studies of the economic history of the period, for especial stress has been laid upon gradual change and gradual development; and it was precisely the factor of development which Burckhardt, in his search for "the recurrent, constant, and typical," pretty much failed to deal with. Burckhardt's failing was a serious one, for even if man's nature changes little, his history changes much.¹⁴

Before this alliance of the high *bourgeoisie* and the decadent feudality, which is basic to any understanding of the sixteenth century, the high *bourgeois* had, however, exploited the democratic aspirations of their smaller fellows, whose numbers and strength they had employed gradually to reduce and to cripple the political and economic strength of the feudatories. They could, on occasion, make and unmake tyrants after a fashion

¹³Von Martin, *Sociology of the Renaissance*, 73.

¹⁴Cf. F. Engel-Janosi, *The Growth of German Historicism* (Baltimore, 1944), 74, 76.

that the modern student of Italian history sometimes, perhaps inappropriately, calls "proto-fascist." Let me give a single example of this control of the state and exploitation of the lesser *bourgeois* and the proletariat by the first great capitalists. It comes as early as the fourteenth century, and I would illustrate it from the able researches of Armando Saporì.¹⁵ Following the financial crisis of 1339, caused by the collapse of the credit of Edward III of England and Robert the Wise of Naples and the threatened bankruptcy of the Bardi and the Peruzzi, and the complete failure, by July of 1342, of Florentine designs upon Lucca, banking interests in Florence, both *grandi* and *popolani*, raised the famous Walter of Brienne, titular Duke of Athens, to the Florentine *signoria*, hoping so to guide his domestic and foreign policies that the ruinous expenditures of the preceding decade might be stopped, for neither the bankers nor the public treasury could any longer afford the luxury of costly failure. Capitalist propaganda prepared the way well, if quickly, for Walter of Brienne, and all social classes combined in welcoming the establishment of his lordship over Florence: "The capitalists," declares Saporì, "could not have wished for more."¹⁶ But they did wish for more; they wished Walter to rule in their interests; he wished to rule in his own; and after less than a year the banking circles which had made him lord of Florence conspired against him and expelled him from the city (on July 26, 1343). For the historical sociologist of the Renaissance here is, in actual fact, the "ideal type," who illustrates within himself much of the political and economic pattern of the larger society in which his career is woven.

From a consideration of a few recent views of the social and sociological history of the Italian Renaissance, we may pass, more briefly, to the work of some more specifically economic historians and note, too, the reaction against economic history in Italy. Building upon the brilliant model furnished, a half century ago, by Professor Gaetano Salvemini in his *Magnati e popolani in Firenze dal 1280 al 1295*,¹⁷ and upon the learned works, also in Florentine history, of Robert Davidsohn and Alfred Doren, as well as the valuable studies of Gioacchino Volpe in the economic and social history of Pisa, Italian scholars have produced a vast number of articles and monographs. They have described and analysed the growth of municipal populations; the accumulation of capital in ground rents and commercial enterprise; the relations of the city (*città*) to its dependent countryside (*il contado*); contracts, loans, and partnerships; the growth of the artisan and mercantile classes; the beginnings of industrial capitalism in the fourteenth century; the struggle between urban proletariat and *bourgeois* patriciate; the significance of the growth of credit; and the multiplicity of financial techniques and institutions which were evolved to meet the increasingly complex needs of the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries. It is true that not infrequently the facts of economic and political history were pressed into the Marxian mould, and the rival interests of *popolo grasso* and *popolo minuto* were depicted, in the throes of the class struggle, with a specious and sometimes sinister modernity. It has been the good fortune of Italian historiography, however, in so far as the later middle ages and the Renaissance are concerned, not to rotate on the axis

¹⁵See his study of *La Crisi delle compagnie mercantili dei Bardi e dei Peruzzi* (Florence, 1926), 146-54, 177, 185, 205.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 148.

¹⁷Florence, 1899.

of any school of economic thought. There is a marked independence in the interests and work of Italian scholars. The school of economic interpretation established in Germany by Karl Bücher and Werner Sombart stimulated much scholarship and discussion; it also did much harm, and vitiated by gratuitous complications much of the economic history of the medieval and Renaissance periods. Bücher's theory of the successive planes and periods of economic development (*Wirtschaftsstufen*), to the refutation of which Professor Alfons Dopsch has devoted much time and strength, is now but a chapter in the history of economic history, but the name of Werner Sombart, who also laboured under this misconception still looms very large, and his influence upon present understanding of capitalism and its concomitant phenomena in the later middle ages and the Renaissance is thought by some of his critics to be a pernicious one.¹⁸ But regimentation of historical thinking by a dominant school did not come in Italy, and after the first decade of the present century interest in economic history waned somewhat, and Italian historical writing reflected the increasing dissatisfaction with materialism and with egocentric positivism. Benedetto Croce was the apostle of a new idealism. A potent nationalism gradually turned the attention of many young Italian scholars from medieval and Renaissance history to the more inspiring and patriotic pursuit of writing the history and hopes of the Risorgimento, for here the historian's stethoscope marked the heart-beat of a new Italy, risen phoenix-like from the ashes of a great past, and to a pride in this historical greatness of Italy was to be added a proper confidence in her future. Fewer local histories were now written, and scholars studied the broader aspects of Italian national culture.

Further notices of books and articles on the economic history of this period may be found in an article by Professor F. L. Nussbaum,¹⁹ although he gives, unfortunately, almost no attention to Italy. An abundance of material on our subject may be found in a learned article by Professor Gino Luzzatto, on the "Study of Medieval Economic History in Italy,"²⁰ in which the Renaissance also receives attention. Nussbaum sounds, however, a wise note of caution with which we may close this section of our survey: "Forty years ago we were still involved in the attempt to establish an 'economic interpretation of history.' Since then our faith both in interpretations and in economics has waned. . . ." ²¹ We may consider a single example of the difficulties encountered in such interpretations in Renaissance history.

Some of the effects of this *bourgeois*, so-called capitalist, spirit, most often thought to arise from the economic transformation of society during this period, are glibly described as individualism, secularism, utilitarianism, materialism, and the like. These terms are all easily understandable until you make the mistake of trying to understand them. Individualism is often regarded as one of the prime characteristics of Renaissance society and the origin of several other Renaissance and modern "isms." In a learned and provocative article, however, on individualism in the Renaissance, Professor

¹⁸Cf. M. Postan, "Medieval Capitalism" (*Economic History Review*, IV, 1932-4, 212-27).

¹⁹"Economic History of Renaissance Europe" (*Journal of Modern History*, XIII, 1941, 527-45).

²⁰*Journal of Economic and Business History*, IV, 1932, 708-27.

²¹*Journal of Modern History*, XIII, 1941, 528.

Norman Nelson has shown that the term means so much or so little that many scholars have contrived, for many years, to discuss very different phenomena under the word individualism: to Jakob Burckhardt individualism, born of the Italian political scene in the late thirteenth century, was the soul and source of the new humanist culture; but Giuseppe Toffanin interprets humanism as being absolutely opposed to individualism which he associates with the medieval commune, ever anxious to cast off the restraints of political and moral authorities external to themselves; while some scholars, like J. Huizinga, have quite properly affirmed that the term is hopelessly ambiguous without a very specialized definition, and that both the middle ages and the Renaissance are far from possessing the kind of cultural homogeneity and unity which might permit of analysis with any single concept as a measuring-rod. Into the confused logomachy of what scholars have declared and denied individualism to be, I shall not go: it must suffice to refer to Professor Nelson's article on "Individualism as a Criterion of the Renaissance."²² Here the reader will find some suggested distinctions and definitions which help a bit to dispel the clouds of dust which have gathered over the battlefield of Renaissance scholarship in two generations of sometimes acrimonious dispute on this subject. Professor Roland H. Bainton, however, while trying to steer clear of too vague concepts, has described some of the religious and intellectual aspects of the transition from late medieval to early modern times in a bibliographical article called "Changing Ideas and Ideals in the Sixteenth Century."²³ Bainton's comments on the numerous works he cites are noteworthy, and his picture of the passage of Europe from Renaissance to Reformation is an instructive one.

Reference has already been made in this paper to Croce and to the effect of the new idealism upon some Italian historians. Also in the idealist tradition have been the anti-scholastic and modernist studies of the late Professor Giovanni Gentile and his followers, whose critical works on some of the chief Renaissance philosophers have been very stimulating although they have tended to put modern questions to Renaissance sources and projected contemporary ideas and problems into a rather remote past, which is probably not the proper way to reconstruct the intellectual life of Italy—or of any country—in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. To Gentile the Renaissance represents, in any event, a distinct break from the medieval period; Renaissance man felt the creative force of his own thought, felt himself of godlike power and capacity, and proceeded therewith to reconstruct the world after his own fashion. It was the craving to do this and the consciousness of the great strength necessary which became the special characteristics of the Renaissance, and which distinguish it, in Gentile's opinion, from the middle ages: hence comes "the dawn of the modern world."²⁴ For Gentile the chief representatives of this spirit are Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola, and in the thought of Marsilio, Giuseppe Saitta, a student of Gentile, has traced the final apotheosis of man.²⁵

²²*Journal of English and Germanic Philology*, XXXII, 1933, 316-34.

²³*Journal of Modern History*, VIII, 1936, 417-43.

²⁴Giovanni Gentile, "La Concezione umanistica nel mondo" (*Nuova Antologia*, LXVI, 1931, 315).

²⁵*La Filosofia di Marsilio Ficino* (Messina, 1923).

Such self-confident idealism stands, however, in strong contrast to the scholastic spiritualism of Francesco Olgiati,²⁶ to whom the underlying spirit of humanism and the Renaissance movement remained the solid core of Catholic Christianity, *il Rinascimento cristiano*,²⁷ and in his learned and thoughtful studies Giuseppe Toffanin has emphasized that Latin was the language and the culture of Lactantius, St. Jerome, and St. Augustine no less than of Cicero; that humanism was very strictly in the patristic tradition; and that the antiquity and universality of the Catholic Church were those of the ancient Roman culture so beloved of the humanists.²⁸ Humanism becomes thus but a chapter in the history of the Church. Renaissance humanism, we now perceive, is not based in any so-called individualism; individualism we should think of as springing from the great heretical movements of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; individualism is, in fact, medieval, and humanism is opposed to it! In Meister Eckhardt and his followers, in John Wyclif, and in the sixteenth-century Reformers, Toffanin sees an "anti-Roman current."²⁹ The beginnings of modern philosophic liberalism, which suggest the names of Averroes, Ockham, Nicholas of Cusa, and Pietro Pomponazzi are very improperly regarded as any part of humanism: they are anti-humanist and largely non-Italian in origin and spirit.³⁰ Humanist philosophy deals with the same problems as theology.³¹ For Toffanin the central theme of the Italian Renaissance, like the thesis of his book, is the co-eternal character of Catholicism and Latin culture: "la religione nostra è eterna e tale sarà la letteratura latina."³² To Vittorio Rossi, however, the Renaissance was neither pagan nor Christian; it was an intellectual assimilation of, and a spiritual victory over, both of them; it produced "a new balance of thought, modern thought."³³

Professor Johan Nordström has given us an interesting essay on *Moyen-âge et Renaissance* which emphasizes the medieval French origins and background of the Italian Renaissance: Nordström insists that France displayed, from the eleventh to the thirteenth century, virtually all the characteristics—economic and social, scientific and philosophical, literary and artistic—commonly regarded as first appearing in the Italian Trecento and Quattrocento.³⁴ His thesis of the French and medieval north-Alpine origins of the Renaissance, however, has been violently, indeed vituperatively, challenged by Italo Siciliano, who castigates Nordström's alleged

²⁶Olgiati has discussed the philosophical implications of his position, with special reference to Armando Carlini, Croce, and Gentile, in an article on "Idealismus u. Spiritualismus" (*Italienische Kulturberichte*, I, 1934, 121-39).

²⁷See his *L'Anima dell' umanesimo e del Rinascimento* (Milan, 1924).

²⁸Giuseppe Toffanin, *Che cosa fu l'umanesimo* (Florence, 1928); *Il Cinquecento* (Milan, 1929); and *Storia dell' umanesimo (dal XIII al XVI secolo)* (Naples, 1933). For some of Toffanin's chief emphases, see the *Storia dell' umanesimo*, 77-80 ff., 110 ff., 170, 190-1, 269 ff., and 314-16.

²⁹*Storia dell' umanesimo*, 277-81.

³⁰*Ibid.*, 270-1.

³¹Cf. Ernst Cassirer, *Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1927), 4: "Die Philosophie des Quattrocento ist und bleibt, gerade in ihren bedeutendsten und folgereichsten Leistungen, wesentlich Theologie. Ihr gesamter Gehalt drängt sich in die drei grossen Probleme: Gott, Freiheit, Unsterblichkeit zusammen."

³²*Storia dell' umanesimo*, 164.

³³"Il Rinascimento" (*Nuova Antologia*, LXIV, 1929, 137-50) and *Il Quattrocento* (Milan, 1933).

³⁴J. Nordström, *Moyen-âge et renaissance* (Paris, 1933), chap. II, IV-VIII, and especially IX.

ignorance and deficiencies with a lack of caution and objectivity which seem to me rather to exceed the failings he laments in Nordström.³⁵ Siciliano defends and seeks to illustrate the indigenous growth of the Italian Renaissance; he overstresses what he regards as the futile character of much twelfth-century classicism; and ends by reaffirming traditional views of "middle ages and Renaissance."³⁶ Although he has not done justice to Nordström and the point of view the latter represents, Siciliano's book is lively and sometimes convincing.

That much of this controversy and disagreement derives from a failure of satisfactory definition to begin with, is very obvious; it has been very obvious to the scholars concerned; but extended study of their sources has, apparently, forced upon them very different views of the relative weight to be given to the various and multiple elements they find in Renaissance culture. It is not, then, a lack of definition we suffer from; for we have had, in recent years, altogether too many definitions of the Renaissance; but, unfortunately, scholars have not yet established for us a universally acceptable definition of the Renaissance. This is inevitable as long as they are unable to reduce the huge diversity of materials with which they deal to patterns in the essential delineaments of which they are able to concur. However, for an outline of the Italian and German controversies of the nineteen-thirties on the character, meaning, and importance of the Renaissance in Italy, reference may be made to the valuable study, to which I owe much, of Professor August Buck, on "Das Problem der italienischen Renaissance in der neuesten Forschung."³⁷ I shall content myself with this reference to Buck, and not deal further with the books and articles which he has considered, for it is not desirable that I should give here very much of what is easily available elsewhere.³⁸ But no reader of Buck's study

³⁵I. Siciliano, *Medio Evo e Rinascimento* (Biblioteca della "Rassegna," XIX, 1936), 35-50.

³⁶*Ibid.*, 51 ff., 77 ff., 109 ff.

³⁷In the *Italienische Kulturberichte* (Leipziger Romanistische Studien, III. Reihe, 1937), II, 179-213.

³⁸There has been much controversy and some polemic on various aspects of "the Renaissance concept" (*der Renaissancebegriff*). The most important articles are: J. Huizinga, "Das Problem der Renaissance" (*Italien*, I, 1927-8), and in Huizinga's *Wege der Kulturgeschichte* (Munich, 1930), 89-139; M. J. Wolff, "Richtlinien der Renaissance bewegung" (*German.-Roman. Monatsschrift*, XX, 1932, 293-302); H. W. Eppelsheimer, "Das Renaissance-Problem" (*Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*, XI, 1933, 477-500); G. Weise, "Der doppelte Begriff der Renaissance" (*ibid.*, XI, 1933, 501-29); Carl Neumann, "Ende des Mittelalters? Die Legende der Ablösung des Mittelalters durch die Renaissance" (*ibid.*, XII, 1934, 124-71); R. Stadelmann, "Zum Problem der Renaissance" (*Neue Jahrbücher f. Wissenschaft u. Jugendbildung*, X, 1934, 49-63); and the well-known article by Konrad Burdach, "Die seelischen u. geistigen Quellen der Renaissance bewegung" (*Historische Zeitschrift*, CXLIX, 1934, 477-521); and Arminio Janner, "Individualismus u. Religiosität in der Renaissance" (*Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*, XIII, 1935, 357-77).

Eppelsheimer, the able biographer of Petrarch, defends the essential soundness of Burckhardt's position against Konrad Burdach's stress upon the mystico-spiritual, religious, and medieval-Christian development and character of the Renaissance movement. Janner also defends Burckhardt. Burdach's followers have sadly diminished in numbers in the last fifteen years or so. Delio Cantimori, "Sulla storia del concetto di Rinascimento" (*Annali della R. Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa*, 2nd ser., I, 1932, 229-68), discusses the history of the Renaissance concept from Cola di Rienzi and Machiavelli to Hegel, Burckhardt, and De Sanctis. Professor E. F. Jacob has summarized some of the work done in the nineteen-twenties, especially in Germany and Britain, in a paper on "The Fifteenth Century: Some Recent Interpretations" (*Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, XIV, July, 1930).

can fail to hear what he does not say: that Renaissance scholarship of the past generation has suffered severely from the bane of originality.

No generation has beheld in equal measure with our own the conquest of nature by the scientist. It is not surprising that the history of science should have become a subject of increased interest. Obviously, too, since the Renaissance has been hailed so much as the germinal period of our own culture, the historian of science was bound to investigate the extent of scientific innovation to be discerned and the significance of the intellectual "mutations," so-called, thereby induced in this much disputed period. Although some historians, most notably Professor Lynn Thorndike, have studied for its own sake the history of science from Ptolemy to Copernicus and Galileo, the mainspring of modern science is the elusive mechanism whose operation most recent historians have sought to understand. If this mainspring be a proper scientific method, the Renaissance conceived in terms of humanism at least has had nothing to do with modern science, according to an important article by Professor John Herman Randall, Jr., on "The Development of Scientific Method in the School of Padua."³⁹ Randall says flatly that many humanists, in the field of science, "seem to have displayed all the customary ignorance and futility of intellectual revolutionaries, and to have proposed new methods distinguished chiefly by the novelty of their ignorance."⁴⁰ He cautions us against the uncritical acceptance of the importance which "pioneer thinkers of the sixteenth and seventeenth century made of their own turning away from the heritage of the past,"⁴¹ and emphasizes that the preceding later middle ages contain the roots of seventeenth-century scientific advance, with "countless bonds of continuity in materials, methods, and even achievements." With ample and effective demonstration of his thesis, Randall affirms that the theory and method of modern science grew with the constant reappraisal and reconstruction of the fundamental concepts of the Aristotelian tradition, and strictly within that tradition in the two great scientific schools of the later middle ages and early modern times, the fourteenth-century Ockhamites in Oxford and Paris and the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Averroists in Padua.⁴² To add to their final achievement of "a logic of investigation and inquiry,"⁴³ there came, with the seventeenth century, the insistence upon the mathematical structure of nature, "that the principles of natural science be mathematical," and here too the dominant tradition in the advance of modern science was Aristotelian, according to Randall, and was little furthered by Renaissance Platonism, to which he believes too much importance is sometimes attached.⁴⁴ Instead of the medieval Aristotle lying like an incubus upon the growth of a truly scientific spirit, Randall concludes that "the father of modern science turns out to be none other than the Master of them that know."⁴⁵ This is by and large the conclusion to which Professor Lynn Thorndike has come in some forty years of study and research, although he has concerned himself more with the substance than the form of scientific investigation, necessarily so, since he has wished

³⁹*Journal of the History of Ideas*, I, 1940, 177-206.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 178.

⁴¹*Ibid.*

⁴²*Ibid.*, 180.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 201.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 204-5, 182-3.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 203.

to make available to his readers the contents of the vast sources he has explored.⁴⁶ He seeks, where possible, to let the sources speak for themselves.

It is customary to describe Thorndike's work as massive or magistral or monumental; however true such epithets are, they are hardly instructive; but, then, it is not easy to reduce the life's work of a great scholar to a few convenient *clichés*. There is, fortunately, no need to attempt here any succinct appraisal of Thorndike's work—were I competent to do so—for Professor Dana B. Durand has summarized for us, with some success, Thorndike's place in the historiography of medieval and early modern science.⁴⁷ Thorndike's disdain of the Renaissance is famous; indeed, it is almost notorious. In general one may say of Thorndike's volumes that they seek to illustrate the greatness of fourteenth-century science, and confirm in this respect the general contention of the late Professor Pierre Duhem, while they tend to depreciate the more illustrious reputation of the sixteenth century. Thus Richard Suiseth (Swineshead), Jacopo and Giovanni de' Dondi (dall' Orologio), John de Murs, Nicholas Oresme, and Henry of Hesse are, for examples, extolled as great scientific figures in the fourteenth century (vol. III), while certain revered names like Leonardo da Vinci, Copernicus, Vesalius, and others are subjected to a deflationary and often very effective criticism (vol. V). "These giants, whom our schoolbooks have taught us to venerate as founders of modern science, emerge from the pages of *Magic and Experimental Science* with a notable diminution of stature."⁴⁸ Thorndike has explored the ubiquitous relationships, as he has seen them, between magic and science in the later middle ages and "the period," as he calls it, "formerly known as 'the Renaissance'"; he has shown that not infrequently a basic and positive contribution to modern science has arisen from the pursuit of magical practice and experiment; and that even the greatest scientists were never "ahead of their times," that they stood upon the shoulders of their predecessors, and had their full share of concern, almost invariably, with alchemy, astrology, geomancy, and other occult interests: even Leonardo da Vinci is regarded, as a challenge to those who have so much extolled his universal genius, as "the magician of the Renaissance" (vol. V, chap. II). The task of exploring the changing social milieus in which modern science has grown, the relations between "science and society," "technics and civilization," and the like, Thorndike has, for the most part, left to others, believing that it is first necessary to know what science was in a given era before it can be related to contemporary political, social, and economic conditions.

Some historical sociologists have alleged that the spirit of calculation, the conduct of business enterprise with precise determination of profit and loss, led to the mathematical and statistical analysis of nature, and that studies in the natural sciences were quickened by the needs of the new industries, a theme emphasized by Franz Borkenau, whose book, already

⁴⁶See his *History of Magic and Experimental Science* (New York, 1934-41), III-VI. The first two volumes, published in 1923 (and reprinted in 1929), cover the period from the Roman Empire to the end of the thirteenth century. Of outstanding value, too, in any bibliography of Renaissance science, is Lynn Thorndike's *Science and Thought in the Fifteenth Century* (New York, 1929).

⁴⁷"Magic and Experimental Science: The Achievement of Lynn Thorndike" (*Isis*, XXXIII, 1942, 691-712).

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, 704.

several times referred to, forms a bridge over which one may pass from the social to the scientific history of medieval and early modern Europe. The same theme is emphasized by Von Martin and others, and is the subject of a recent paper by Edgar Zilsel, on the "Sociological Roots of Science."⁴⁹ Although Mr. Zilsel's account is admittedly sketchy (and there is some doubt in his mind as to what sociology consists in), his general contention is that modern science awaited the union, which came about 1600, of the rationalism and capacity for abstract thinking of academically trained persons with the practical interests and mechanical skills of artisans, mariners, and so on.⁵⁰ From this alliance of intellectual training and practical experience, we are told, there came with William Gilbert (d. 1603) and Galileo (d. 1642), a new age of technology, and further advances in metallurgy and engineering, cartography and navigation, gunnery and fortifications, shipbuilding, and the like, which arose to meet the needs of the new commercial and industrial society and the new centralized national states of Europe.⁵¹

A summary of current views on Renaissance science is much facilitated by the fact that a recent number of the *Journal of the History of Ideas*,⁵² has been largely given over to a symposium on the place and importance of science in the Renaissance period. The chief articles in this group are by Professors Dana B. Durand and Hans Baron; Durand tends towards a rather low evaluation of the scientific contributions of the Renaissance; while Baron, as in previous publications, takes a pro-Renaissance position. Durand has concluded, as a result of his critical analysis of the relative value of old and new elements in the history of science in fifteenth-century Italy, that "the balance of tradition and innovation in fifteenth-century Italy was not so decisively favorable as to distinguish that century radically from those that preceded it, nor to constitute the Quattrocento a unique and unrivalled moment in the history of western thought."⁵³ Science is a hard-headed subject, and some of its historians have been hard-headed too. They have tended to distrust any reference to an intangible spirit, a *Zeitgeist*, which does not lend itself easily to objective appraisal, but which is said to inform the thought and action of an age. Historians of the Renaissance period, in science as well as in other aspects of its culture, have been clashing upon the basic issue of whether there is any such thing as a really significant Renaissance spirit; whether, in fact, the concept of a *Zeitgeist* is not likely to beg any historical question put to the sources. Professor Hans Baron has stood out, however, in defence of the older view of a Renaissance spirit; in the present article he seeks, with aid from the works of Ernst Cassirer,

⁴⁹ *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVII, 1941-2, 544-62.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 548, 553-5.

⁵¹ It is disappointing to find Zilsel subscribing to the antiquated notion that the cheapness of slave labour makes the "introduction of machines superfluous" (*American Journal of Sociology*, XLVII, 559). The historians of ancient slavery have shown that slave labour was extremely uncheap, and whatever the explanations we give of the mysterious failure of the Graeco-Roman world to construct machines for industrial production, slavery should not figure very prominently among them.

⁵² Vol. IV, Jan., 1943, 1-74.

⁵³ Dana B. Durand, "Tradition and Innovation in Fifteenth-Century Italy: 'Il Primato dell' Italia' in the Field of Science" (*Journal of the History of Ideas*, IV, 1943, 20). In a somewhat similar survey of "the intellectual interests reflected in libraries of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries," Miss Pearl Kibre has rendered a similar verdict (*Journal of the History of Ideas*, VII, 1946, 297).

Leonardo Olschki, and others, to demonstrate the importance of the Renaissance *Zeitgeist* in the forward march of science.⁵⁴ He believes that the critical subjective humanistic spirit of the fifteenth century, since it detached itself, according to him, from the otherworldliness and self-debasement of the middle ages, was the indispensable prelude to the objective scientific performance of the great sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The passage is thus from some understanding of human nature to nature, Baron affirms, from man to the natural world in which he lives, and which he is most anxious to understand, for it will contribute to a deeper understanding of the self from which his speculation and his observation had begun. We deal here with intangible forces, but we should deal with them sympathetically, for to dismiss them would leave us vulnerable to the suggestion that things you cannot touch are not important.

In describing the relationship between Renaissance society and science Baron also stresses the "symbiosis" of academic theory and practical experience for the solution of problems which were arising in the new capitalist industries. Here, if we may so observe as an aside, the Renaissance concept, strictly interpreted as a rebirth of the rational spirit of antiquity, is particularly misleading, for the technological incapacity of the Graeco-Roman world, however baffling and difficult to explain, is an historical commonplace; and these new techniques which arose with the new industries have their background, like the class that brought them into being, in the rise of towns in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It is widely agreed, but not mentioned in this connection by Zilsel or Baron, that the mechanical clock, an invention of the later thirteenth century, is the source from which springs, ultimately, the precision instruments and the mechanics of modern civilization.⁵⁵

It is not possible to appraise the science of the fifteenth century without comparing and contrasting its achievements with those of the fourteenth century. Such a comparison, as Durand notes, is not favourable to the fifteenth century. In this connection the great Pierre Duhem has emphasized the originality and importance of French scientific scholarship, centred in fourteenth-century Paris, and maintained that the work of Galileo, when viewed in the light—or the dim shadows—of his predecessors, rather resembles a milestone than a great landmark in the history of science. The theory of the diurnal rotation of the earth, a highly significant emendation of the Ptolemaic cosmology, first appeared at the beginning of the fourteenth century in the University of Paris, and in Nicholas Oresme, who defended the theory later in the century, Duhem saw "a French precursor of Copernicus." Ptolemaic astronomy, however, was not herewith very much modified; the geocentric system remained by and large unchallenged; and what effect such speculations had on Copernicus it is not yet, apparently, possible to state with any confidence.⁵⁶ In the realm of physics,

⁵⁴Hans Baron, "Towards a More Positive Evaluation of the Fifteenth-Century Renaissance" (*Journal of the History of Ideas*, IV, 1943, 21-49).

⁵⁵The first-known description of a mechanical clock appears in a Basel MS (F. IV. 18) of Robertus Anglicus's commentary on the *Sphere* of Sacrobosco (described by Lynn Thorndike, "Invention of the Mechanical Clock about 1271 A.D." *Speculum*, XVI, 1941, 242-3); the best known of the early clock-makers are the Paduans Jacopo and Giovanni de' Dondi "dal' Orologio," father and son, in the fourteenth century (on whom see Thorndike, *A History of Magic and Experimental Science*, III, 386-92).

⁵⁶Durand, "Tradition and Innovation in Fifteenth-Century Italy" (*Journal of the History of Ideas*, IV, 6, 11).

too, Pierre Duhem staked out a large claim for his compatriots, and "undertook to show that the modern era of physics began with the fourteenth-century Paris scholastics, especially Buridan and Oresme, who carried out a fundamental critical revision of the peripatetic theory of motion, establishing in its stead the so-called theory of *impetus*. . . . If Duhem is right, the essential steps in preparing the way for Galileo were taken first in fourteenth-century Paris, and later in sixteenth-century Italy by followers of the Paris tradition, the Quattrocento contributing nothing of importance to this process."⁵⁷

In support of his view that the humanist emphasis upon humane and mundane values—man is a proper study for man—was beneficial to scientific progress, Hans Baron singles out, as two important aspects of his argument, the humanist assault upon astrology and upon the medieval cosmology and its implications. He mentions the attacks upon astrology, on literary and semi-philosophic grounds by Petrarch at the beginning of the Renaissance,⁵⁸ and much more importantly by Giovanni Pico della Mirandola towards the end of the fifteenth century. Throughout the whole period with which we are concerned science was seriously impeded if not dominated by the pseudo-science of astrology, which invaded the fields of medicine, law, and politics, but the subordination of man to the external influence and control of planetary conjunctions seemed to rob him of free will and creative capacities of his own. Either the independent worth of the human personality had to go, it is alleged, or the "scientific" attachment to astrology had to go. Faced with these alternatives, certain humanists abandoned astrology in opposition to its contemporary support by scientists. It seems unworthwhile to argue, in this context at any rate, the scientific character and the valuable by-products of astrology—its influence was surely more pernicious than constructive in the history of science—and so the humanist who disregarded science can, in this instance it would appear, be thought of as advancing the cause of modern science further than the contemporary scientist who disregarded humanism. This position is succinctly stated by Professor Ernst Cassirer: "The real motive for the liberation from astrology was not the new concept of nature, but the new concept of the intrinsic dignity of man."⁵⁹ Baron's conclusion to be drawn herefrom is now easily apprehended, and we can appreciate the force of his near paradox that the humanistic, non-scientific Quattrocento "may have produced such philosophic views and intellectual habits as on the one hand could foreshadow characteristics of the later 'scientific mind' and on the other in due time react on science itself."⁶⁰

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, 17. On the medieval impetus theory, however, and its relation to the Newtonian inertial concept, see Marshall Clagett, *Giovanni Marliani and Late Medieval Physics* (New York, 1941), 125-6 n., and works there cited. On Nicholas Oresme, see A. D. Menut and A. J. Denomy, in *Medieval Studies* (Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto, 1943), V, 239 ff.

⁵⁸See, *infra*, n. 92.

⁵⁹Ernst Cassirer, *Individuum und Kosmos* (Leipzig, Berlin, 1927), 125 ff., quoted by Baron, "Towards a More Positive Evaluation of the Fifteenth-Century Renaissance" (*Journal of the History of Ideas*, IV, 1943, 29): "Nicht die neue Anschauung der Natur, sondern die neue Anschauung vom Selbstwert des Menschen war das eigentliche Motiv der Befreiung" (Cassirer, *Individuum und Kosmos*, 126). (But there is here, of course, a long Christian opposition to astrology, on doctrinal grounds, that should not be overlooked.)

⁶⁰Baron, "Towards a More Positive Evaluation of the Fifteenth-Century Renaissance" (*Journal of the History of Ideas*, IV, 1943, 31).

In the sixteenth century the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic-Christian cosmology of the middle ages was dealt the same kind of a blow as, but more severe than, the cosmology of the Old Testament (and the New Testament) received when learned Christians in the later second century sought to reconcile biblical passages with the astronomical and cosmological data furnished them by Claudius Ptolemaeus.⁶¹ The antecedents of sixteenth-century cosmological speculation, however, Cassirer, Baron, and others find in the thought of the fifteenth century, and here they regard the work of Nicholas of Cusa as marking a fundamental advance upon the medieval past.⁶²

The static world of medieval thought, cast in the finite universe of Aristotle and Ptolemy and of those scholastic theologians who rejected the possibility of a plurality of worlds, was enclosed and limited by Ptolemy's concentric crystalline spheres, and from the earth as the centrum man looked out upon the divine panorama of fixed stars and planets. Man lived on a vile and corrupt earth, placed in the centre of the universe, and so far removed from the stars which were uncorrupt and incorruptible. Since the dregs and scum sank into the centre of the world, hell was situated there: "in the spatial sense the medieval world was literally diabolocentric."⁶³ A new element is said to enter into man's thinking, however, into his attitude towards both the universe and himself, when Nicholas of Cusa, albeit more mystic than astronomer, rescued the earth and man who dwelt upon it from this devastating contempt by his confident declaration that the earth was identical in nature with the noble stars, was itself a "noble star."⁶⁴ Cassirer, Baron, and others have found in such an idea of Nicholas of Cusa a manifestation of the new spirit, the background of the new science, which in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries proves to be the solvent of the whole cosmology of the middle ages. The heliostatic theory of Copernicus has decentralized the whole system (and an acentric concept will follow); Galileo can rejoice in demonstrable proofs that the earth and the stars have common physical bases; and in the pantheism of Giordano Bruno a divine spirit can permeate an infinite universe.⁶⁵ But the spirit of this so-called martyr to science is more mystical than

⁶¹F. C. Burkitt, "Pagan Philosophy and the Christian Church" (*Cambridge Ancient History*, XII, 1939, chap. XIII, 467 ff.).

⁶²Cassirer, *Individuum und Kosmos*, chap. I-II.

⁶³A. O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Cambridge, Mass., 1942), 101-2.

⁶⁴Cf. Durand, "Tradition and Innovation in Fifteenth-Century Italy" (*Journal of the History of Ideas*, IV, 12); Baron, "Towards a More Positive Evaluation of the Fifteenth-Century Renaissance" (*ibid.*, IV, 1943, 33-5). Nicholas of Cusa, *De docta ignorantia*, (Leipzig, 1932), II, 12: "tunc non est verum, quod terra ista sit vilissima et infima. . . . Est igitur terra *stella nobilis*, quae lumen et calorem et influentiam habet aliam et diversam ab omnibus aliis stellis. . . . Ita quidem Deus benedictus omnia creavit. . . ." See Cassirer, *Individuum und Kosmos*, 26 ff. (Cusanus's text cited on 28, n. 2), and cf. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being*, 104. Some of Nicholas of Cusa's statements made a notable impression upon seventeenth-century writers, but they were merely meant to be illustrative of his preachment *de docta ignorantia*; he dealt in antinomies which became, by all too constructive interpretation, scientific prophecies. Nicholas of Cusa did not, however, propound the theory of a decentralized universe, as Bruno asserted, "under his breath": he was anxious to point the difficulty of using such terms as "centre" and "circumference" in seeking to describe the universe. He does not appear to have abandoned the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic conception of the universe in any signal fashion (Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being*, 113-14). See also Lynn Thorndike, *Science and Thought in the Fifteenth Century* (1929), 133-41.

⁶⁵Baron, "Towards a More Positive Evaluation of the Fifteenth-Century Renaissance" (*Journal of the History of Ideas*, IV, 1943, 35-6).

mathematical, and "Bruno died," says R. H. Bainton, "for a Copernicus whom he did not understand."⁶⁶ Professor Lovejoy has also emphasized that Bruno "was not led to his characteristic convictions by reflection upon the implications of the Copernican theory or by any astronomical observations."⁶⁷ Bruno operated closely within the tradition of medieval theology and Platonistic metaphysics; and if he seemed to shatter medieval views of the universe, he was but pushing to a more logical conclusion than St. Thomas was willing to accept, certain implications inherent in "the intrinsically contradictory nature of the general medieval conception of God."⁶⁸

The concept of a static universe, established by God's will in the creation, centred in the earth upon which man played his part in the divine drama of salvation is thus broken down, and a new concept of a decentralized universe emerges, which rescues man and his world from the quality of their especial vileness (*vilissimum et infimum*), but none the less reduces him in its more obvious implications to insignificance in a scheme of things no longer centred in a world which he has regarded as primarily designed as the scene whereon he may work out his all-important destiny. I say primarily, because not even St. Thomas seems to have regarded the universe as existing solely as an instrument of human salvation.⁶⁹ In any event, however now the mind and will of God may be the ultimate cause of the character and the appearance of the world, the proximate causes thereof have become such natural phenomena as cold and heat, oceans and earthquakes, storms, winds, and the like, which lend themselves to scientific investigation. Man's theological roots have been torn and twisted. From a static universe we are approaching the concept of one which is dynamic and evolutionary. Everywhere is everything in flux, subject to life and death, growth and decay, and Leonardo could observe "the change of species in flora and fauna in the course of geological history."⁷⁰ But in this concept of change, in which all things flow like the river of Heraclitus, the universe is not only decentralized, it is also, in a sense, depersonalized, and a fertile field is supplied for panpsychism and pantheism, and the metaphysical bases of Christian speculation have received no inconsiderable blow. This is, I take it, one of the most important results of the science and philosophy of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. But perhaps the medieval influence is deep within all this, for in distinguishing between ultimate divine causation and the proximate natural causes of things in the phenomenal world, what have we but the Averroist doctrine of a twofold truth, which, having acknowledged the valid position of revealed theology, can thereafter pursue the study of natural philosophy without further reference to God and revelation?⁷¹

⁶⁶*Journal of Modern History*, VIII, 440; cf. Cassirer, *Individuum und Kosmos*, 197-99. In the concept of the plurality of worlds, which gained increasing acceptance among the schoolmen from the later thirteenth century on, can be traced, with some continuity, the origins of Giordano Bruno's theory of an infinite universe (see Durand, "Tradition and Innovation in Fifteenth-Century Italy," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, IV, 12, and works there cited). The important questions were whether these worlds were inhabited by rational beings, whether the latter required salvation, whether Christ had become Incarnate for them, etc.

⁶⁷*The Great Chain of Being*, 116.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, 116-21.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, 77.

⁷⁰Baron, "Towards a More Positive Evaluation of the Fifteenth-Century Renaissance" (*Journal of the History of Ideas*, IV, 1943, 46).

⁷¹Cf. Johan Nördström, *Moyen-âge et Renaissance* (Paris, 1933), 93-9.

The studies of Durand and Baron called forth comments from other scholars, which we have no room here to consider, as part of the Renaissance symposium conducted by the *Journal of the History of Ideas*.⁷² From these comments, however, I should like to note Professor Ernst Cassirer's on the "lack of clarity as to the problem and the method of investigation in the history of ideas."⁷³ The problem of the historian, he warns us, is not to prove the mere existence, in the history of science, of a considerable body of mathematical lore in a given era. The problem is to investigate the use to which this knowledge is put and the consequences that emerge therefrom. The method of the historian of science, he indicates, should not be one of extensive description, but of analysis and of comparison. Does a knowledge of mathematics, for example, provoke the curiosity of a middle age with some interest in natural philosophy or does it transform the very culture of a modern age convinced that "mathematics is not one field of knowledge, but the only valid criterion of knowledge."⁷⁴ Cassirer warns us of the futility of trying to draw a dividing line in time between the middle ages and the Renaissance, but he insists that "the character of every culture rests on the equilibrium between the forces that give it form."⁷⁵ He believes that from the fifteenth century on the balance between certain juxtaposed forces shifts slowly but steadily: the Church comes to exert less powerful sanctions than the State; theology and revealed truth give way before philosophy and natural science. The historian of ideas should not be content to prove the detached existence of ideas in a given period, but with the extent to which these ideas condition the minds of men and are basic to the culture of the period. He thus demands of the historian of ideas effective synthesis and frank evaluation. The cry for historical synthesis has long been an ardent one among medievalists and Renaissance scholars: "an hour of synthesis," said the late Professor Antoni Rubió i Lluch of Barcelona, "for a lifetime of analysis!" But in the history of medieval and Renaissance science has enough work yet been done to make possible syntheses in which we may put much confidence?

A bibliographical survey of work on the history of medieval and Renaissance science, up to a half dozen years ago, is contained in an article by Francis R. Johnson and Sanford V. Larkey.⁷⁶ They point out the need for further investigation in botany during the Renaissance period, more general studies of anatomy and physiology, and of the technical arts and inventions (mining and metallurgy, shipbuilding, and navigation, etc.). The history of mathematics has perhaps been the best handled, and Renaissance medicine has received much attention. Astronomy has also fared well: Galileo and Tycho Brahe are well provided for although research has lagged somewhat in the cases of Kepler and even Copernicus. Johnson and Larkey insist—with reference to the question we have just asked—that studies in Renaissance science are still in a fact-finding stage, and that the time has not yet come for trustworthy syntheses. Quite properly they call for the demonstration and recognition, which they hope further work will bring, of "the continuity of science [from the middle ages to the Renaissance to modern times] and the correlation of its history with the social, political,

⁷²Vol. IV, 1943, 49-74.

⁷³*Ibid.*, 49-50.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, 51.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, 55.

⁷⁶[Renaissance] Science" (*Modern Language Quarterly*, II, 1941, 363-401).

religious, and literary history of mankind." Their hopes are high, but all serious students of the Renaissance will share them.⁷⁷

Few scholars would today stand by the view that the Renaissance was based, in its most significant aspects, upon an actual rebirth of ancient Graeco-Roman culture; the name Renaissance has always been more than a bit difficult; and unfortunately there is more than a mere name at stake here, for the concept of revival which inheres in the name is bound, if the concept is unsound, to vitiate much of our thinking and writing on the Renaissance. In seeking to evaluate this concept pertinent questions have often been addressed to the humanists themselves. Professor W. K. Ferguson has described some "Humanist Views of the Renaissance."⁷⁸ He reminds us that, among the fifteenth-century humanists themselves, "the metaphor of rebirth in the literal sense of the word is rare."⁷⁹ "The Italian humanists thought of the civilization of their own day as a new and original creation, in many respects like that of antiquity but distinctly their own. It was, in all its aspects, the work of the Italian cities and their men of genius."⁸⁰ Medievalists of the last generation have tended, of course, to question how new and how original this creation was. But the Renaissance concept is by and large a modern one; much use was made of it by liberal and anti-clerical historians in the nineteenth century. The propriety of its continued use has been maintained by seeking to establish for it a new content largely discovered or constructed in the last three decades or so. The concept of Renaissance, however, has not evolved naturally from the scholarly research of most of its recent defenders; they have begun, rather, with the emotional necessity of defending it; they have been to some extent exegetes of a history revealed in the bible of Jakob Burckhardt. Renaissance apologists have produced a bulky literature in the last two or three decades.⁸¹ The historian of art has reacted most strongly, perhaps, against any considerable revision of our views concerning Renaissance culture. It is obvious that the nature of the materials with which he works should give him a deep respect for the more traditional evaluations of ancient influence upon the so-called Renaissance.

One of the best known recent apologists of the Renaissance concept is Professor Erwin Panofsky, a distinguished historian of art, whose views are set forth in an article on "Renaissance and Renascences."⁸² But even the art historian has, under assault, qualified the traditional views of

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, 374-6, 400, 401.

⁷⁸*American Historical Review*, XLV, 1939, 1-28.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, 18.

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, 28. Cf. Herbert Weisinger, in the *Papers of the Michigan Academy of Science, Arts, and Letters*, XXX, 1944, 625-38, and in *Speculum*, XX, 1945, 461).

⁸¹The Italian literature on the Renaissance, mostly in defence of the concept, is very large. Reference may be made to the following: Giovanni Gentile, "Intorno al concetto dell' umanesimo" (*Giornale Dantesco*, XXXVIII, n. s. VIII, 1937); Franco Simone, "La coscienza della Rinascita negli umanisti" (*La Rinascita*, II, 1939); (*ibid.*, III, 1940); Margherita di Giovanni, "La coscienza della Rinascita negli umanisti" (*ibid.*, III, 1940); Ardengo Soffici, "L'essenza del Rinascimento" (*ibid.*, IV, 1941); and Barna Occhini, "Medio Evo e Rinascimento" (*ibid.*, V, 1942). Of Italian scholars who wrote on the Renaissance during the nineteen-thirties, and who are not mentioned elsewhere in this paper, mention may be made of: Ettore Allodoli, Eugenio Anagnine, Vittorio Cian, Francesco Fiorentino, Eugenio Garin, Arturo Marpicati, E. F. Morando, Natalino Sapegno, A. Solmi, Giovanni Soranzo, Luigi Tonelli, Raffaele Venturi, and G. Zonta. Still interesting and valuable is the study of the late Vladimiro Zabughin (1880-1923) on the *Storia del Rinascimento cristiano in Italia* (Milan, 1924).

⁸²*Kenyon Review*, VI, 1944, 201-36.

Renaissance—and the historian of literature has tended to go along with him—to the point where it has become easy even for a medievalist to agree with him in very much of what he has to say. Now a considerable knowledge of classical art and letters is recognized to have been the possession of ninth-century Frankish Gaul and Germany, the so-called Carolingian Renaissance (or at least *renovatio*); in the later tenth and eleventh centuries we have a less important Ottonian Renaissance in Germany and Anglo-Saxon Renaissance in England; we have a proto-Renaissance in southern France and northern Italy, in the twelfth and earlier thirteenth centuries, and a proto-Humanism in northern France and England.⁸³ It is for the fifteenth century, however, that the art historian would reserve the real renaissance and the chief Renaissance; now, we are informed, comes the first real integration of classical form and content. In the fifteenth century there was no longer a feeling of actual historical continuity with antiquity,⁸⁴ as there had been in earlier renaissances, but the association with classicism had become academic, and therefore became permanent, intangible but immortal,⁸⁵ and the period marked a rebirth of some of the more important aesthetic and emotional values of antiquity.⁸⁶ But in the claims thus made for the Renaissance, as a result of the increased historical distance and detachment from the ancient past—which is said to have made possible a much more complete and objective reconstruction of antiquity in the minds of men than had hitherto been possible—the medievalist will doubtless find a good deal that is unacceptable.

Inevitably there comes to the fore in any consideration of the Renaissance the name of Francesco Petrarca. Much has been written on Petrarch in the last decade. Here I should like to note chiefly the recent study by Mr. J. H. Whitfield,⁸⁷ which reasserts in the face of much learned literature to the contrary both the unity of Petrarch's thought and the importance of his contributions to modern culture. Humanism is said to have changed, "in the short space of a hundred years, the mind of Italy and the course of European civilization . . ."⁸⁸ while humanism itself is defined for us, in simple fashion, as "an attitude of mind."⁸⁹ Mr. Whitfield displays astonish-

⁸³*Ibid.*, 208-18.

⁸⁴Cf. Wm. S. Heckscher, in the *Journal of the Warburg Institute*, I, 1938, 209, and on the feeling of continuity with the ancient past which medieval man is said to have possessed until well into the fourteenth century, see T. E. Mommsen (*Speculum*, XVII, 1942, 237-8, and refs. there cited).

⁸⁵Panofsky, "Renaissance and Renascences," 225-9.

⁸⁶It is interesting to note that this defence of the Renaissance comes from a scholar who, a decade ago, showed us that the famous late-Renaissance theme of "Et in Arcadia ego," made famous by the work of Nicolas Poussin and others—what seemed very much of a classical motif—is actually a classicized adaptation, even if the artist made it very much his own, of the medieval "Legend of the Three Living and the Three Dead" (Panofsky, "Et in Arcadia ego," in *Philosophy and History: Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer*, Oxford, 1936, 223-54, especially 232 ff.). This recalls, in some ways, old Henry Thode's contention that the influence of Graeco-Roman antiquity upon Renaissance art was an external one. However, a more objective appraisal of the influence of antiquity upon Renaissance art will be possible, we may trust, when Professor Wm. S. Heckscher is able to complete his *catalogue raisonné* (or significant portions thereof) of classical works of art which were demonstrably known and accessible to artists of the Renaissance period: Heckscher writes me that the results "may vary quite a bit from accepted views" (Letter of February 24, 1947, from the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N.J.).

⁸⁷*Petrarch and the Renaissance* (Oxford, 1943).

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, 19.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, 147.

ing courage or foolhardiness in a field where scholars have grown extremely cautious of spectacular generalizations.⁹⁰ His book is, nevertheless, skilfully and carefully written, entertaining and attractive to read, but both style and thought are marred by an excessive love of paradox. He has reason, however, to protest against the association of Renaissance culture with cruelty, and of humanism (at least early humanism) with Renaissance despotism, and he views with almost justifiable suspicion the neo-scholastics' exaltation of medieval society and their constant debasement of the Renaissance (chap. I).

Whitfield has sought to show that, if we read the works of Petrarch himself rather than those of his modern detractors, we shall find him consistent in his reflections on religion, classical studies, ethics, and politics,⁹¹ and also in his attacks upon contemporary astrology, alchemy, and medicine (chap. II). Unfortunately Whitfield has omitted several inconvenient texts, easily to be discovered in the works of Petrarch, which would cast the shadows of ignorance and insincerity over the noble picture he has drawn of his famous subject. Unfortunately for Petrarch some of his modern detractors have not neglected some of these texts, but Whitfield has neglected the opportunity to explain them away, if he can, or to reconcile them with Petrarch's alleged consistencies. While Whitfield's book is thought-provoking, it is also a bit provoking. Thus Petrarch, whose disbelief in astrology is affirmed by Whitfield, could none the less write, in speaking of his triumph at the French court as an envoy of the Visconti, that a famous astrologer had foretold in his youth that he would enjoy familiarity with almost all the distinguished princes of his day and that he would experience good will at their hands.⁹² Petrarch's attacks upon the Aristotelian and Averroistic science of his day are famous; they are quoted with approval by numerous scholars including Whitfield.⁹³ Petrarch dismisses contemporary scientists with the easy assurance that even if they

⁹⁰See the remarks on humanism in P. O. Kristeller in *Byzantion*, XVII, 1945, 353-4 ff., 366-7.

⁹¹C. C. Bayley, "Petrarch, Charles IV, and the 'Renovatio Imperii'" (*Speculum*, XVII, 1942, 323-41), has not found Petrarch's political thinking a consistent whole: Bayley emphasizes that Petrarch's political theory revolved with "chameleon-like adaptiveness" (339) around three ideals of power—Roman-republican, imperial, and Italian, which in any transference from the realm of *Ideal* to *Realpolitik* were bound to be in fundamental conflict with one another (340, 341).

⁹²Fr. Petrarcae, *Epistolae de rebus familiaribus et variae* (ed. Giuseppe Fracassetti, Florence, 1859-63), III, 184: "mihi adhuc puero famosus quidam praedixit astrologus futurum ut fere omnium principum aut illustrium, quos mea tulisset aut latura esset aetas, familiaritates eximias atque insignem benevolentiam habiturus essem . . ." (*Fam.*, lib. xxii, ep. 2). Petrarch's much-heralded disbelief in dreams seems to spring from the fact that Cicero did not believe in them: "idcirco somniis fidem habeo non magis quam Cicero ipse, propter unius sui somnii fortuitam veritatem, multorum ambagibus implicatur . . ." (*Fam.*, V, 7, 16, in Vittorio Rossi, *Edizione nazionale delle opere di Francesco Petrarca*, XI, *Le Familiari*, II, Florence, 1934, 25). Thorndike has noted some of Petrarch's other superstitions and inconsistencies (*Magic and Experimental Science*, III, 220-2).

⁹³Whitfield, *Petrarch and the Renaissance*, 43-4. The two chief texts are in Petrarch's work *De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia* (in Fr. Petrarcae Florentini . . . *Opera quae extant omnia*, Basel, 1581, 1038, 1042-3; new edition by L. M. Capelli, in the *Bibliothèque littéraire de la Renaissance*, eds. P. de Nolhac and L. Dorez, Paris, 1906, VI, 24-5, 39-40); translated by J. H. Robinson and H. W. Rolfe, *Petrarch: The First Modern Scholar and Man of Letters* (New York and London, 1914), pp. 39-42; and discussed by D. C. Allen, "Petrarch and the Physicians" (*Restarch Studies of the State College of Washington*, III, Dec., 1935, 37-47).

gave valid answers to the questions they investigated, "they help in no way toward a happy life, for what does it advantage us to be familiar with the nature of animals, birds, fishes, and reptiles, while we are ignorant of the nature of the race of man to which we belong, and do not know or care whence we come or whither we go."⁹⁴ Messrs. Robinson and Rolfe, D. C. Allen, Whitfield, and many others have expressed admiration of Petrarch for these views, but they seem to me to be no more than the rhetorical gesture of the impatient reformer in every age, including the middle age, for this kind of sermonizing, which is regarded as evidence of the modernity of Petrarch's mind, was a commonplace with university preachers at Paris in the thirteenth century. It fills the sermons of Jacques de Vitry, Gautier de Château-Thierry, Robert de Sorbon, and others, for the most part still in manuscript, but whose contents Barthélemy Hauréau and Charles H. Haskins have explored for us a bit: "Clerks busy themselves with eclipses of the sun," we read, "but fail to observe the darkening of their own hearts by sin," while "far better it is that they should seek to know themselves than to search out the nature of animals, the virtue of herbs, or the courses of the stars."⁹⁵ These platitudes seem to me no less eloquent than those of Petrarch.

Whitfield informs us that Petrarch turned in impatient disgust from medieval speculation, which dealt with abstract ideas of God and the universe, the whole somehow ever in the clouds, and not with the concrete problems of the attainment of truth and virtue which God had posed for man on earth. "Petrarch reverses the attitude" [of the medieval scholastic], declares Whitfield, "and his reversal leads directly to the humanist ideal of education, and remains in European currency until the eighteenth century."⁹⁶ This point of view is illustrated by parallels in the thought of Petrarch and Voltaire and is buttressed with quotations from Edward Gibbon. "Europe," concludes Whitfield, "owes a debt to Petrarch greater than to any single figure since. His was not only the scepticism which dissolved the Middle Ages, it was also the affirmation which made possible the modern epoch."⁹⁷ In this connection, however, it is well to recall that the humanist attack which Petrarch led against Averroism and Aristotelianism was a protest not against scholastic theology, but against the philosophic impersonalism, the naturalistic science, and the collectivist view of man and the cosmos, which obtained in the north Italian centres of Padua, Bologna, Pavia, and Venice.⁹⁸ Against this soulless science the Florentine Platonist of the next century sought a refuge for his hopes and his yearning for an individualist life after death in the teachings of the ancient Academy and even in the prevenient grace of Augustinianism. This is not a movement from medieval "scholasticism" in the sense in which we think of the term: it is actually a revolt against the beginnings of modern science and the attitudes toward life and God that its methodology tends

⁹⁴*Opera*, 1581, 1038; ed. L. M. Capelli, 24-5.

⁹⁵Robert de Sorbon and Gautier de Château-Thierry (in MSS), cited by Chas. H. Haskins, *Studies in Medieval Culture* (Oxford, 1929), 49.

⁹⁶Whitfield, *Petrarch and the Renaissance*, 105.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, 114.

⁹⁸Venice is the scene of Petrarch's attack upon the Aristotelians in the *De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia* (ed. L. M. Capelli), 39-40.

to induce.⁹⁹ This humanist protest is hardly a sign of modernity; indeed, it is almost the contrary; and upon this fact Giuseppe Toffanin, whose views we have already noted, has insisted in his historical studies of humanism.¹⁰⁰ For Toffanin's case I hold no brief, but I should find it no easier to defend Whitfield's antiquated view of *Petrarch and the Renaissance*.

Although the political history of the several states in Renaissance Italy has been largely rewritten in the last generation, and the Italian journals are full of the results of archival research, fewer traditional ideas have been challenged in studying the politics, government, and diplomacy of the period than in studying its economics, sociology, religion, science, philosophy, and the like. Nevertheless, here too claims are made for Italian innovation. Thus Professor Garrett Mattingly has traced something of the history of "The First Resident Embassies";¹⁰¹ he finds in the Italian Quattrocento the first resident ambassadors with permanent assignments and the origins of the modern system of diplomacy; and he relates the system to the game of politics being played so astutely to maintain a balance of power in the peninsula.¹⁰² The diplomatic and military relations of the five chief powers in Italy in the later fifteenth century have been analysed in detail by Professor Ernest W. Nelson, in an article on the "Origins of Modern Balance-of-Power Politics."¹⁰³ Nelson likewise pushes the policy of balance of power back to at least the middle of the fifteenth century in Italy (most notably in the fairly constant alliance of Florence, Milan, and Naples against Venice). Some scholars have attached much importance to this feature of Renaissance history, but I think it can be easily overestimated. To balance and so to immobilize the power of an opponent you cannot defeat by yourself is a reaction basic to the psychology of any individual and any community. It is a manifestation of the will to survive. Examples could easily be produced from medieval, especially papal, history, and the territorial centralization and orderly internal government said to be essential to balance-of-power politics¹⁰⁴ are found to no small extent in the Latin and Byzantine states in Greece and the Aegean islands from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, and, what is more important, the Venetians in Negroponte, the Franks in Achaea, the Greeks in Mistra, and a half dozen others played an adroit and consistent game of power

⁹⁹Cf. P. O. Kristeller and J. H. Randall, Jr., "The Study of the Philosophies of the Renaissance" (*Journal of the History of Ideas*, II, 1941, 491 ff.). D. C. Allen, *Research Studies of the State College of Washington*, III, maintains that Petrarch "was essentially a Platonist" (41), whose "final philosophy is a spiritual one" (46), to whom the materialist interests and speculations of the Averroistic Aristotelians were very repugnant. Cf. Erminio Troilo, "L'Averroismo padovano" (in *Società Italiana per il Progresso delle Scienze: Atti della XXVI. Riunione*, 1938, III, 255-86).

¹⁰⁰Whitfield casts, in passing, many aspersions upon medieval life and thought; this is not the place to answer or to challenge his observations (and with some of them I can agree). But if Whitfield is right in reminding us that "Olgiati's bland assumption that the Middle Ages and the system of St. Thomas Aquinas are one and the same thing" is a mistaken view (*Petrarch and the Renaissance*, 41, cf. 22-3), neither are the middle ages to be summarily dismissed with a few silly stories from Jacques de Vitry, Passavanti, and the *Gesta Romanorum* (*ibid.*, 24-5, 49-50, 108). Petrarch's own scorn of the middle ages is the subject of a paper by T. E. Mommsen, "Petrarch's Conception of the 'Dark Ages'" (*Speculum*, XVII, 1942, 226-42).

¹⁰¹*Speculum*, XII, 1937.

¹⁰²*Ibid.*, 432 ff.

¹⁰³*Medievalia et Humanistica*, I, Jan., 1943, 124-42.

¹⁰⁴*Ibid.*, 133.

politics and military balance from one decade to the next. I should not care to dispute the fact that Renaissance Italy furnishes a more perfect model of balance of power, within the very narrow definition we are given, than had perhaps hitherto obtained, but such diplomacy is in fundamentals a contribution of no special time and no special place; it is a response to given stimuli which operates inevitably, whether in a feudal or a *bourgeois* world, whenever such stimuli are present, and political organization makes at all possible any such response. From the medieval Greek histories of Karl Hopf, Wm. Miller, D. A. Zakythinos, and others, one would not find it difficult to trace the long histories of several alliances designed to secure a balance of power in Greece and the Morea through much of the period of Latin and Greek rivalry up to the advent of the Turk (1204-1456). I regret that very limited space forbids further discussion of this matter, but I find small value in the assertion that "in the inherent dynamics of international relations . . . Renaissance Italy foreshadowed the character of the family of modern western nations."¹⁰⁵

I have sought to sketch here a few of the leading ideas set forth, and controversies engaged in, by Renaissance scholars in the past two or three decades. I have not, however, indicated any present needs in Renaissance scholarship although they are very many. Statements of Renaissance desiderata in political and constitutional history, in science, and in literature, with reports on our progress and the lack of it in the fulfilment thereof, have been recently made by Professors Louis B. Wright, F. R. Johnson and S. V. Larkey, Don Cameron Allen, and John G. Kunstmann, in a valuable number of the *Modern Language Quarterly*.¹⁰⁶ Professors P. O. Kristeller and J. H. Randall, Jr., have collaborated in a learned bibliographical "Study of the Philosophies of the Renaissance," in the *Journal of the History of Ideas*.¹⁰⁷ Similar articles have appeared in other publications—*Journal of Modern History*, *Church History*, and the *Huntington Library Quarterly*—under the auspices of the Committee on Renaissance Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies. But these reports do not mention the work of one small group of research historians of whom I entertain much hope. In studying the impact of Greek art, literature, and philosophy upon Renaissance Italy, we must look increasingly, I think, to experts in Byzantine and Mediterranean history for new information. Although no one would question Italian primacy in the cult of Graeco-Roman antiquity in the later fourteenth century, study of the period on the broader basis of Mediterranean history, from Barcelona to Constantinople, has shown there were more lovers of the Greek—and Latin—classics than were known to Remigio Sabbadini when he wrote his classic account of *Le scoperte dei codici latini e greci ne' secoli XIV e XV*,¹⁰⁸ which has remained for over forty years one of our chief authorities for the discoveries of Latin and Greek manuscripts, and so for a knowledge

¹⁰⁵Baron, "Towards a More Positive Evaluation of the Fifteenth-Century Renaissance" (*Journal of the History of Ideas*, IV, 1943, 27).

¹⁰⁶Louis B. Wright, "Introduction to a Survey of Renaissance Studies" (*Modern Language Quarterly*, II, 1941, 355-62); Johnson and Larkey, "[Renaissance] Science" (*ibid.*, 363-401); Don Cameron Allen, "Latin Literature [of the Renaissance]" (*ibid.*, 403-20); John G. Kunstmann, "German Literature [of the Renaissance]" (*ibid.*, 421-38, especially valuable on Konrad Burdach and the much-disputed *Der Ackermann von Böhmen*).

¹⁰⁷Vol. II, 1941, 449-96.

¹⁰⁸Florence, 1905.

of their dissemination and influence. But when one speaks of the classical renaissance in the fourteenth century, Catalonia merits, but has not gained, especial prominence and respect. The late Professor Antoni Rubió i Lluch of the University of Barcelona, one of the greatest medieval historians of the past century, has produced a score of works, largely unknown on this continent, which connect Catalonia with Greece in the fourteenth century and deal at the same time with the classical renaissance in Catalonia.¹⁰⁹ I would particularly call attention to Rubió's brilliant study of "Joan I humanista i el primer període de l'humanisme català," in the *Estudis Universitaris Catalans*.¹¹⁰

We have not emphasized nearly enough, it seems to me, the political, economic, and military necessities, quite apart from aesthetic considerations, which advanced the cause of Greek culture in the Italian city-states—and in Catalonia—where the rulers and wealthy *bourgeois* had large interests in Greece and the islands of the Aegean. Pierre de Nolhac has very shrewdly observed "that it was not love of letters alone that decided the Florentine magistrates in the creation [of a chair of Greek in 1360]: Boccaccio had to convince them of the advantages which would result from the use of Greek in many of their commercial transactions and political relations."¹¹¹ At about the same date, in 1358, the Florentine family of the Acciajuoli became established in Corinth; thirty years later they were to occupy Athens; and the late William Miller has observed that few who visit the famous Certosa outside of Florence realize that it was built by the Acciajuoli from "the spoils of Greece."¹¹² Relating Byzantine affairs to Italian history will not, of course, rewrite our traditional views of the Renaissance, but it will certainly modify them, and no small part of Byzantine history in the fourteenth century must be the record of Catalan activities in the Levant.

For two or three examples of the Catalan material, to illustrate its importance in the history of an incipient aesthetic apperception of Hellenic beauty among western Europeans, we may draw upon some of the rich resources supplied us by the vast learning of Professor Rubió i Lluch. Catalan soldiers of fortune held the city of Athens for three-quarters of a century (1311-88), and their leaders came to love and appreciate the treasure they possessed. In a document of September, 1380 King Pedro IV of Aragon described the Acropolis as "the richest jewel in all the world, the like of which no other king in Christendom could match" (*lo dit castell sia la pus richa joya qui al mont [sic] sia e tal que entre tots los Reys de cristians envides lo porien fer semblant*).¹¹³ Although Don Pedro IV is doubtless giving much consideration to the Acropolis as a fortress, there

¹⁰⁹See the almost complete bibliography of Rubió's works in the *Homenatge a Antoni Rubió i Lluch* (Barcelona, 1936), I, ix-xv.

¹¹⁰No. 10, Barcelona, 1917-18, 1-107.

¹¹¹*Pétrarque et l'humanisme* (Paris, 1907), II, 158.

¹¹²*The Latins in the Levant* (London, 1908), 287.

¹¹³*Documents per l'història de la cultura catalana mig-eva*, ed. A. Rubió i Lluch (Barcelona, 1908, 1921), I, doc. CCCX; Rubió, *Los Navarros en Grecia* (Barcelona, 1886), 106-7, and doc. XX (233); Ferdinand Gregorovius, *Geschichte der Stadt Athen im Mittelalter* (Stuttgart, 1889), II, 191; Gregorovius, *Athens* (in Greek), translated by Sp. P. Lampros (Athens, 1904, 1906), II, 194; William Miller, *The Latins in the Levant* (London, 1908), 315; and Rubió, *Los Catalanes en Grecia* (Madrid, 1927), 133 ff. (The document, dated at Lérida, September 11, 1380, is from the Archives of the Crown of Aragon in Barcelona, register 1268, fol. 126.)

is a strong aesthetic ring in his description. It is, in fact, as Gregorovius and Rubió i Lluch have emphasized, the first aesthetic eulogy of the Acropolis, after almost a thousand years of silence, to come to the mind and lips of anyone in western Europe.¹¹⁴ Seven years later, when Catalan possession of Athens was being threatened by the Florentines, King John I of Aragon-Catalonia, son and successor of Pedro IV, wrote the officers and syndics of the city of Athens, in April of 1387, that they were not to think that he had forgotten such an illustrious part of his crown as was the city of Athens (*tan assenalyat membre com es aquest de nostra Corona*), and that with God's help he would make the Catalans in Athens a personal visit (*personalment visitar*), to enliven by his royal presence both the Catalans and all who served them in that historic city of the violet crown.¹¹⁵ Rubió i Lluch has often asserted with pride that King John was the first European sovereign to express a desire to visit Athens, and it is fitting that this desire, and this expression of pride in the city and its great name, should have come from Don John, *l'aimador de la gentilesa*, who is very properly depicted as a humanist, the first royal humanist in Europe, in Bernat Metge's notable work *Lo Somni*,¹¹⁶ and the King's name is linked with that of his distinguished friend Juan Fernandez de Heredia, confidant of six Popes of Avignon and Grand Master of the Knights of St. John, who was one of the first great dignitaries of Europe truly to interest himself in the history and literature of ancient—and medieval—Greece.¹¹⁷ Rubió i Lluch has hailed Heredia as "one of the first philhellenists in Europe."¹¹⁸ Heredia's interest in the Greek classics resulted in Aragonese translations, the first in any European vernacular, of thirty-nine *Lives* of Plutarch, parts of Thucydides, of Josephus (*de bello judaico*), and even of the Byzantine historian Zonaras; at his behest Aragonese versions were prepared of the Latin historical works of Eutropius and Orosius; and the Aragonese version of the Greek *Chronicle of Morea* was prepared for him, and the manuscripts proudly bear his name.¹¹⁹ For the extensive cultivation of the Latin classics—Cicero, Vergil, Ovid, Seneca, and the Latin historians—I shall do no more than refer again to the many works of Rubió i Lluch and espe-

¹¹⁴Gregorovius, *Stadt Athen*, II, 192; Gregorovius-Lampros, *Athens* (in Greek), II, 195; and see especially Rubió i Lluch, "Significació de l'elogi de l'Acropolis d'Atenes pel Rei Pere'l Ceremonios," *Homenaje ofrecido a D. Ramon Menéndez Pidal: Miscelánea de Estudios lingüísticos, literarios, e históricos* (Madrid, 1925), III, 37-56; *Estudis Universitaris Catalans*, X, 23-4; and *Los Catalanes en Grecia*, 135 ff.

¹¹⁵Rubió i Lluch, *Documents per l'història de la cultura catalana mig-eva*, II, Introd., XVI, XLI; *Homenaje a Menéndez y Pelayo* (Madrid, 1899), II, 110; *Anuari de l'Institut d'Estudis Catalans*, I, 1907, 250; *Los Catalanes en Grecia*, 150; *et alibi*. (The document is from the Arch. Cr. Aragon, reg. 1751, fol. 51v.)

¹¹⁶Rubió, *Estudis Universitaris Catalans*, X, 55-7.

¹¹⁷Cf. Ferran Soldevila, *Història de Catalunya* (Barcelona, 1934), I, 384-6.

¹¹⁸*Estudis Universitaris Catalans*, X, 31.

¹¹⁹On Heredia as a patron of Greek, Latin, and vernacular letters, see A. Morel-Fatio's introduction to his edition of the Aragonese version of the *Chronicle of Morea* (*Libro de los Fechos*) (Geneva, 1885), *passim*; Karl Herquet, *Juan Fernández de Heredia, Grossmeister des Johanniterordens* (Mülhausen i. Th., 1878), 88-92; J. D. Le Roux, *Les Hospitaliers à Rhodes* (Paris, 1913), 199 ff., 242-7; and Jose Vives, *Juan Fernández de Heredia, Gran Maestre de Rodas* (Biblioteca Balmes, 1927); on his activities in Greece and cultivation of Greek Literature, ancient and medieval, see Rubió i Lluch, *Anuari de l'Institut d'Estudis Catalans*, VI, 1915-20, 184-93; *Estudis Universitaris Catalans*, X, especially 28 ff.

cially to his study of fourteenth-century Catalan humanism in the *Estudis Universitaris Catalans*.

Almost a century and a half before the appearance of the famed Complutensian Polyglot, Simon Atumano, the humanist Archbishop of Catalan Thebes (1366-1381?), seems to have prepared, during the later years of his Theban residence, at least part of a *Biblia Triglotta* (a Bible with Hebrew, Greek, and Latin texts), which he dedicated to Pope Urban VI.¹²⁰ The career of Simon Atumano suggests one or two points of no small interest, it seems to me, in the history of Greek scholarship in Renaissance Italy. Before his translation to his Greek bishopric, Atumano had presided as bishop over the see of Gerace in southern Italy for some seventeen years, from 1348 to 1366,¹²¹ and during these years, of course, Boccaccio was searching in vain, we are always informed, for a proper tutor in Greek. To Simon Atumano Greek was a native language; he was a classical scholar; and he was apparently quite willing to teach Greek. During the winter of 1381-2, for example, after his banishment from Thebes, Simon Atumano taught Greek—in the city of Rome itself—to Raoul de Rivo, famous dean of Tongres, an important figure in his day.¹²² Simon Atumano was no obscure person; I cannot understand how Petrarch and Boccaccio overlooked him in the thirteen-fifties. He was well known to Pope Urban V (1362-1370) and to King Frederick III of Sicily (1355-1377). The Florentine humanist Coluccio Salutati (1331-1406), himself the correspondent of Petrarch and Boccaccio, had a high regard for Simon Atumano as a scholar and as a *vir multe venerationis*,¹²³ and the Republic of Venice bestowed upon him the honour of its coveted citizenship in April of 1373.¹²⁴ On fourteenth-century Catalan humanism much more could be said; Rubió i Lluch has said it; but there is no space and no necessity here to repeat it. Enough indication has been given, I trust, that Italy possessed no complete monopoly of interest in Graeco-Roman antiquity in the late Trecento.

But whether the early Renaissance was a uniquely Italian phenomenon or not, it is Italy which quite properly has received the most attention and excited the most controversy. We have observed much difference of opinion among scholars, but I daresay this period will always cause much disagreement. Its culture is too complicated to be explained by any simple formula, and very likely, as Symmachus said of divine truth, we should realize, even on the lowly level of Renaissance scholarship, that there must needs be more than one avenue of approach.

¹²⁰Giovanni Mercati, *Se la versione dall' ebraico del codice veneto greco VII sia di Simone Atumano, Arcivescovo di Tebe: Ricerca storica con notizie e documenti sulla vita dell' Atumano* (Rome, 1916), 15-17, 19, 30-2, 41, with a brief biography of the Archbishop Simon, 26 ff., and some new documents, 47 ff. What is left of the *Biblia Triglotta* is now in MS in the Library of St. Mark's in Venice.

¹²¹G. Mercati, *Simone Atumano, Arcivescovo di Tebe*, 30.

¹²²*Ibid.*, 16 and Rubió i Lluch, *Homenaje a D. Carmelo de Echegaray* (San Sebastian, 1928), 384.

¹²³*Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati* (ed. F. Novati, Rome, 1891-1911), II, 480; cf. Rubió i Lluch, *Anuari de l'Institut d'Estudis Catalans*, IV, 1911-12, 47-8; *Estudis Universitaris Catalans*, X, 44 ff.; Salutati, *loc cit.*, speaks of Simon Atumano's having translated Plutarch's *De remediis irae* from the original Greek into Latin.

¹²⁴*Regesti dei memoriali*, lib. VII, no. 696 (ed. R. Predelli, Venice, 1876-1914), III, 108.

DISCUSSION

Mr. Soward asked Mr. Setton whether he thought that the rise of fascism in Italy led to an increase of interest in history more remote from current events and whether this explained an increase of interest in the Renaissance and the Middle Ages.

Mr. Setton replied that the Italians (and Germans) were always very interested in the middle ages and the Renaissance because of the way their present was built upon this past, but he doubted whether fascism had increased in any way Italian interest in the Renaissance. He said, however, that he believed the philosophy of idealism, an important foundation of the fascist philosophy, did have a close relationship to Italian historical writing as well as to Italian politics: its transcendentalism easily leaped over inconvenient facts in medieval history and thought, and glorified unduly the novel and peculiarly Italian characteristics of the Renaissance; in the realm of politics the idealists blithely passed over the importance of economic and industrial resources, to emphasize spiritual and moral values as the chief bases of national greatness. The same philosophical attitude could thus deepen Italian pride in the past and confidence in the future, both at the same time, and in this connection Mr. Setton spoke of the works of Giovanni Gentile both as a Renaissance historian and a fascist publicist.

Mr. Dorland said that the breadth and detail of Mr. Setton's paper made one wonder about the value of courses "surveying" civilization when given to junior students.

Mr. Sage said that this paper, and also that of Mr. Trudel, marked a real advance in Canadian scholarship, for instance by getting away from Canadian history. English-speaking Canadian historians have in the past been too little interested in ideas, probably much less than their French-speaking colleagues.

Mr. Lower commented on the question of science (which Mr. Setton had omitted when reading this paper). Did this include the story of geographical discovery?

He went on to say that he had not realized that the Renaissance men never thought of themselves as taking part in a "rebirth" of classical civilization. He felt, however, that this was quite likely because men are not normally historically minded. It was therefore logical for the men of the Renaissance to regard it as a new civilization. He drew a parallel with North American civilization which he said was really a new civilization. He said that the people of the United States are not hampered by Canadian nostalgia for Europe and are making a clean-break with the past. They realize that they are building a new civilization.

Mr. Trotter said he believed that men are much more interested in the past than Mr. Lower had suggested. Men always have a keen desire to link their own lives with the past. He gave as example the development of architecture in North America. The men of colonial times built façades in the style of contemporary England. Later architectural developments continually harked back to past European styles. In the same way men of the Renaissance through contacts with material buildings must have been aware of the connection with antiquity and of the renewal of classical ideas.

Mr. Spragge referred to *Mr. Lower's* conception of "colonial mindedness." He suggested that interest in Europe is not "colonial mindedness." Co-operation with Europe is essential.

Mr. Setton said *Mr. Lower* and *Mr. Trotter* were not necessarily at odds. There is a European background in North American civilization but there are also new responses in North American civilization to material factors of the environment.

LA CONCEPTION DE L'HISTOIRE CHEZ LES HISTORIENS CONTEMPORAINS, 1923-46*

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Nous avons l'intention dans ce travail, de faire, non pas l'étude critique des systèmes ou des écoles historiques actuelles, mais simplement la revue générale des idées émises sur l'histoire. Le domaine que nous nous proposons de parcourir, comprend les principaux historiens des pays d'Europe et d'Amérique. Tout de suite, nous admettons la vanité de ce projet: plusieurs pays nous restent fermés, parce que notre connaissance des langues est limitée; plusieurs affirmations ne nous parviennent que par l'intermédiaire de traductions; le temps limité de nos recherches ne nous a pas permis d'examiner la doctrine de tous les historiens, comme nous l'aurions désiré; et, enfin, certains auteurs que nous considérons comme représentatifs, passeront sans doute incognito dans l'histoire de l'histoire.

L'an 1923, notre point de départ, est une date arbitrairement choisie, mais quelles dates ne le sont pas? Il y aurait sans doute moyen de revendiquer la légitimité de cette date. William Dunning, Frederic Harrison, Max Nordau, Ernest Lavisse viennent de mourir; Rickert, Eimmell, Pokrovsky, John Holland Rose ont à peu près fini de publier; Shotwell vient de présenter un ouvrage important sur l'historiographie¹; une traduction anglaise de Schweitzer paraît en librairie, sur la décadence de la civilisation², dans laquelle l'auteur juge la mission que l'histoire a remplie dans le passé et le rôle qu'elle doit jouer dans l'avenir: cet examen marque une étape dans l'historiographie.

Lorsque nous repassons les diverses définitions de l'histoire rencontrées ici et là chez les historiens contemporains, nous sommes portés à croire que la Cité des historiens est une cité pacifique où tout le monde s'entend cordialement, où les divergences d'opinion ne portent en somme que sur des détails. Oh! nous ne songeons pas ici à la définition scandaleuse donnée par Henry Ford: "L'histoire, c'est de la blague"³, parce que Ford n'a pas écrit l'histoire, il s'est contenté de la faire. Nous ne demandons pas non plus l'avis de Benedetto Croce, car sa réponse a de quoi nous laisser perplexes: "L'histoire, c'est l'histoire vivante; la chronique, c'est l'histoire morte; l'histoire, c'est l'histoire contemporaine, la chronique, c'est l'histoire passée⁴. . . . Il n'y a ni philosophie ni histoire de la philosophie, mais l'histoire qui est la philosophie et la philosophie qui est l'histoire et fait partie de l'histoire d'une façon intrinsèque⁵. . . . L'histoire, comme la philosophie, n'a pas de commencement historique, mais

*Les passages cités d'ouvrages anglais, italiens ou espagnols sont des traductions de l'auteur.

¹James T. Shotwell, *An Introduction to the History of History* (New York, 1922).

²Albert Schweitzer, *The Decay and the Restoration of Civilization: The Philosophy of Civilization*. Part I (trans. by C. T. Campion, London, 1923).

³Cité par A. L. Rowse, *The Use of History* (London, 1946), 28.

⁴Benedetto Croce, *History: Its Theory and Practice* (trans. by Douglas Ainslie, New York, 1921), 19. La première édition en italien parut en 1917, en librairie, et en 1912 et 1913 dans les revues. Nous citons souvent cet ouvrage qui en réalité est en dehors du champ que nous nous sommes tracé, mais la doctrine qui y est exposée est la même que celle que *History as the Story of Liberty*, et à l'avantage de renfermer des formules concises plus propres à la citation.

⁵*Ibid.*, 83.

seulement un commencement idéal ou métaphysique⁶." Nous cherchons une définition et nous trouvons en son lieu une "adéquation" de termes et une extension illimitée de l'objet. Cheyney avoue que la définition est difficile à donner, parce que l'histoire "n'est pas un mot technique proprement dit, comme la géométrie ou la chimie ou l'astronomie, mais elle est un mot à sens large, assez semblable au terme science ou philosophie ou art"⁷. Plusieurs historiens, cependant, ont formulé une définition. Collingwood, Berr et Aron en font l'étude des faits humains du passé⁸; pour Fortescue et Scott, l'histoire est le registre de tout ce que l'humanité de tous les temps a pu éprouver.⁹ Rosenstock, en admettant les définitions précédentes, marque un point de vue spécial, celui du critique: l'histoire est "la tradition corrigée et purifiée"¹⁰; Rosa fait de l'histoire "la société dans le temps"¹¹ et Hanotiaux, "le sentiment de la continuité dans le corps social"¹²; Wells, qui fera sa fortune à écrire l'histoire universelle, la définit: "l'aventure commune de toute l'humanité"¹³. Les définitions que nous venons de donner sont faites en relation avec le sujet même de l'histoire. Barnes, Shotwell, Pierce, Bassi et Powicke¹⁴ définissent doublement l'histoire comme une connaissance et comme le sujet de cette connaissance. Garraghan introduit un troisième terme: en plus des "événements du passé," du "registre" de ces événements, il propose "le procédé pour tenir ce registre," et il fait bien remarquer que l'histoire traite de l'activité humaine en tant que définie dans le temps et dans l'espace.¹⁵

En somme, exception faite des formules de Croce, nous avons des définitions qui ne comportent point de différences essentielles. On peut déjà deviner, dans l'une ou l'autre, des tendances particulières: c'est ainsi que Barnes et Rosa annoncent une histoire qui devient science sociale, Hanotiaux ne cache pas son désir de faire surtout de la philosophie de l'histoire, mais on nous laisse tout de même sous l'impression que l'histoire est quelque chose de très simple à définir et que, le point de départ, la définition, étant clairement admis par la plupart des auteurs, les dis-

⁶*Ibid.*, 181.

⁷Edward P. Cheyney, *Law in History and Other Essays* (New York, 1927), 142.

⁸R. G. Collingwood, *Human Nature and Human History* (Oxford, 1936), 7; H. Berr, *L'Histoire traditionnelle et la synthèse historique* (Paris, 1921), iii; R. Aron, *Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire: Essai sur les limites de l'objectivité historique* (thèse principale pour le doctorat ès-lettres présentée à la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Paris, Paris, 1938), 161.

⁹Sir John Williams Fortescue, *The Writing of History* (London, 1926), 1; Ernest Scott, *History and Historical Problems* (Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1925), 4.

¹⁰Eugen Rosenstock-Hussy, *The Predicament of History* (reprinted from the *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. XXXII, no. 4, Feb. 14, 1935), 3.

¹¹José Maria Rosa, *Interpretación religiosa de la historia* (Buenos Aires, 1936), 19.

¹²Gabriel Hanotiaux, *De l'Histoire et des historiens* (Paris, 1919), 1. Nous citons cet ouvrage de 1919 pour la même raison donnée plus haut sur le *History* de Croce.

¹³Wells, *The Outline of History*, cité par Harry Elmer Barnes, *History and Social Intelligence* (New York, 1926), 142.

¹⁴Harry Elmer Barnes, *History, Its Rise and Development: A Survey of the Progress of Historical Writing from Its Origins to the Present Day* (reprinted from the 1922 edition of the *Encyclopedia Americana*), 205; Shotwell, *History of History*, 2. Donald J. Pierce, *An Introduction to the Logic of the Philosophy of History* (Toronto, 1939), 6; Angel C. Bassi, *Ciencia historica y filosofia de la historia. Espiritu y metodo de su enseñanza* (Buenos Aires, 1936), 10; F. M. Powicke, *History, Freedom, and Religion* (London, 1938), 14.

¹⁵Gilbert J. Garraghan, *A Guide to Historical Method* (ed. Jean Delanglez, New York, 1946), 3.

cussions se ramèneront à des différences de méthodes. Mais si nous étudions plus à fond le problème de l'histoire, le mirage s'évanouit; les historiens s'entendaient assez bien sur la définition, mais la question de l'objet de l'histoire va bientôt les séparer.

On admet généralement que l'histoire peut avoir plusieurs objets à la fois, mais quelques-uns des objets proposés ne sont pas admis également par tous les historiens ou sont même bannis de l'histoire. L'objet traditionnel, l'étude des causes et des effets, reste prôné par le grand nombre, dont les thomistes et même des non-thomistes comme Louis Halphen.¹⁶ C'est qu'il est convenu que l'histoire a surtout pour objet les manifestations intellectuelles, l'action intelligente, ainsi que l'affirme Collingwood: "L'historien, dans son enquête du passé, fait une distinction entre ce qu'on peut appeler la surface d'un événement et l'intérieur... ce n'est pas de simples événements qu'il étudie... mais des actions, et une action est la synthèse de l'extérieur et de l'intérieur d'un événement."¹⁷ Shotwell admet le même point de vue: "L'histoire, c'est plus que des événements, c'est la manifestation de la vie, et, derrière tout événement, il y a un travail de l'esprit et de la volonté"¹⁸. Scott accepte la conception intellectuelle de l'histoire telle qu'exposée par Lord Acton ("Les idées sont l'essence de l'histoire"¹⁹) et celle de McLaughlin, que l'histoire a pour objet les idéaux et les intentions, l'esprit et le caractère de l'homme²⁰. Pour Croce, l'histoire est affaire de pensée²¹, et Powicke ne voit pas non plus comment les actes du passé pourraient être considérés en dehors de l'intelligence²². C'est pourquoi, Butterfield recommande aux étudiants de s'appliquer non à des périodes, mais à des problèmes²³. Albert Mathiez indique à l'historien comme devoir de redécouvrir les problèmes dont l'humanité a fait l'objet ainsi que les solutions qu'on a essayé d'apporter²⁴.

L'histoire ayant pour objet l'action intelligente, on s'est demandé si elle était autorisée à prononcer des jugements. Croce, qui veut cependant que l'histoire mène à l'action, s'y oppose carrément: "L'histoire ne juge jamais, mais toujours justifie"²⁵; car, pour lui, il ne s'agit pas d'évaluer des sentiments, mais de connaître les faits en eux-mêmes. Certes, il admet que les jugements sont nécessaires, mais dans le domaine de l'action seulement: ils ne peuvent s'accorder "avec la logique de l'historiographie qui n'admet pas les hommes ou les actes comme étant entièrement bons ou entièrement mauvais et rejette cette question comme une question insoluble parce que fondamentalement erronée"²⁶; ces jugements sont faux, poursuit-il, parce que, s'il est "possible de distinguer avec raison entre le bien et le mal, qui se distinguent toujours clairement et sont opposés l'un à l'autre," il est impossible de distinguer entre l'homme de

¹⁶Louis Halphen, *Introduction à l'histoire* (Paris, 1946), 15.

¹⁷Collingwood, *Human Nature and Human History*, 13.

¹⁸Shotwell, *History of History*, 315.

¹⁹Cité par Scott, *History and Historical Problems*, 17.

²⁰*Ibid.*

²¹Benedetto Croce, *History as the Story of Liberty* (London, 1938), 21.

²²Powicke, *History, Freedom, and Religion*, 6.

²³H. Butterfield, *The Study of Modern History: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered at Cambridge on 14 November 1944* (London, 1944), 25.

²⁴Albert Mathiez, *La Révolution et l'église*, viii. Cité par Frances Acomb, *Some Historians of Modern Europe: Essays in Historiography by Former Students of the Department of History of the University of Chicago* (ed. Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Andrew MacLeish, Chicago, 1942), 314.

²⁵Croce, *History: Its Theory and Practice*, 89.

²⁶Croce, *History as the Story of Liberty*, 49.

bien et l'homme qui n'est pas homme de bien; or, "toute créature humaine est à la fois bonne et mauvaise"²⁷. Pour une raison différente de celle de Croce, Spengler rejette, lui aussi, le jugement en histoire: "Lorsque nous observons la croissance d'une plante, résume Fauconnet, nous ne songeons à déclarer exacte telle phase et inexacte telle autre. . . Or, l'histoire universelle étudie des cultures, c'est-à-dire des organismes vivants. Dès lors, rien n'est faux, rien n'est vrai pour elle. Justifier une théorie, c'est pour l'historien expliquer sa fonction morphologique. A cela doit se borner son rôle. Erreur définitive, vérité éternelle sont ici, pour lui, deux notions sans emploi"²⁸. Mais la plupart des historiens que nous avons consultés, tiennent à leur droit de porter des jugements; d'ailleurs, fait remarquer Coulton, ceux qui s'opposent à ces jugements, sont les premiers à en prononcer, ils ne peuvent s'en empêcher, et "comment peut-on comprendre quelque chose si nous ne prenons pas la peine de juger?"²⁹ Garraghan dit de son côté que "si l'historien trouve l'occasion de louer ce qui peut l'être et de blâmer ce qui est blâmable, il n'y a rien dans la logique, dans la morale ou dans les exigences techniques de son art, pour l'en empêcher"³⁰. D'autres auteurs sont plus catégoriques: ils affirment que le jugement est un objet essentiel de l'histoire. "L'histoire est une morale, écrit Hanotaux . . . elle passe au crible les actes des hommes. . . Elle juge. Elle est le tribunal où siège la conscience des générations"³¹. Bassi n'est pas moins exigeant: "L'histoire, sans le jugement, ne répond pas aux fins qui lui ont été universellement assignées"³².

L'histoire a pour objet l'action intelligente, mais elle est aussi l'histoire de tout l'homme, et ceci amène les historiens à se demander si l'individu ou des groupes d'individus ou des institutions peuvent être considérés comme objets directs de l'histoire. L'individu? l'homme moyen? Abbott reproche à cet homme moyen d'avoir pris "la place de César, d'Alexandre, de Shakespeare et de Georges Washington comme acteur principal dans la nouvelle histoire": "nous avons, écrit-il, une foule d'ouvrages qui essaient de nous représenter la manière de vivre de l'homme moyen, ce qu'il faisait pour subsister, ce qu'il mangeait, buvait et revêtait"³³; Abbott s'oppose à ce qu'on mette sur le même plan les grands hommes et l'homme moyen³⁴, il accuse les biographes de rapetisser au niveau de leur moralité ou de leur intelligence les personnages célèbres de l'histoire.³⁵ Hanotaux attache une très grande importance au héros: "L'individu historique, c'est par excellence, le grand homme, le héros, le prophète, le saint, celui qui a saisi, prolongé, réalisé en son jugement, en sa volonté et en son oeuvre, les aspirations de sa génération et de son temps pour leur donner un essor nouveau. Sans le héros, pas de progrès, pas d'histoire"³⁶. Aron et Cheyney ne s'opposent pas au culte du héros,

²⁷*Ibid.*, 207.

²⁸André Fauconnet, *Un Philosophe allemand contemporain: Oswald Spengler (Le Prophète du Déclin de l'Occident)* (Paris, 1925), 70. Spengler naquit en 1880 et mourut en 1936.

²⁹G. G. Coulton, *Four score Years: An Autobiography* (Cambridge, 1943), 321.

³⁰Garraghan, *A Guide to Historical Method*, 366.

³¹Hanotaux, *De l'Histoire et des historiens*, 10.

³²Bassi, *Ciencia historica y filosofia de la historia*, 351.

³³Wilbur Cortez Abbott, *Some "New" History and Historians* (Boston, Mass., 1932), 14.

³⁴*Ibid.*, 19.

³⁵*Ibid.*, 26.

³⁶Hanotaux, *De l'Histoire et des historiens*, 35.

mais soutiennent qu'il fait l'objet de la biographie et non de l'histoire: Cheyney, en donnant pour raison que l'influence des plus grands hommes est aléatoire et dépend de l'existence de circonstances favorables³⁷; Aron, en montrant l'opposition de la biographie et de l'histoire: "Le biographe s'intéresse à l'homme privé, l'historien avant tout à l'homme public. . . . Une biographie saisit une époque en même temps qu'un homme, mais elle est orientée vers celui-ci; l'historien, en dernière analyse, vise, au-delà de l'homme, l'époque"³⁸. La classe constitue pour Pokrovsky l'objet principal de l'histoire³⁹. Seignobos veut s'occuper du peuple: "Je n'ai pas voulu, écrit-il dans une préface, limiter l'étude à la petite minorité privilégiée, décorée parfois du nom d'élite, dont les actes tiennent la plus grande place dans les documents et les ouvrages d'histoire. J'ai cherché à décrire les conditions de vie de la masse du peuple"⁴⁰. Rosenberg porte son attention sur la race.⁴¹

La politique doit-elle être considérée comme objet de l'histoire? Non, répond Barnes, parce que l'Etat n'est en somme qu'un foyer où convergent les intérêts humains, et ce sont ces derniers qui déterminent la nature et la direction de l'évolution politique: la politique doit donc recevoir moins d'attention.⁴² Oui, soutient Rowse, "la politique est l'histoire qui se fait sous nos yeux"⁴³; oui, dit encore Seignobos, parce que "la dernière guerre nous a montré avec toutes ses autres activités"⁴⁴. Et les institutions? Rowse et Seignobos attachent beaucoup d'importance à la politique, mais ils diffèrent sur les institutions: pour Rowse, l'histoire des institutions doit être, en un sens, centrale . . . c'est dans les institutions publiques que les hommes manifestent leur volonté de contrôler les événements"⁴⁵; par contre, Seignobos les laisse de côté sous prétexte qu'elles représentent "les désirs ou l'idéal des autorités plutôt que les actes de leurs sujets"⁴⁶.

L'histoire contemporaine devenant de plus en plus sociale, il est naturel de rencontrer un plus grand nombre d'historiens qui donnent à l'histoire comme objet l'évolution de la société. Fling, Rosa, Altamira et Garraghan avaient d'ailleurs défini l'histoire en fonction de cet objet⁴⁷. Barnes, que l'on considère comme le chef de la nouvelle école, résume la thèse de la façon suivante: "Le nouveau type d'historien soutient que le but de l'histoire est de donner à la génération actuelle une représentation du passé si complète et sûre qu'elle puisse en arriver à

³⁷Cheyney, *Law in History and Other Essays*, 163.

³⁸Aron, *Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire*, 81, 82.

³⁹Mikhail Mikolayevich Pokrovsky, cité de Thomas R. Hall, dans *Some Historians of Modern Europe*, 353.

⁴⁰Charles Seignobos, *Essai d'une histoire comparée des peuples de l'Europe* (Paris, 1938), vi.

⁴¹Eric Russell Bentley, *A Century of Hero-Worship: A Study of the Idea of Heroism in Carlyle and Nietzsche with Notes on Other Hero-Worshippers of Modern Times* (Philadelphia and New York, 1944), 212.

⁴²Harry Elmer Barnes, *The New History and the Social Studies* (New York, 1925), 8.

⁴³Rowse, *The Use of History*, 185.

⁴⁴Seignobos, *Essai d'une histoire comparée des peuples de l'Europe*, vi.

⁴⁵Rowse, *The Use of History*, 66.

⁴⁶Seignobos, *Essai d'une histoire comparée des peuples de l'Europe*, vi.

⁴⁷Fred Morrow Fling, *The Writing of History: An Introduction to Historical Method* (New Haven, 1920), 16; Rosa, *Interpretacion religiosa de la historia*, 18; Rafael Altamira, cité de John E. Fagg, dans *Some Historians of Modern Europe*, 3; Carraghan, *A Guide to Historical Method*, 10.

comprendre d'une façon intelligente comment et pourquoi s'est produit l'état actuel de la civilisation"⁴⁸.

L'histoire, étudiée sous le point de vue de son objet, a-t-elle un domaine bien étendu? Berr, Shotwell, Barnes, Fortescue, Powicke et Trevelyan lui assignent tout le passé humain, tout la vie même⁴⁹; Hanotaux dit plus: "Rien n'est hors de son domaine"⁵⁰.

Les qualités qu'on applique à l'histoire, sont aussi bien diverses: elles se résument dans la négation de tout caractère absolu. D'abord, l'histoire n'existe pas nécessairement. Croce nous a déjà dit qu'elle a un commencement métaphysique⁵¹ et Boyer nous explique qu'elle "aurait pu ne pas être. . . . Pour le thomisme, l'histoire est contingente. Elle est l'histoire de l'homme . . . or, le fini n'est pas nécessaire"⁵². L'histoire est une connaissance relative, parce qu'indirecte et imparfaite: "Les faits de l'histoire, écrit Garraghan, sauf ceux que nous connaissons par notre propre expérience, ne nous sont connus que d'une façon indirecte . . . le passé peut être, et en fait il l'est, étudié sous divers angles d'intérêt à mesure que les générations se succèdent"⁵³ et il signale un élément absolument incontrôlable en histoire: la volonté libre de l'homme⁵⁴. Science fort relative, soutient aussi Powicke, parce que, si la société a déjà tant de difficultés à comprendre son propre présent, dont elle fait elle-même l'expérience, comment ne pourrait-elle pas éprouver de grandes difficultés à comprendre un passé qui ne lui parvient que par des témoignages? il reste donc qu'il faut distinguer deux sortes d'histoire: l'une que l'on peut percevoir, mais comme à travers un verre fumé, l'autre que l'on ne peut connaître et dont l'objet nous restera inconnu en dépit de tous nos efforts.⁵⁵ Jusserand fait remarquer que ce n'est pas tout de faire l'examen de toutes les sources accessibles, de bien discuter les preuves, il faut accorder aussi une part considérable aux probabilités: "l'historien exhume le passé, sa tâche ressemble à celle du paléontologiste qui ne trouve pas toujours des squelettes entiers et doit oser une hypothèse sur la nature des parties qui manquent"⁵⁶. Et "de cette relativité, écrit Aron, l'histoire ne triomphe jamais complètement, parce que les expériences vécues constituent la matière de la science, et que les faits, dans la mesure où ils transcendent les individus, n'existent pas en eux-mêmes, mais par et pour les consciences. L'histoire vise un objet qui, non seulement a passé, non seulement a disparu, mais qui n'atteint à l'être que dans les esprits et change avec eux"⁵⁷. Une grande part du travail de l'historien est oeuvre subjective. Qu'il considère les faits historiques, il se trouve une présence de dates célèbres; or, dit Rosenstock, les dates célèbres ne sont pas des faits, mais des créations de la tradition; elles ont pris naissance longtemps avant l'historiographie et longtemps après les événements dont elles rap-

⁴⁸Barnes, *The New History*, 15.

⁴⁹Berr, *L'Histoire traditionnelle*, 3; Shotwell, *History of History*, 5; Barnes, *The New History*, 17; Fortescue, *Writing of History*, 1; and George M. Trevelyan, *The Present Position of History: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered at Cambridge, October 26, 1927* (London, 1927), 9.

⁵⁰Hanotaux, *De l'Histoire et des historiens*, 27.

⁵¹Croce, *History: Its Theory and Practice*, 181.

⁵²Charles Boyer, *Il concetto di storia nell'idealismo e nel tomismo* (Rome, 1935), 58.

⁵³Garraghan, *Guide to Historical Method*, 4, 5.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 149.

⁵⁵Powicke, *History, Freedom and Religion*, 21, 22.

⁵⁶*The Writing of History* by Jean Jules Jusserand, Wilbur Cortez Abbott, Charles W. Colby, and John Spencer Bassett (New York 1926), 20.

⁵⁷Aron, *Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire*, 272.

pellent le souvenir, événements dont le sens avait complètement échappé aux spectateurs⁵⁸. Subjective encore, parce que l'historien doit nécessairement faire un choix parmi les faits qui se présentent à sa connaissance, de sorte, dit Halphen, que "l'ordre de grandeur de ces faits est, en un sens, fonction de la nature du sujet abordé"⁵⁹. Et l'historien ne peut jamais savoir s'il a pris connaissance de tous les faits, même lorsqu'il travaille sur un sujet précis et déterminé⁶⁰, car une partie seulement de l'histoire, et une bien petite partie, suivant Croce, nous est accessible.⁶¹ Il s'ensuit, écrit Trevelyan, que "le travail des historiens consiste largement à se corriger et à se compléter les uns les autres"⁶². Les autorités traditionnelles se trouvent par le fait même assez malmenées; Collingwood refuse de croire aux autorités: "Pour l'historien, il ne peut y avoir d'autorités, parce que ces auteurs ainsi nommés autorités attendent un verdict que lui seul peut prononcer"⁶³. Collingwood admet cependant que l'historien doit reconnaître dans ses prédécesseurs une certaine autorité dans la mesure même de son incompetence.⁶⁴ Faut-il, pour ces raisons s'abandonner au scepticisme absolu? Clark admet les déficiences de l'histoire, mais il fait aussi remarquer qu'après tout il existe des faits⁶⁵. Garraghan affirme contre Croce que ce serait "folie de conclure tout de suite qu'on ne peut rien connaître d'une façon absolue du passé"⁶⁶. L'historien, écrit Butterfield, "ne réussit pas toujours à fournir l'explication totale de la vie des hommes, mais quand il y réussit, alors nous pouvons considérer telle épisode comme faisant partie d'un monde qu'on peut comprendre et dont toutes les parties ont des relations entre elles"⁶⁷: au lieu d'aboutir au scepticisme, on trouve donc au contraire la satisfaction de l'esprit.

Le problème de la relativité de l'histoire en soulève immédiatement un autre qui lui est connexe: l'histoire est-elle un art ou une science? est-elle l'un et l'autre? Plusieurs historiens répondent qu'elle est l'un et l'autre. Hanotaux l'affirme: "Il y a l'histoire pour l'histoire, comme il y a l'art pour l'art. . . L'historien est un conteur, mais un conteur vrai. Cette condition de l'histoire fait d'elle une science"⁶⁸. Shotwell et Jusserand admettent la même dualité: l'histoire est recherche (c'est la science), elle est narration (c'est l'art)⁶⁹, "dans la recherche des faits et dans l'examen de la vérité, l'historien doit être aussi consciencieux que l'homme de science. Dans la présentation, il doit être un artiste, et un vrai"⁷⁰. Temperley n'est pas moins explicite: "La science et l'art ont trouvé, de nos jours, dans l'histoire, un terrain commun"⁷¹. C'est qu'on admet

⁵⁸Rosenstock-Hussy, *The Predicament of History*, 2.

⁵⁹Halphen, *Introduction à l'histoire*, 59.

⁶⁰Fortescue, *The Writing of History*, 68.

⁶¹Croce, *History: Its Theory and Practice*, 51.

⁶²Trevelyan, *The Present Position of History*, 7.

⁶³Robin G. Collingwood, *The Historical Imagination: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered before the University of Oxford on 28 October 1935* (Oxford, 1935), 10.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*

⁶⁵G. N. Clark, *Historical Scholarship and Historical Thought: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered at Cambridge on 16 May 1944* (Cambridge, 1944), 20.

⁶⁶Garraghan, *A Guide to Historical Method*, 73.

⁶⁷Butterfield, *The Study of Modern History*, 20.

⁶⁸Hanotaux, *De l'Histoire et des historiens*, 13, 14, 15, 18.

⁶⁹Shotwell, *History of History*, 6-11.

⁷⁰Jusserand, *The Writing of History*, 3, 4.

⁷¹Harold Temperley, cité de Margareta Faissler, dans *Some Historians of Modern Europe*, 504.

généralement qu'en plus de l'élément dit scientifique qui repose dans les faits et dans la méthode, il y a un autre élément, l'âme de l'histoire, et cet élément, nous dit Rowse, "ne peut être exprimé que par l'art"⁷². Gustave Lanctôt attribue à l'art le même rôle nécessaire dans la dualité de tâches qui s'imposent à l'historien: "La première, celle qui est primordiale, est de faire entrer dans l'histoire la vérité documentaire et la complexité des faits sociologiques. La deuxième, c'est de projeter dans cette histoire un sentiment et un éclat qui s'accordent aux grands événements"⁷³. Sarton applique à l'histoire, pour les mêmes raisons, le mot célèbre appliqué à la médecine: "le plus ancien des arts et la plus jeune des sciences"⁷⁴.

Mais il y a les partisans de la science! Quelques-uns d'entre eux, tout en restant en faveur de l'art, souhaitent que l'histoire s'en libère peu à peu: "De l'art, si elle retenait quelque chose, écrit Berr, ce serait une intuition de la vie, un certain don de pénétration psychologique qui peut aider l'historien, qui peut faire la vocation d'historien, mais qui ne supplée pas à la méthode scientifique"⁷⁵. Cheyney désire aussi que l'histoire garde certaines qualités de l'art, mais il veut que ce soit à cause même de la matière traitée, et non d'après un plan délibéré de l'auteur.⁷⁶ A ceux qui seraient tentés de se montrer trop catégoriques sur cette question,⁷⁷ Scott rappelle que la mesure est une vertu nécessaire: "C'est là une de ces questions auxquelles on ne répondra jamais d'une façon définitive, et il n'est pas à souhaiter non plus qu'on y puisse répondre. Il y a un ton de défi dans la prétention du brillant historien qui veut que l'histoire soit une science, ni plus ni moins"⁷⁸. Du Plessis admet que l'histoire est une science, mais en laissant entendre qu'il n'a guère confiance en son caractère scientifique: "L'histoire, écrit-il, qu'un illustre démolisseur, au siècle dernier, traitait de pauvre petite science conjecturale, ne l'est ni plus ni moins que les autres"⁷⁹. Elle lui semble donc, en un sens, conjecturale, et c'est là aussi l'avis de Spengler: "Il s'agit en somme de découvrir une hypothèse et une méthode susceptibles de dégager pour la première fois, la logique et l'histoire. Au premier moment du système, l'existence d'une pareille logique est en quelque sorte postulée par l'auteur. Il a pleinement conscience que la démarche ultérieure de sa pensée implique un acte de foi initial. Mais n'est-ce pas ainsi que toutes les sciences nouvelles sont nées?"⁸⁰ Pour Cheyney, l'histoire est une science, mais d'un certain point de vue, c'est-à-dire qu'elle l'est, non pas à cause du sujet sur lequel elle s'exerce, mais à cause de la façon dont elle s'exerce⁸¹. C'est à peu près l'opinion de Collingwood: selon lui, l'histoire ressemble à la science, mais elle en diffère dans ses objets: la science porte sur l'abstrait, sur l'universel, elle est indifférente au temps et à l'espace, tandis que l'histoire

⁷²Rowse, *The Use of History*, 111.

⁷³Gustave Lanctôt, "Les Historiens d'hier et l'histoire d'aujourd'hui" (*Canadian Historical Association, Annual Report*, 1941, 14).

⁷⁴Georges Sarton, "Le Sentiment du passé" (*Extrait d'Isis*, VIII, no. 27, Feb. 3, 1925, 398).

⁷⁵Berr, *L'Histoire traditionnelle*, 29.

⁷⁶Cheyney, *Law in History and Other Essays*, 165.

⁷⁷Barnes, *History: Its Rise and Development*, 206.

⁷⁸Scott, *History and Historical Problems*, III. Parlant de Bury qui énonça cette affirmation en 1903.

⁷⁹Joachim du Plessis de Grenedan, *Le Sens de l'histoire: La caravane humaine* (Paris, 1932), 3.

⁸⁰Fauconnet, *Spengler*, 6.

⁸¹Cheyney, *Law in History and Other Essays*, 153.

porte le concret, sur l'individuel et s'intéresse au lieu et au moment⁸². Aron admet que l'histoire soit une science, mais non une science naturelle: "Le passé humain pénètre de tout autre manière le présent, que le passé naturel. Celui-ci n'est pas conservé dans le présent, en tant que passé, nous expliquons les formes actuelles par une histoire hypothétique. . . Dans la nature, il n'existe de documents que par hasard. Au contraire, l'homme crée des documents par essence, puisqu'il prolonge l'action de son corps par des outils, et que toutes ses créations révèlent immédiatement l'activité d'un esprit."⁸³ Shotwell voit entre l'histoire et les sciences naturelles cette différence fondamentale, que les sciences naturelles "considèrent les phénomènes du point de vue de l'espace, l'histoire du point de vue du temps"⁸⁴. Pour Millar, cette différence est que les naturalistes n'étudient les phénomènes que de l'extérieur, alors que les historiens les étudient de l'intérieur⁸⁵. L'histoire est une science, mais une "science imparfaite"⁸⁶, écrit Sée: "La grosse difficulté pour l'histoire-science, c'est qu'elle n'a pas seulement à étudier les sociétés humaines à un moment donné, à l'état statique, mais elle doit, et c'est même sa principale tâche, les étudier à l'état dynamique, dans leur évolution à travers le temps"⁸⁷. Sée apporte d'autres raisons: "L'histoire ne peut établir aucune relation mathématique, par conséquent ne peut formuler aucune loi, au sens propre du mot. Et aussi, l'expérimentation, qui a donné une assise si forte aux sciences physico-chimiques et même biologiques, lui est interdite. . . Elle ne peut user de l'observation directe." Enfin, "il n'y a de science que du général; c'est seulement au général que s'appliquent les lois. Or, l'histoire enregistre (et enregistre surtout) des faits individuels, des événements qui ne se répètent pas"⁸⁸. Sée a cependant trouvé un moyen de faire de l'histoire une vraie science sans passer par les lois du général: "La méthode comparative peut efficacement nous aider à distinguer ce qui, dans l'évolution, est l'effet d'événements particuliers, fortuits, et ce qui, au contraire, est la conséquence de phénomènes permanents, d'un caractère général. En un mot, elle est le meilleur procédé qui permette de donner des faits historiques une explication satisfaisante pour l'esprit, c'est-à-dire de faire de l'histoire réellement une science"⁸⁹. D'autres historiens admettent que l'histoire peut fort bien être considérée comme science, sans qu'on exige d'elle de porter des lois: Garraghan dit qu'elle remplit les quatre conditions nécessaires à la science: un *système de vérités générales* portant sur un *sujet défini* et établi par une *méthode efficace*⁹⁰. Fling admet, lui aussi, tout simplement, que si la science est toute "connaissance organisée", en ce cas l'histoire est une science.⁹¹ Bassi exige comme condition essentielle, que l'histoire puisse comprendre des lois, et il ajoute qu'elle remplit cette condition: elle a des lois qui expli-

⁸²Collingwood, *The Historical Imagination*, 5, 6.

⁸³Aron, *Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire*, 33.

⁸⁴Shotwell, *History of History*, 317.

⁸⁵Cité de F. X. Millar Moorhouse dans Guilday, "The Catholic Philosophy of History" (*Papers of the American Catholic Association*, ed. by Peter Guilday, with an introduction by Ross J. S. Hoffman, III, 1936, 89). Comprend des travaux lus à l'assemblée de 1933 par des personnalités religieuses.

⁸⁶Henri Sée, *Science et philosophie de l'histoire* (Paris, 1928), 235.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, 135.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, 118, 119.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, 143.

⁹⁰Garraghan, *Guide to Historical Method*, 38.

⁹¹Fling, *The Writing of History*, 20.

quent le passé, le présent et même l'avenir.⁹² Mais si l'histoire a des lois, les a-t-on découvertes? Du Plessis en donne deux: "Deux lois déterminent donc l'ordre de marche de la Caravane: une loi d'organisation, d'action et de réaction politiques, en vertu de laquelle les groupements humains s'agrègent et se subordonnent les uns aux autres pour former des Etats indépendants et qui font l'histoire; une loi de transformation cyclique et de continuité occillante, en vertu de laquelle l'histoire n'est qu'un enchevêtrement ininterrompu d'alternances et de recommencements"⁹³. Cheyney en donne six, la première seule est certaine, la loi de continuité; les autres ne sont pas encore démontrées: une loi de mutabilité, une loi d'interdépendance des individus, des classes, des tribus, des nations; une loi de démocratie, une loi de progrès moral⁹⁴.

La tendance socialisante de certains historiens a soulevé un autre problème: l'histoire est-elle ou peut-elle être une science sociale? Aron répond négativement: "La sociologie se définit, ou bien par opposition aux autres sciences sociales; ou bien par opposition à l'histoire. . . . La sociologie se caractérise par l'effort pour établir des lois (ou du moins des régularités ou des généralités) alors que l'histoire se borne à raconter des événements dans leur suite régulière. . . . Nous appelons sociologie la discipline qui dégage des relations entre les faits historiques"⁹⁵. Fling est même avis: "La sociologie ne peut être la science de l'histoire; c'est la science naturelle de la société. L'historien aussi bien que le sociologue étudient les faits sociaux du passé, mais pas toujours les mêmes faits sociaux. . . . Leurs méthodes sont logiquement différentes parce que leurs fins sont différentes"⁹⁶. Sée rejette à son tour l'identité de l'histoire et de la sociologie, parce que "celle-ci ne tient qu'un compte relativement sommaire de l'espace et du temps; elle se propose surtout de décrire les faits sociaux et l'organisation des sociétés in abstracto. Au contraire, pour l'histoire, les deux facteurs, temps et espace, sont essentiels"⁹⁷. Une autre catégorie d'auteurs reconnaissent que la sociologie ne s'identifie pas avec l'histoire, mais en fait partie, Berr est de ceux-là: "La sociologie, bien loin d'être mise à part, doit être intégrée dans l'histoire scientifique, dans la synthèse. Mais elle n'est qu'un des points de vue de la synthèse. Elle étudie un des éléments constitutifs de l'histoire, l'élément proprement social"⁹⁸. Enfin, nous avons le groupe de la "nouvelle" histoire, celui qui identifie histoire et science sociale. Pour Clark, "en somme, il n'y a pas de distinction logique entre l'histoire et la science sociale"⁹⁹. Rowse qui soutient que l'étude de la société et de son évolution apporte à l'histoire son explication essentielle¹⁰⁰, est aussi catégorique que Clark: "L'histoire est essentiellement le registre de la vie des hommes en société, dans leur environnement géographique et physique. . . . C'est là le terrain de l'histoire; ce n'est pas l'arrière-plan: c'est l'histoire même"¹⁰¹. L'objet de la "nouvelle" histoire, Barnes le trouve dans l'homme en tant que membre des groupes sociaux en état d'évolution, et c'est, selon lui, ce qui facilite

⁹²Bassi, *Ciencia historica y filosofia de la historia*, 152.

⁹³Du Plessis, *Le Sens de l'histoire*, 38.

⁹⁴Cheyney, *Law in History and Other Essays*, 10-22.

⁹⁵Aron, *Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire*, 190.

⁹⁶Fling, *The Writing of History*, 17.

⁹⁷Sée, *Science et philosophie de l'histoire*, 130.

⁹⁸Berr, *L'Histoire traditionnelle*, 26, 27.

⁹⁹Clark, *Historical Scholarship and Historical Thought*, 15.

¹⁰⁰Rowse, *The Use of History*, 16.

¹⁰¹Cité *ibid.*, 66.

la compréhension et l'analyse de l'histoire d'une façon plus scientifique¹⁰². Pour Rosa, histoire et science sociale ne font qu'un: "Un fait historique est toujours un fait social. . . . L'histoire sans la sociologie ou la sociologie sans l'histoire, sont des abstractions inutiles"¹⁰³. Et lorsque Garraghan définit l'histoire, on peut se demander si c'est l'histoire qu'il définit ou la sociologie¹⁰⁴.

Et puisque nous parlons de science, il nous faut aussi songer à l'érudition. Des historiens savants, ou qui aspiraient à le devenir, ont choisi l'érudition. Nous connaissons l'école des historiens, dits historisants, qui n'osent écrire un mot sans l'appuyer sur une référence et qui se gardent bien de faire des commentaires. Le théoricien de cette école moderne, serait la Roumain Xénopol, et son représentant le plus autorisé, Louis Halphen. Du Plessis leur dit: "Savoir vraiment, c'est connaître les causes pour prévoir les effets. Il est étrange que des savants le dédaignent ou s'en effraient. Croient-ils donc que le vrai moyen de connaître la cathédrale, ce soit de tâter, de cuber, d'analyser chaque pierre, d'aligner des statistiques, d'échafauder des calculs? Ne prenons pas pour fin le moyen, si fécond soit-il. . . . Découvrir la vérité sur un événement, un peuple, une époque, ce n'est pas la fin de l'histoire; pas plus que ce n'est celle de la physique de vérifier une formule ou une hypothèse"¹⁰⁵. Spengler accuse l'érudition aussi bien que la philosophie d'avoir été des "maîtresses d'erreur"¹⁰⁶; chacun des érudits "s'est borné à mettre au premier plan et en pleine lumière la portion du monde antique qui répondait le mieux à ses fins personnelles"¹⁰⁷. Hanotaux se montre sévère pour l'érudition: "L'érudition n'est pas l'histoire: elle n'en est ni le corps ni l'âme; tout au plus le squelette. . . . L'abus du document est une paresse qui ne justifie pas tant d'orgueil"¹⁰⁸. Pour Croce, l'érudition n'est pas l'histoire et n'est pas non plus la rivale de l'histoire, elle n'engendre pas l'histoire mais elle est engendrée par elle¹⁰⁹.

Plusieurs historiens ont donc voulu élever l'histoire à la dignité de science. Le Bon l'élève davantage et en fait "la synthèse de diverses sciences"¹¹⁰. Par Hanotaux et Collingwood, l'histoire se voit conférer un rang plus élevé encore au-dessus de la science: "Raconter l'homme à l'homme, pour améliorer l'homme, tel est le devoir que l'historien s'est tracé. Et que peut la science alors? L'histoire atteint des sommets que la science ne connaît pas"¹¹¹.

Et la philosophie? Si l'on maltraite l'art au profit de la science, si l'on veut chasser tout ce qui n'est pas science ou science sociale, la Philosophie doit bien s'attendre un peu d'être bannie à son tour, de la République, et d'une façon beaucoup plus sérieuse que l'avait été la Poésie par l'aimable Platon. Et bannie, elle l'a été. Spengler veut supprimer jusqu'au dernier vestige de philosophie en histoire, car, pour lui, l'histoire est un organisme vivant, et la vie ne peut être comprise par des notions métaphysiques; la

¹⁰²Barnes, *The New History*, vii; Barnes, *History and Social Intelligence*, 271.

¹⁰³Rosa, *Interpretacion religiosa de la historia*, 18, 30.

¹⁰⁴Garraghan, *Guide to Historical Method*, 10.

¹⁰⁵Du Plessis, *Le Sens de l'histoire*, 7, 8, 9.

¹⁰⁶Fauconnet, *Spengler*, 62.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸Hanotaux, *De l'Histoire et des historiens*, 25, 26.

¹⁰⁹Croce, *History: Its Theory and Practice*.

¹¹⁰Gustave Le Bon, *Bases scientifiques d'une philosophie de l'histoire* (Paris, 1931), 12.

¹¹¹Hanotaux, *De l'Histoire et des historiens*, 43.

métaphysique s'oppose à l'histoire comme la Vérité au Fait¹¹². Weber la bannit, lui aussi: "Toute intrusion de concept métaphysique dans la recherche positive est de nature à compromettre la fécondité et la validité des résultats"¹¹³. Même idée chez Powicke: "Un historien, en tant qu'historien, n'est pas supposé être un philosophe ou un théologien, et même s'il est tout cela en même temps, on ne doit pas attendre de lui, comme historien, qu'il permette à des considérations philosophiques ou théologiques de s'interposer entre lui et l'étude de l'évidence historique"¹¹⁴. Lorsque Berr expose sa nouvelle conception de l'histoire, une synthèse historique, il a soin de préciser: "Et c'est tout autre chose que de la philosophie"¹¹⁵.

Il reste encore heureusement des historiens qui n'ont pas perdu la foi en la philosophie. Rosenstock réclame la philosophie comme un guide nécessaire: "L'historien, convaincu qu'il doit étudier le passé de la même façon que le géologue étudie la terre, se perd inévitablement à travers le labyrinthe de milliards de faits possibles. Et c'est là le moindre mal. La philosophie est au moins un guide"¹¹⁶. La philosophie est plus que cela, nous disent les thomistes: elle est essentielle à l'étude de l'histoire. Millar écrit que dans l'histoire humaine, le facteur fondamental et celui qui conditionne tout, c'est la nature humaine et que, par conséquent, l'interprétation de cette nature humaine tombe sous le contrôle, non de l'histoire ou de la méthode historique, mais de la philosophie¹¹⁷. Aron exprime la même thèse d'une façon plus concise: "La théorie de l'histoire se confond avec une théorie de l'homme, c'est-à-dire une philosophie"¹¹⁸. Elle est essentielle à l'histoire pour l'application du principe de causalité, "afin d'unir, écrit Aron, par des rapports valables universellement, les phénomènes éparpillés, et c'est la philosophie qui fournit cette notion"¹¹⁹. Selon Garraghan, elle est nécessaire et pour l'application du principe de causalité, dans les causes éloignées, et pour fournir le principe d'induction historique dans l'étude des causes prochaines que l'histoire traite en tant que science particulière¹²⁰. Quand à Croce, il ne rejette pas la philosophie, il ne l'adopte pas non plus comme telle, il la transforme, il la confond avec l'histoire, ce qui revient à l'adopter comme telle ou à la rejeter. . . . Il explique son point de vue de la façon suivante: "La pensée historique a joué un vilain tour à cette respectable philosophie transcendantale, comme aussi à sa soeur jumelle, la religion transcendantale, dont l'autre est la forme raisonnée ou théologique; elle lui a joué le tour de la transformer en histoire, en interprétant tous ses concepts, toutes ses doctrines, toutes ses disputes et même ses désaveux sceptiques et désolés. . . . Ainsi, la pensée historique a fait justice de cette domination séculaire de la philosophie transcendantale et en a indiqué la fin par une nécrologie qui lui convenait. . . . La philosophie elle-même a cessé de jouir d'une existence autonome, parce que sa prétention à l'autonomie se fondait sur son caractère métaphysique. Ce qui l'a remplacé, n'est plus de la philosophie,

¹¹²Bentley, *A Century of Hero Worship*, 209.

¹¹³Raymond Aron, *Essai sur la théorie de l'histoire dans l'Allemagne contemporaine: La philosophie critique de l'histoire* (thèse complémentaire pour le doctorat ès lettres présentée à la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Paris, Paris, 1938), 222.

¹¹⁴Powicke, *History, Freedom, and Religion*, 5.

¹¹⁵Berr, *L'Histoire traditionnelle*, 27.

¹¹⁶Rosenstock-Hussy, *The Predicament of History*, 5.

¹¹⁷Guilday, *Catholic Philosophy of History*, 91.

¹¹⁸Aron, *Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire*, 267.

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, 160.

¹²⁰Garraghan, *Guide to Historical Method*, 146, 147, 350.

mais de l'histoire, ou, ce qui revient au même, de la philosophie en autant qu'elle est de l'histoire et de l'histoire en autant qu'elle est de la philosophie"¹²¹. Vous saisissez facilement. . . .

Le sort de la philosophie de l'histoire est lié, d'une certaine façon, à celui de la philosophie. Je dis d'une façon, parce que, si l'on bannit la philosophie, il est évident que la philosophie de l'histoire devra, elle aussi, disparaître; et si la philosophie garde ses droits, il n'est pas sûr que la philosophie de l'histoire voit les siens, par le fait même, sauvegardés. Le problème de la philosophie de l'histoire, nous prévient Rowse, est un problème fort délicat: "Il y a un grand danger à trop théoriser sur l'histoire; toute théorie particulière de l'histoire est sujette à se présenter sous une forme trop schématique: ceci se produit quand les événements humains se trouvent contraints de pénétrer dans le cadre gênant que leur impose le théoricien"¹²²; mais il ajoute qu'il est aussi dangereux de se laisser tomber dans ce qu'il appelle "le trop commode fauteuil du scepticisme historique". Problème délicat, et aussi problème difficile, Sée en donne la raison: "Tout le monde s'accorde sur ce qu'il faut entendre par philosophie des sciences. Il n'en est pas de même pour la philosophie de l'histoire, sans doute parce que l'histoire est beaucoup moins bien définie que les mathématiques ou la physique et aussi parce qu'elle n'a que très tardivement été considérée comme une science"¹²³. Diverses définitions ont été tentées. Sée considère la philosophie de l'histoire, comme s'exerçant surtout à des synthèses: "C'est spécialement à la philosophie de l'histoire qu'il appartiendra de montrer le lien qui peut exister entre l'histoire et les diverses sciences de l'homme. . . . Cette philosophie de l'histoire ne doit-elle pas être considérée comme le prolongement direct de l'histoire soi-disant 'empirique'?"¹²⁴ Aron se fait de la philosophie de l'histoire une conception différente: "Notre livre conduit à une philosophie historique qui s'oppose au rationalisme scientiste en même temps qu'au positivisme. . . . Philosophie historique qui est aussi en un sens une philosophie de l'histoire, à condition de définir celle-ci, non pas comme une vision panoramique de l'ensemble humain, mais comme une interprétation du présent ou du passé rattachée à une conception philosophique de l'existence"¹²⁵. Pringle se rapproche davantage de la notion traditionnelle, lorsqu'il donne à la philosophie de l'histoire la mission de considérer l'histoire de l'humanité comme un seul tout et de montrer, en autant qu'il est visible, le plan qui semble en voie de se réaliser si l'on envisage la suite des événements comme un tout¹²⁶. Et nous avons la thèse thomiste. Le Père Boyer, l'un des plus illustres représentants du thomisme contemporain, l'exprime comme suit: "L'histoire de l'homme est certainement l'histoire de l'homme. Mais l'histoire, en tant que telle, n'est pas seulement l'oeuvre de l'homme, mais en même temps l'oeuvre de Dieu. . . . Comme les êtres, elle est l'oeuvre de Dieu. L'auteur de l'univers doit soutenir dans l'existence ce qu'il a créé. . . . La philosophie de l'histoire, c'est la *Cité de Dieu* de saint Augustin, ou le *Discours sur l'histoire universelle* de Bossuet, ou la *Science nouvelle* de Vico. . . . C'est ici qu'il convient

¹²¹Croce, *History as the Story of Liberty*, 34, 35.

¹²²Rowse, *The Use of History*, 105.

¹²³Sée, *Science et philosophie de l'histoire*, 13.

¹²⁴*Ibid.*, 240, 241.

¹²⁵Aron, *Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire*, 13.

¹²⁶A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, *The Philosophy of History* (from the Proceedings of the British Academy, London, XI, 3).

de justifier le concept de la philosophie de l'histoire, et d'affirmer l'existence d'une direction de l'histoire, voulue et opérée par la Divine Providence, par le moyen des causes secondes, et en particulier dans l'histoire humaine, par le moyen de l'activité libre des hommes"¹²⁷. Du Plessis, dans une langue moins philosophique, exprime la même idée: "C'est dans le détail qu'est toute l'horreur de la condition humaine. Elevons-nous: si l'histoire a un sens, c'est que Dieu la mène. Il ne peut la mener qu'à lui. . . . Avec saint Augustin, Bossuet, de Maistre. . . . Chesterton, ou Berdiaeff, il faut reconnaître dans l'unité de l'histoire, à côté, au-dessus des faits humains, d'autres faits, divins ceux-là, et qui les dominent, les pénètrent, les saturent de divinité. . . . Le progrès est le signe de Dieu"¹²⁸.

La nécessité d'une philosophie de l'histoire, quelle qu'elle soit, ne manque pas d'avocats. Mais d'une façon générale, on en fait la preuve par les conséquences néfastes qui s'ensuivraient de son absence. C'est ainsi que Rosa publie un ouvrage où il démontre que la religion est l'âme de la société, et que cette société, au cours de l'histoire, progresse ou entre en décadence selon que les hommes conservent ou ne conservent pas la notion du divin¹²⁹. Mgr Schrembs affirme que l'histoire de l'humanité est incompréhensible sans la notion de Providence; il admet sans doute l'importance des interprétations économiques, sociologiques ou politiques de l'histoire, mais à condition que ces interprétations restent soumises à la fin surnaturelle de l'humanité¹³⁰. Schweitzer fait remarquer que, depuis le jour où la philosophie a renoncé à son devoir (celui d'édifier l'histoire sur une théorie de l'univers), "l'idéal moral sur lequel repose la civilisation, a erré par le monde, comme un mendiant qui ne trouve plus de refuge"¹³¹. Sans philosophie de l'histoire, écrit Hanotaux, l'histoire "ne serait qu'un vain bruit de mots"¹³². Aron, toujours métaphysicien, établit d'une façon strictement logique, la nécessité d'une philosophie de l'histoire: "La série de l'ensemble du passé . . . appelle une double justification, celle des notions qu'elle utilise pour interpréter et estimer les sociétés et les cultures, celle de l'état qui marque l'achèvement provisoire de l'évolution. Double justification qui constitue l'objet traditionnel de la philosophie de l'histoire"¹³³.

D'autres auteurs, par contre, sont incertains et n'osent se prononcer. "Milyukov ne croit pas en la philosophie de l'histoire qu'il veut remplacer par des lois spéciales, mais sans en être convaincu"¹³⁴. Altamira est encore moins catégorique: "parlant un jour de la philosophie de l'histoire, il ne savait pas s'il existait réellement une fin vers laquelle tendrait l'humanité aveuglément, sous l'instigation, peut-être, de quelque chose de transcendantal à elle-même. Il se plaignit de ce que la plupart des historiens avaient esquivé les véritables problèmes de la philosophie, mais il n'essaya nullement de formuler un système qui pourrait définir et prédire la marche de l'humanité"¹³⁵. Garraghan dit à peu près la même chose de Charles E. Beard, avec cette différence que Beard considère comme nécessaire un

¹²⁷Boyer, *Il concetto di storia*, 64-75, *passim*.

¹²⁸Du Plessis, *Le Sens de l'histoire*, 14, 57.

¹²⁹Rosa, *Interpretacion religiosa de la historia*, 9.

¹³⁰Guilday, *The Catholic Philosophy of History*, 4.

¹³¹Schweitzer, *The Decay and the Restoration of Civilization*, 6, 80.

¹³²Hanotaux, *De l'Histoire et les historiens*, 40.

¹³³Aron, *Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire*, 289.

¹³⁴Paul Nikolayevich Milyukov, cité de Rogers P. Churchill dans *Some Historians of Modern Europe*, 332.

¹³⁵Cité de John E. Fagg, dans *Some Historians of Modern Europe*, 15.

cadre quelconque, une brillante conception de l'histoire universelle; mais Beard ne veut pas se prononcer, il refuse de donner le nom de philosophie de l'histoire à l'hypothèse qu'il émet, à savoir que le cours de l'humanité est orienté vers la démocratie collectiviste¹³⁶. Sée distingue entre finalisme et téléologie: pour lui, la téléologie, ce sont les destinées futures de l'humanité, objet traditionnel de la philosophie de l'histoire: or, "ce sont des questions que peut agiter le métaphysicien, mais qui ne sont pas de notre domaine, précisément parce qu'elles ne sont susceptibles ni de démonstrations ni d'explication rationnelle"¹³⁷. Shotwell et Cheyney l'expulsent carrément de l'histoire¹³⁸, parce que le domaine de l'histoire, c'est la Cité de l'homme et non la Cité de Dieu. Pringle lui reproche d'être partielle, de n'avoir jusqu'ici étudié que la civilisation de l'Occident, d'avoir gardé trop longtemps un certain relent d'égoïsme national et religieux¹³⁹. Spengler l'accuse d'être volontairement arbitraire¹⁴⁰. Clark ne croit pas non plus en elle, parce que, selon lui, l'histoire n'a pas de plan et que d'ailleurs il ne peut être question de connaître un plan dans l'histoire prise comme un tout¹⁴¹. Mais le plus illustre détracteur de la philosophie de l'histoire est peut-être Croce; il a pris plaisir, semble-t-il, à accumuler contre elle une litanie d'accusations et d'épithètes. "La philosophie de l'histoire, écrit-il, est tout aussi contradictoire que la conception déterministe sur laquelle elle se base et à laquelle elle s'oppose. . . . Le vide de pensée logique est comblé par le *praxis*, ou ce qu'on nomme sentiment, qui alors apparaît comme de la poésie par réfraction spéculative"¹⁴²; elle est "un procédé de création et de supposition", elle est "une conséquence de l'impuissance mentale," elle est incohérente, les philosophies de l'histoire "sont les produits hybrides de la philosophie abstraite et de l'historiographie dénaturée"¹⁴³. Et pour qu'on le comprenne bien, il dit clairement sa pensée: "La philosophie de l'histoire est morte"¹⁴⁴. Voilà terminée son oraison funèbre.

Certains adversaires de la philosophie de l'histoire s'aperçurent tout de même qu'il manquait quelque chose à l'histoire. Berr déclare donc: "La philosophie de l'histoire ne peut être éliminée sans être remplacée. Elle doit être remplacée par la synthèse historique. La philosophie de l'histoire se présente sous une double forme: tantôt elle est la théorie qui étudie la nature et le rôle de l'histoire; tantôt elle est la construction qui explique le passé. La synthèse, en histoire, doit se constituer de même, sous la double forme de la théorie qui guide le travail et de la construction explicative"¹⁴⁵. Croce comble le vide avec l'idée de liberté: "La liberté est l'éternelle créatrice de l'histoire et elle-même elle est le sujet de toute histoire. Comme telle, elle est d'une part le principe qui explique le cours de l'histoire, et d'autre part, l'idéal moral de l'humanité"¹⁴⁶. Seignobos essaie de trouver une solution facile dans le hasard: "Les uns, dit-il en

¹³⁶Garraghan, *Guide to Historical Method*, 370. Garraghan renvoie à un travail de Beard reproduit dans l'*American Historical Review* de 1934.

¹³⁷Sée, *Science et philosophie de l'histoire*, 149, 150.

¹³⁸Shotwell, *History of History*, 315; Cheyney, *Law in History and Other Essays*, 162.

¹³⁹Pringle, *The Philosophy of History*, 5, 16.

¹⁴⁰Fauconnet, *Spengler*, 55.

¹⁴¹Clark, *Historical Scholarship and Historical Thought*, 10, 11.

¹⁴²Croce, *History: Its Theory and Practice*, 68, 69.

¹⁴³Croce, *History as the Story of Liberty*, 35, 301.

¹⁴⁴Croce, *History: Its Theory and Practice*, 81.

¹⁴⁵Berr, *L'Histoire traditionnelle*, iii.

¹⁴⁶Croce, *History as the Story of Liberty*, 59.

parlant des changements produits dans les conditions de vie, ont été l'effet de la rencontre, dans un même moment, de séries de faits indépendants, appelée hasard ou accident, qui constitue les événements historiques, guerres, invasions, révolutions, réformes, dont l'origine est souvent l'initiative des individus"¹⁴⁷. Aron lui répond: "Une succession d'événements fortuits ne constitue pas une histoire. . . . L'histoire se caractérise moins par les rencontres que par l'orientation d'un devenir"¹⁴⁸. Ailleurs, la philosophie de l'histoire est remplacée par la lutte de classe, comme chez Pokrovsky¹⁴⁹, par la lutte de race, comme dans le *Mythe* de Rosenberg. Toutes ces philosophies de l'histoire (et la négation de toute philosophie de l'histoire est encore une philosophie), qui s'opposent les unes aux autres, doivent-elles nous conduire au scepticisme? Shotwell nous rassure; pour lui, les diverses interprétations de l'histoire ne représentent pas une faiblesse ou une anarchie; au contraire, chaque nouveau système aide au progrès général, et le nouveau système, au lieu d'être une loi absolue, n'est qu'une suggestion, qu'un nouveau stimulant en vue d'autres recherches, et nous aboutissons alors à une interprétation historique des interprétations elles-mêmes¹⁵⁰.

Enfin, une dernière question se pose aux historiens: quelle peut être et quelle doit être l'utilité de l'histoire? En certains milieux, et peut-être par conviction professionnelle, on attache à l'histoire une importance de tout premier ordre. Elle est essentielle, nous dit Croce, pour rappeler l'humanité à elle-même, pour maintenir et développer la civilisation¹⁵¹. "Sans l'histoire, affirme Scott, l'humanité ne serait qu'une agglomération éphémère d'unités, nées aujourd'hui et oubliées demain"¹⁵²; Rowse dit de son côté: "Supprimez le sentiment de l'histoire, et la vie humaine, comme nous la connaissons, deviendrait impossible à penser; l'histoire est aussi fondamentale que cela à nos vies"¹⁵³. Halphen nie catégoriquement que l'histoire ait à nous fournir des leçons de morale et de civisme¹⁵⁴, mais à côté d'une négation, il est facile d'aligner plusieurs témoignages en faveur de l'utilité morale de l'histoire: Hanotaux, Jusserand, Scott, Hart, Sarton, Butterfield, Cheyney, Rowse, tous admettent que l'histoire est riche de leçons morales, qu'elle est la grande éducatrice de l'entendement, qu'elle est une école d'expérience¹⁵⁵. Et puisque l'histoire pouvait être considérée comme une école d'expérience, on a voulu en faire le guide du présent. Halphen, qui refusait à l'histoire toute utilité morale ou civique, s'en sert comme d'une clef pour comprendre le présent¹⁵⁶. Et Garraghan écrit: "Une situation d'aujourd'hui peut ressembler à l'une d'hier assez pour faire de l'expérience de celle-ci, un guide pour manier d'une façon convenable une situation présente"¹⁵⁷. Temperley et Bassi sont à peu près

¹⁴⁷Seignobos, *Essai d'une histoire comparée*, v.

¹⁴⁸Aron, *Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire*, 20.

¹⁴⁹Cité de Thon R. Hall, dans *Some Historians of Modern Europe*, 353.

¹⁵⁰Shotwell, *History of History*, 334.

¹⁵¹Croce, *History as the Story of Liberty*, 199.

¹⁵²Scott, *History and Historical Problems*, 7.

¹⁵³Rowse, *The Use of History*, 30.

¹⁵⁴Halphen, *Introduction à l'histoire*, 74.

¹⁵⁵Hanotaux, *De l'Histoire et des historiens*, 43; Jusserand, *The Writing of History*, 29; Scott, *History and Historical Problems*, 2-5; Basil Henry L. Hart, *Why Don't We Learn from History?* (London, 1944), *passim*; Sarton, "Le Sentiment du passé," 393; Butterfield, *The Study of Modern History*, 13; Cheyney, *Law in History and Other Essays*, 173; Rowse, *The Use of History*, 16.

¹⁵⁶Halphen, *Introduction à l'histoire*, 8.

¹⁵⁷Garraghan, *Guide to Historical Method*, 14.

du même avis¹⁵⁸. Cheyney renchérit sur eux en soutenant même que le passé, c'est la seule clef du présent¹⁵⁹. Cependant, Fieldhouse n'accepte pas le jugement de ces historiens: selon lui, il est aussi dangereux de se servir l'histoire pour en tirer des leçons pratiques et pour expliquer le présent, qu'il était dangereux autrefois de se servir de l'histoire pour enseigner la religion ou le patriotisme¹⁶⁰.

Certains partisans de l'utilité pratique de l'histoire, vont plus loin: l'histoire servirait à comprendre d'avance l'avenir: Bassi, Halphen et Cheyney l'envisagent sous ce point de vue¹⁶¹. Hanotaux écrit: "L'historien a pour tâche de reconnaître l'opinion dans le passé et de la guider dans l'avenir. . . . Par définition, l'historien est un voyant, voyant dans le passé et voyant dans l'avenir. Ainsi se détermine sa fonction"¹⁶². Spengler est d'avis qu'on peut tout au plus s'en tenir à des suggestions¹⁶³, et c'est à peu près le sentiment de Fieldhouse¹⁶⁴.

On a surtout attaché beaucoup d'importance à l'enseignement de l'histoire, comme un excellent moyen d'entraîner les facultés de l'esprit¹⁶⁵, et cet entraînement doit préparer à l'action: Hanotaux veut que l'histoire "tende sans cesse à l'action. . . . Ecrire l'histoire, c'est agir; et c'est pourquoi, il convient que l'historien soit homme d'action"¹⁶⁶. Et cet idéal d'Hanotaux s'est réalisé au Canada, tout particulièrement, où, l'expliquait longuement Saunders, l'histoire a été et est encore un instrument d'action française¹⁶⁷. L'histoire est nécessaire, non seulement pour rendre plus fructueuse l'action personnelle de l'individu, comme l'affirme Bassi¹⁶⁸, mais aussi pour soutenir l'action morale et politique, suivant Croce¹⁶⁹: "le cas de Churchill, dit là-dessus Rowse, nous fournit l'argument le plus fort qu'il soit en faveur d'une éducation à base d'histoire"¹⁷⁰. Scott et Trevelyan qui admettent que l'histoire doit conduire à l'action et l'enrichir, se refusent cependant à admettre qu'on en fasse un instrument de propagande¹⁷¹. Rowse s'est même intéressé à l'utilité pratico-pratique de l'histoire, en énumérant les avantages qu'elle peut présenter comme carrière dans l'enseignement, dans le Service civil et dans la diplomatie¹⁷². Hanotaux a simplifié finement tout ce débat, quand il a

¹⁵⁸Cité de Margareta Faissler, dans *Some Historians of Modern Europe*, 512; Bassi, *Ciencia historica y filosofia de la historia*, 12.

¹⁵⁹Cheyney, *Law in History and Other Essays*, 28.

¹⁶⁰H. N. Fieldhouse, "The Failure of the Historians" (*Canadian Historical Association, Annual Report*, 1942, 53).

¹⁶¹Bassi, *Ciencia historica y filosofia de la historia*, 12; Halphen, *Introduction à l'histoire*, 8; Cheyney, *Law in History and Other Essays*, 27.

¹⁶²Hanotaux, *De l'Histoire et des historiens*, 38.

¹⁶³Fauconnet, *Spengler*, 10.

¹⁶⁴Fieldhouse, "The Failure of the Historians," 63.

¹⁶⁵Shotwell, *History of History*, 195, 196; Scott, *History and Historical Problems*, 120-1; Butterfield, *The Study of Modern History*, 27; Rowse, *The Use of History*, 156; Bassi, *Ciencia historica y filosofia de la historia*, 289; Altamira, cité de John E. Fagg, dans *Some Historians of Modern Europe*, 3; Trevelyan, *The Present Position of History*, 4.

¹⁶⁶Hanotaux, *De l'Histoire et des historiens*, 41.

¹⁶⁷R. M. Saunders, "History and French-Canadian Survival" (*Canadian Historical Association, Annual Report*, 1943, 25).

¹⁶⁸Bassi, *Ciencia historica y filosofia de la historia*, 12.

¹⁶⁹Croce, *History as the Story of Liberty*, 198.

¹⁷⁰Rowse, *The Use of History*, 15.

¹⁷¹Scott, *History and Historical Problems*, 141; Trevelyan, *The Present Position of History*, 5.

¹⁷²Rowse, *The Use of History*, 4-6.

écrit: "Une faculté qui s'exerce cause un plaisir. . . . L'histoire a donc une autre raison d'être que son utilité"¹⁷³.

Les idées qu'on a émises sur les différents problèmes de l'histoire, présentent donc une diversité considérable, et cette diversité le paraîtrait encore davantage, sans aucun doute, si nous avions poussé notre enquête plus loin, si nous avions consulté plus d'ouvrages et dépouillé toutes les revues d'histoire, comme nous aurions dû le faire: mais notre travail était soumis à des limites restreintes. Des historiographes ont tenté de partager toutes ces idées diverses en systèmes qui pourraient donner une idée plus claire du champ de l'histoire; Barnes a classé en huit groupes les historiens contemporains¹⁷⁴, mais il est obligé de reconnaître que certains historiens ne conviennent que bien artificiellement à tel groupe qu'on leur détermine, ou que d'autres doivent être classés dans deux ou trois groupes en même temps, de sorte qu'à la fin le panorama n'est pas beaucoup plus précis et que nous sommes beaucoup moins certains. Il faudrait ajouter sans cesse des subdivisions aux groupes, et le nom même sous lequel on étiquette le groupe principal peut soulever des discussions sans fin. N'en est-il pas de même dans toutes les sciences qui ne sont pas des sciences techniques? Et c'est peut-être, pour l'histoire, la condition même de son progrès.

¹⁷³Hanotaux, *De l'Histoire et des historiens*, 13.

¹⁷⁴Barnes, *The New History*, 31.

THE EARLY EDITORIAL POLICY OF THE *MONTREAL WITNESS*

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A CENTURY ago this January, the second volume of the *Montreal Witness* appeared.¹ Dutifully conscious of the favours of "Divine Providence," the editor John Dougall, was encouraged to persevere in his task. The *Witness* described itself as an experiment new in Canadian journalism, an effort to combine the newspaper, the book review, and the magazine and "to invest the whole with a distinctly-marked Christian, but not sectarian character."² Two further peculiarities were introduced: Commercial advertising was declined, although the *Witness* was prepared to notice "gratuitously . . . [that] . . . which we think likely to advance the best interests of the people, whether temporal or eternal." Secular politics were banished by the declaration that the *Witness* had no politics but the politics of the Kingdom of Heaven, a statement capable of several interpretations, as the future was to show. For a decade, from 1846 to 1856, the *Witness* continued as a weekly newspaper, and the purpose of this study is to trace its development, with particular reference to its editorial policy, in this period.

Inseparable from the *Witness* was its editor, John Dougall. A Paisley man, he was a splendid example of God's Scot, whose duty was to convert the heathen and reform his ways. The better to accomplish this end, Dougall established himself in Montreal in 1825, where he became successively a bookseller and a publisher. The name of his shop, "The Religious and Useful Book Store," tells a good deal, and the titles of his newspapers, the *Canada Temperance Advocate*, and the *Montreal Witness* tell a good deal more. Throughout his long life (Dougall died in harness in 1886), he was upheld by a remarkable religious faith.³ This consideration provides the index to his character, and to the formidable journals of which he was the directing force. Originally a Presbyterian, Dougall abandoned the historic, but exceedingly cantankerous, St. Gabriel's for Zion Congregational Church.⁴ Denominational affiliations, however, meant little; his cardinal principles probably owed nothing to the churches he frequented. It will be recalled that the *Witness* described itself as "Christian, but not sectarian." Innumerable changes were rung on this theme, "acknowledging no sect but Christianity," and "[the] great truths of the Gospel . . . the principles of the Reformation." The frankness of the latter statement requires little comment. A strong predestinarianism, and an equally strong sense of individual responsibility formed the core of Dougall's Christianity. These coloured all his thinking—political, social, and economic, as well as religious. Political democracy or social equality did not exist, since both, as in the instance of salvation, were for the elect.

¹The full title was the *Montreal Witness*. For the purpose of brevity, the shorter, and more popular form, the *Witness*, is used in the text of this study. The printer was J. C. Beckett; the format, eight pages of four columns.

²*Montreal Witness*, Dec. 14, 1846.

³There is no biography of John Dougall. Extensive sketches appeared in the Montreal press on his death in August, 1886.

⁴R. Campbell, *History of the Scotch Presbyterian Church in St. Gabriel Street* (Montreal, 1887), 443 ff.

The attributes of the Godhead which appear to have appealed most strongly, were those of judgment and vengeance, and his numerous invocations were addressed to "the Lord," "Jehovah," or "Divine Providence." The Bible was the foundation of this sinewy and muscular faith. Moral fervour and gloom were present in about equal quantities. A hard faith, yet it reinforced Dougall's belief in his own righteousness, and enabled him to devote a long and stormy life to plucking the mote from his neighbour's eye.

I

Designed so patently for one-way traffic, inevitably the *Witness* figured in violent collisions. At one time or another, it collided with Anglicans, Roman Catholics, and a host of other religious bodies. Controversies with Catholics were the most sustained, although not necessarily the most bitter. Polemics against "Rome" began with the first number of the *Witness* when about half of the editorials and leading news items contained matter offensive to Catholics. During the decade under examination, the newspaper kept up the attack. Finally, Catholics were driven to reply in kind, and, in 1850, there appeared the *True Witness*, whose title suggests an effective use of irony on the part of the editor, George Edward Clerk.⁵ Clerk, like Dougall, was a Scot, so for over twenty years, Montreal was enlivened by the spectacle of the expatriates engaged in the national pastime of theological controversy. The *Witness's* battle with the Church of England was more complicated. For the "Crown and Altar" Anglican, such as, for example, the Reverend John Bethune, rector of Montreal, or his rustic ally "priest" Reid of Frelisburg, the *Witness* had no pity. To the "converted" Anglican, i.e., the Low Churchman, it was prepared to extend toleration. Accordingly, it always had a good word for "our Evangelical contemporary," the *Berean* the Low Church organ of the Diocese of Quebec. At one point, the *Witness* tried to stir up strife within the Church by setting the parochial clergy and laity against the bishops.⁶ A series of letters appeared signed "An Episcopalian," but as the style and matter were characteristically Dougall, the anonymity was probably transparent.

The violent denominational bias of the *Witness* has been commented on frequently. It is, in fact, one of the few things generally known about the newspaper. Without in any way denying the bias, it is legitimate to suggest that it sprang from several sources. It may be admitted at once that Dougall was incapable of understanding a form of Christianity, sacramental in character, corporate in ideal, and laying stress on historical continuity. Hence, his criticism of Anglicanism and of Roman Catholicism on doctrinal grounds. A critical examination of the *Witness* discloses that other arguments were advanced. As the chief beneficiary of the Clergy Reserves, the Church of England represented an endowed and privileged body, in which the *Witness* professed to see the survival of Old World feudalism. Similarly, the Catholic Church was attacked because it was the Church of the French Canadians and the Irish, whose rising social

⁵*Vide* Agnes Coffey, "George Edward Clerk, Founder of True Witness" (Canadian Catholic Historical Association, *Report*, 1934-5); Agnes Coffey, "The True Witness and Catholic Chronicle" (Canadian Catholic Historical Association, *Report*, 1937-8); and M. P. Reid, "Arrivals and Survivals" (Canadian Catholic Historical Association, *Report*, 1941-2).

⁶*Montreal Witness*, Jan. 23-Mar. 22, 1852.

position challenged the security of the Anglo-Canadian *petite bourgeoisie*. That group, of course, provided the *Witness* with its clientele. "There is," declared an editorial of disarming modesty, "no people . . . among whom there is a greater amount of talent than among the inhabitants of Canada speaking the English language . . . they are mostly immigrants, and it is not the least energetic, enterprising, and enlightened who emigrate."⁷ It was to these "intelligent operatives" and "sturdy yeomanry" that the *Witness* catered. Shrewd politics dictated emphasis on points of similarity within this group, and, even more, on points of difference with those outside. Social and economic status, and race, along with religion, were the real determinants of the *Witness's* editorial policy.

The racial bias merits further consideration. The divine mission of the Anglo-Saxon peoples was one of the *Witness's* most sustained themes. This doctrine might do well enough for Canada West, but it failed completely to recommend itself in Canada East. The presence of a French-Canadian majority and of an increasing Irish minority produced a racial pattern which was the reverse of simple. Yet the solution advanced by the *Witness* was simplicity itself. As far as French Canadians were concerned, it was conversion. Dougall was a force in the French-Canadian Missionary Society, and, as will be seen later, featured the activities of the Society in the columns of the *Witness*. The history of the Missionary Society lies outside the scope of this paper, but it may be said briefly that its purpose was to make Protestants of the French Canadians by means of a programme of evangelization and education. There were probably other motives, as Robert Campbell, the historian of St. Gabriel Street church indicated unwittingly: "The Rebellion of 1837-8 rather shocked the British portion of the population, and wakened many to perceive that there was no safety for the state, except what was founded on intelligence." The selfishness of the scheme, which was patently more concerned with the safety of one group than the salvation of the other, was lost on the *Witness*, which presented it with unwearied regularity.⁸ The rise of French-Canadian political parties and party leaders was followed closely, but always with this great end in view. Thus the Liberals of the Lafontaine school were described as good men, except for their religion. The Rouge party was warmly approved; whether the approval was as warmly reciprocated may be doubted. The attitude of the *Witness* towards the Irish was revealing. The mass migration of 1847 and the years following brought them to the newspaper's attention in a most dramatic form. So long as Irishmen were prepared to starve at home, the *Witness* was quite reasonable. When, however, the famishing and pest-ridden immigrants began to flood into Montreal, the *Witness's* line changed. An editorial of midsummer, 1847, entitled pointedly, "The Roman Catholic Irish," concluded as follows: "to this Continent, the hive . . . [Ireland] . . . has poured forth her swarms, and even America, free as she deemed herself, is in danger of having the natives of her soil swamped at every election, and being hampered . . . by . . . ignorant men, who will not learn, and who are at the beck of a designing priesthood. . . . Canada is in the same position." In the early eighteen-fifties, the Irish became the *Witness's* principal *bête*

⁷*Ibid.*, Mar. 2, 1846.

⁸For example, "Thoughts for the French Canadian People," a series of six editorials commencing Oct., 1849.

noir. Such untoward events as the Gavezzi disturbances acted characteristically on the *Witness*. It made a sustained effort to throw the complete blame for the tragedy of June 9, 1853 on Irish Roman Catholics, conveniently blind to the fact that the newspaper itself had been the chief instigator in bringing Gavezzi to Montreal.⁹ Public men were approved or disapproved on the strength of their association with the Irish. Francis Hincks was held up to particular execration, partly because of his very close connection with the Montreal Irish community; Robert Baldwin was almost given up when it was discovered that he had attended a requiem for Daniel O'Connell in St. Patrick's church. Attitudes such as these were not calculated to win friends, and it must be admitted that the *Witness* left no solution for the perplexing problem of Canadian racial harmony.

II

In a more positive sense, the *Witness* was active in furthering what it regarded as worthy causes. A marked feature of Montreal life in the eighteen-forties, was the multiplication of societies for the promotion of desirable ends. Thus, there was a Bible Society, a Sunday School Union, a Religious Tract Society, an Evangelical Alliance, a Temperance Society, and even a society for the establishment of universal peace. The annual meetings of all these bodies received ample coverage in the *Witness's* news columns, and their reports provided ammunition for innumerable editorials. With both the organization and the purpose of the societies, the *Witness* was in complete harmony. "There is nothing more cheering," it wrote, "than the extent to which good objects are promoted by private effort."¹⁰ Private effort, of course, was part and parcel of the newspaper's social creed, hence the welcome, accorded. Of the various organizations, the one most favoured was the Montreal Temperance Society. This was only natural, since Dougall had been one of its founders, and, for a long period, the editor of its journal, the *Temperance Advocate*. Tradition in the Dougall family has it that he founded the *Witness* primarily in the temperance cause. Realizing that the title of the *Advocate* was a trifle obvious, he resolved on a more subtle approach. The result was the *Witness*, and, while subtle is scarcely a term to be associated with it, it had no official connection with the temperance organization. Be this as it may, the *Witness* carried an immense amount of propaganda. This ran all the way from inspired news items, to dire editorial warnings. A good example of the former was the report of the "Juvenile Temperance Pic-Nic" on the campus of McGill University, with the touching note, "the attendance was large as may be inferred from the fact that 4400 buns and cakes disappeared almost immediately."¹¹ The apparent favour shown the Temperance Society was excused by the ingenious consideration that it was fundamental to every other good cause. "Indeed, all those who wish success to the other Societies should join in this . . . [for how can they succeed] . . . so long as the mass of the people would rather have a glass of whisky than the best tract that was ever written?"¹²

Of far greater historical importance was the *Witness's* concern in

⁹*Ibid.*, June 15, 1853.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, Aug. 6, 1849.

¹¹*Ibid.*, Aug. 16, 1847.

¹²*Ibid.*, Feb. 1, 1847.

schooling. While it may have been a coincidence that launched the newspaper in the year of the Education Act, only sustained interest can explain the attention the paper gave the subject. It was inevitable, that while the *Witness* should support education, it should do so with a difference. The school favoured was the elementary school, and the elementary school maintained by voluntary, preferably by church, support. Until the early fifties, the *Witness* was highly critical of the existing school laws, since they seemed to increase the power of the state, and to relegate religion to a secondary place.¹³ In order to show the disadvantages of secular schools, the *Witness* published lengthy accounts of the public schools in New England. Their effect, it was asserted, was "to bring down the whole of society to the same level," an illuminating commentary on the *Witness's* concept of democracy. The solution was what the *Witness* called the "Christian School." "The business of teaching must be taken up by the church . . . denominational societies must share in it."¹⁴ "It is really . . . the people who must pay for education, and they may as well pay for a good system at once . . . the supervision of [i.e. by] the Evangelical Churches is the best guarantee."¹⁵ As well as insisting on the voluntary school, the *Witness* campaigned for the well-trained teacher. It campaigned, also, for the well-paid teacher. In a passage of startling modernity, it lamented the low position accorded the teacher in Canadian society.¹⁶ In the ideal social scale, the position of the teacher should be surpassed only by that of "the pastor, missionary, publisher, and editor."

The attitude of the *Witness* towards university education was curious. In the eighteen-forties, only the most tepid interest was taken in what was called "the university question," the secularization of King's College, Toronto. The assumption must be that Toronto was too far away, and university education too grand for the *Witness* and its readers. In the eighteen-fifties, this changed, and the newspaper devoted considerable space to university affairs. McGill University, especially after the granting of the new charter in 1852, came in for approval. In Sir William Dawson, Dougall apparently found a kindred spirit. Thereafter, the *Witness* was always ready to do a journalistic good turn. An editorial, "A New Era," shows how this was done. "It is . . . in McGill College . . . that the greatest improvement is to be found. . . . Indeed, we know of no institution so free from fault . . . [such as] . . . sectarian character, heretical views . . . low tone of morals . . . but no such objection can be brought against McGill. The University of Toronto has been . . . partially improved—but under its present management we do not expect much from it."¹⁷

III

In spite of, or perhaps because of, its religious character, the *Witness* was no enemy of material progress. It could, in fact, have provided Professor Tawney with a few additional pointers on the intimate connection between Protestantism and the rise of capitalism. The *Witness* had no difficulty in associating progress and Divine approval, the elect being

¹³*Ibid.*, Mar. 1, 1847.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, Sept. 28, 1846.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, Jan. 11, 1847.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, Feb. 8, 1847.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, Aug. 6, 1856.

recognizable by their temporal prosperity. One of the best examples of this fundamental truth was provided by an editorial agreeably entitled, "The Hand of God on Popery." After noting the "strife and bloodshed" rampant in Europe, the *Witness* turned to America: "We see . . . Mexico . . . devastated and dismembered . . . [while] . . . the United States is blessed with extraordinary prosperity and stability. . . . In the two provinces of Canada we find the same marked contrast. Upper Canada, chiefly Protestant, is rapidly increasing in all the elements of greatness, whilst Lower Canada, chiefly Roman Catholic, is not only stationary, but is retrograding. . . . Truly, 'Righteousness exalteth' a nation'." More domestic in character was the *Witness's* incessant praise of "industry, frugality, and perseverance." The neglect of these precepts roused the paper to indignation. Speculation was roundly condemned, and from the infallible source; "the Bible declares, 'that they who haste to be rich fall into a snare'. . . . When will men believe . . . the Bible . . . [and] . . . act on its precepts?"¹⁸ Turning from the general to the particular, the *Witness* contained an immense amount of information on business conditions. An annual feature was the "Conditions and Prospects of Canada," which usually appeared in the new year. Throughout 1846, the *Witness* carried a series of articles by J. T. Brondeest, who as a power in the Montreal Board of Trade, and as an "Episcopalian Evangelical" made the best of both worlds.

Two of the *Witness's* enthusiasms call for especial attention. One was railways; the other free trade. From the first volume, the *Witness* demonstrated its interest in railway construction. What canals were to Venice, roads to Rome, rivers to Britain, railways would be to Montreal. The *Witness* never forgot that it was the "Montreal" *Witness*, and that railways were the providential means of breaking Quebec and of challenging New York for the control of north-eastern America trade. Railways were both the symbol and the reality of progress. Again and again, in chronicling the opening of a new line, the *Witness* was moved to philosophize on the meteor-like progress of the age. The efforts of other publicists were appreciatively noted, and it was natural that the *Witness* should have a good word for T. C. Keefer.¹⁹ The details of railway building and operation were carefully observed, Dougall probably acting as his own reporter.²⁰ But while the accounts began enthusiastically, it was rarely that they ended that way. "At this station . . . a lunch was provided . . . and we are sorry to learn that intoxicating drinks flowed freely." On the Grand Trunk project, the *Witness* ran the whole gamut of emotion. It started happily, "the dinner on Friday . . . went off . . . in a very respectable manner, unlike most of the drunken sprees dignified with the name of public dinner."²¹ Yet, only three years later, it wrote, "the worship of material interest has prevailed . . . and found its supreme idol in the Grand Trunk. . . . Before this new Dagon, the Governor General, responsible Ministers, [and] a whole legislature have bowed." The Grand Trunk episode had one benefit. It served to introduce the *Witness's* political hero, George Brown. Whether Brown was known personally to

¹⁸*Ibid.*, Aug. 2, 1847.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, Jan. 19, 1853.

²⁰*Ibid.*, Feb. 4, 1849.

²¹*Ibid.*, Aug. 24, 1853.

Dougall, cannot be determined, but he came to occupy a leading place in the newspaper's columns. A devastating candour was the normal manner in which other national figures were discussed, but Brown received preferred treatment. He had, of course, much to recommend him, apart from his criticism of railway monopolists. "His opposition to Ecclesiastical Corporations, and his labours on behalf of the Sabbath are strongly approved."²²

Of equal interest was the *Witness's* treatment of free trade. It grew up, so to speak, with the free trade movement, and the entire first volume, 1846, is an absorbing commentary on free trade seen through Canadian eyes. The rapid transformation scene in the British House of Commons was characterized as "astounding." Sir Robert Peel instantly became the beau ideal of a statesman, his speech on the Corn Laws being described as surpassing "all that ever were delivered by Cicero, Demosthenes, and all the great orators of heathen antiquity put together."²³ Free trade was speedily translated into the *Witness's* customary moral overtones, "the sublime principles of Christianity." That the adoption of a new fiscal policy by Great Britain might adversely affect Canada, the *Witness* was slow to realize. It fully reported pronouncements of businessmen favouring free trade, and of course minimized, or suppressed, opposing views. More positively, the *Witness* developed its own programme, the repeal of the Navigation Acts, improved farming, and the extension of railways.²⁴ Yet it was on theoretical arguments that the newspaper chiefly relied. "[Protection] annuls the divine law, that all men should look on each other as brethren. . . . [Free Trade] is the greatest means in the providence of God for promoting peace and good will . . . no artificial system, however skilfully constructed, . . . can in any degree equal the beautiful harmony and perfection of the order established by Divine Providence, which is to let every man carry his industry or the produce of it to the best market he can find, and procure what he needs in return . . . on the most favourable terms." Such an argument, the *Witness* regarded as unanswerable.

IV

As well as being concerned with Canada's internal health, the *Witness* was much exercised by its relations abroad. In the category of external relations, the United States occupied the largest place; hence, reviews of United States news, and comments on United States policy filled its exchanges and editorial columns. Its admiration for the United States was very real. If the *Witness* had a model, it was the American religious journal, such as the frequently quoted *New York Evangelist* or *Boston Independent*.²⁵ In the United States, the *Witness* found the ultimate of moral and material well-being, "no luxurious aristocracy, . . . no standing armies to live on the sweat of the poor man's brow and carry licentiousness into the poor man's dwelling." Yet, in its admiration, the newspaper preserved a certain critical quality. The United States it so admired, and so ably interpreted, was the "Free North," New England and the East. This reservation was absolute.

The earliest concern of the *Witness* was in Canadian-United States

²²*Ibid.*, Sept. 14, 1853.

²³*Ibid.*, July 27, 1846.

²⁴*Ibid.*, June 29, 1846.

²⁵*Ibid.*, Dec. 13, 1847.

relations, to use the modern jargon. The first issue, Number I of Volume I, carried the leader, "A Voice from Canada to the Christians of the Free States, on the Prospect of War." The reference of course, was to the dispute over the Oregon boundary. From this beginning, the *Witness* sustained the same line, the essential harmony between Canada and the North. Occasionally, the olive branch was waved a bit menacingly, and the United States was warned, "hanging on your frontier, a dark cloud of Indian tribes, the Mexicans, trained to rapine and bloodshed threatens [*sic*] you on the south . . . your northern frontier bristle[s] with . . . bayonets . . . you have in your midst a sleeping volcano of three million slaves." In the main, however, the appeal was to justice and common sense. Such an argument worked both ways. The *Witness* not only spoke to the United States; it spoke of the United States to Canada. To the newspaper's everlasting credit, throughout the crises and near-crises of the eighteen-forties and fifties, it invariably placed a generous and rational interpretation on the actions of the United States. Aggression was a burden that neither country could easily bear. "The evil effects in Canada [of the war scare] have been unsettling . . . engendering . . . an increase of intemperance consequent upon the night musters of volunteer companies in taverns."

Domestic issues in the United States, presidential elections, and the problem of slavery, fascinated the *Witness*. In political matters, the *Witness* took sides with alarming alacrity. It rapidly transferred its allegiance from the Whig to the Know-Nothing, and, finally, to the Republican party. The Whigs, originally in high favour because of their opposition to the Mexican War, were unceremoniously rejected as "dough faces," before the War ended. The Know-Nothings, who were applauded as representing "the old Puritan feeling," enjoyed approbation until the rise of the Republicans. Since it condemned slavery as well as "Popery," the Republican appeal was irresistible. Presidential personalities and possibilities were eagerly canvassed. In the main, the *Witness* was not lucky in its prognostications. In the elections of 1856, it backed Frémont unreservedly. "Frémont is quite a different character. . . . He is the Nimrod, and Crusoe, and Columbus, and Pizarro of the present generation."²⁶ Equally absorbing was the struggle over slavery. In the estimation of the *Witness*, the issue was slavery, and one will scan its editorial columns in vain for a suggestion of more fundamental causes. Given Dougall's premises, the stand the newspaper took was never a moment in doubt. It was one of uncompromising hostility. The *Witness* began in 1846, with a strong bias in favour of abolitionists, describing them as, "the only class . . . who . . . are discharging their duties towards God and man," and ending ten years later with the gloomy recommendation that it would be better for the North to wreck the Union than to continue to tolerate slavery. Grotesque as such opinions appear today, they must be understood in relation to their times, and to the almost universal condemnation of the north-eastern United States by the English-language press of Montreal. The deliberate singling out of the abolitionists is self-revealing. If the *Witness* had a United States counterpart it was the *Liberator*, and if John Dougall had an American opposite number, it was William Lloyd Garrison.

The *Witness* carried a great deal of anti-slavery literature, culminating in *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. The earliest notice of the book came in the summer

²⁶*Ibid.*, June 25, 1856.

of 1852, and in August appeared the announcement of the first Canadian edition.²⁷ As the proprietor of the Religious and Useful Bookstore, Dougall had a very real interest in a best seller, but his enthusiasm was based on principles as well as on profits. In praising Uncle Tom, the *Witness* threw discretion to the winds, even likening it in effect to the Bible. The final recommendation, while negative, was probably decisive, "the Pope has prohibited the sale . . . of Uncle Tom's Cabin."²⁸

Occasionally, the *Witness's* preoccupation with the United States got it into hot water. The most serious was the newspaper's participation in the Annexation agitation of 1849. As might be surmised, the *Witness* had a strong presumption in favour of union with the United States, and as English-speaking Montreal moved towards annexation, the *Witness* moved with it. As early as February, 1849, it was dealing tentatively with this "important topic." As usual, moral and material motives were jumbled together: "7th. It [annexation] would introduce us to the sympathy and aid of American [charitable] societies." From this beginning, the *Witness* moved rapidly, asserting in August that it wanted only "the indications of Providence," to induce it to declare itself openly. About a month later (September 24), the desired happened, and the *Witness* announced happily that, "the indications of Divine Providence are pointing directly, confidently, and . . . even urgently in the direction of annexation." At that point the *Witness* was brought up short by the vigorous protest of one of its readers, the Honourable Malcolm Cameron. Cameron charged that the newspaper was violating one of its cardinal principles, abstention from politics.²⁹ The *Witness* thereupon reversed its stand, covering its retreat by the ingenious excuse that "the line between questions that are political and those of a moral or religious character are [*sic*] often imperceptible." Undignified as the episode may have been, the crawl-back of the *Witness* was less humiliating than that of most of the Montreal press. Looking back a year later, the *Witness* was able to explain its stand by the turn of events in the United States. "We have heretofore advocated annexation . . . but rather than consent . . . while this slave-catching law is in force . . . we would be willing to see Canada ten times poorer . . . than she is."³⁰ The reference, of course, was to the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. More than any other single instance, the Annexation episode sums up the *Witness's* hopes, upsetting privileged churches, securing Anglo-Saxon supremacy, and ushering in the *bourgeois* paradise. This constant admixture of moral and material motives was one of the paper's most sustained characteristics.

With the issue of November 1, 1856, the *Witness* became a semi-weekly. It had come far in the course of the first ten years. The subscription rate had been slashed from 17s. 6d. to \$2.00 and the number of subscribers had risen from 1,500 to nearly 8,000.³¹ The turning point in the *Witness's* career seems to have been 1850. After that date, circulation grew steadily. The *Witness* had no difficulty in explaining this encouraging progression, "humble dependence on Divine Providence," "the exciting nature of the discussions on which we have been engaged," and "the opening of railways

²⁷*Ibid.*, Aug. 29, 1852.

²⁸*Ibid.*, June 8, 1853.

²⁹*Ibid.*, Oct. 8, 1849.

³⁰*Ibid.*, Oct. 14, 1850.

³¹*Ibid.*, Dec. 14, 1846 and Oct. 22, 1856.

and the multiplication of Post Offices." The locale and status of the readers is more difficult to determine. In some of the earlier volumes, the *Witness* published fairly regularly lists of receipts and the place of residence of its agents. Judging from these, it appears that Canada East and "the Peninsula," i.e. the Ottawa and Rideau valleys, provided the newspaper with the majority of its subscribers. Unfortunately, comparable figures for the later volumes do not appear, so it is impossible to suggest whether the increased circulation of 1856 was based upon intensification within this area or on expansion outside it. The first decade, 1846-56, perhaps represented the *Witness* at its most successful. It spoke for an established clientele, the farmer, town worker, and small tradesman. It spoke, also, for the Protestant and the progressive, regarding those terms as synonymous. In the eighteen-forties and fifties, these groups were still politically considerable in Canada East, and it may be supposed that the *Witness* voiced their views acceptably. The tone of comfortable superiority the *Witness* habitually used probably merely echoed the confidence of a social type which was not yet superseded by the rising French-Canadian middle class nor abandoned by the Anglo-Canadian capitalist class.

There was no time for discussion at the end of the session in which this paper was read. [Editor].

ON THE NATURE OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE
FRENCH AND THE ENGLISH IN CANADA:
AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL INQUIRY

By A. G. BAILEY
The University of New Brunswick

ANTHROPOLOGICAL investigations have long since revealed the frequency with which the names used by primitive tribes to designate themselves are, on being translated, found to mean "the people" in the sense that the users are the only "true" or "real" people and that their neighbours are scarcely to be regarded as fully qualified members of the human species. Although divine authority has not always been claimed in support of this view, the virtual universality of the conception of the chosen people, in some form or other, is generally recognized. Readers of Green and Freeman will recall the inherent virtues which they attributed to the so-called "Anglo-Saxon" element in the British population, whatever that element may be. Although the distressing history of the spurious ideas of race and racial superiority, from Gobineau through Houston Stuart Chamberlain to Hitler, has long been recognized for what it is worth, and has within the last few years been exposed in widely circulated books and pamphlets,¹ it is astonishing how much confusion reigns and how doggedly popular misconceptions of the subject persist. Barring catastrophes, shocking to think of, it is always easier to go on thinking in the habitual wrong-headed way. It conserves energy, and perhaps a general recognition of the truth would be repugnant to those self-regarding emotions that give collective coherence to large masses of men.

These misconceptions concerning the nature of race and nationality, and of the relationship between them, are not merely of academic interest. They underlie persistent mass attitudes and serve as either the springs of action, or the verbal ammunition directed against some group which is primarily an object of attack for economic or ideological reasons, far removed from that group's alleged inherent inferiority or undesirability. If these misconceptions underlie semitism, they also underlie anti-semitism. They serve to fortify the suspicions and hatred of one group for another. They nourish and add flesh to the delusions of the more virulent "racists" of Ontario and Quebec.

That the average citizen who has not made a special study of the subject often confuses the effects of nature and nurture in attributing certain mental endowment and temperament to particular racial stocks is perhaps not surprising in view of the fact that even scholars of eminence appear to have done so. Professor Trevelyan suggests that the sources of Shakespeare's poetic genius may be sought in the fact that he sprang from an area that was near an old borderland of Welsh and Saxon conflict. How "wild Celtic fancy" could be regarded as a cultural endowment as late as the sixteenth century, and in England at that, is hard to conceive. It is evident however that this is not how Professor Trevelyan thinks of the influence as having been handed down, for he speculates on the possible

¹For example, Julian Huxley, *'Race' in Europe* (Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs, no. 5, Oxford, 1929); and Ruth Benedict and Gene Weltfish, *The Races of Mankind* (Public Affairs Pamphlet, no. 85, 1943).

influence of the inheritance of Celtic "blood" upon the English temper.² We know well enough that blood is not inherited, and that even if it were, there would be no reason to suppose that it bore any relationship whatsoever to either intelligence or temperament. The statement is all the more inadmissible when it is remembered that there is not and never has been any such thing as Celtic blood. Although the four distinct blood groups recognized by scientists appear to have a somewhat uneven distribution, most populations seem to have some representation from each group. Nevertheless, the fact has not yet been proved to have any significance in distinguishing between racial stocks or nationalities, for the differences in blood type do not appear to be co-ordinated with other variations in physical characteristics.³ To include them among the factors that may distinguish one type of mentality from another would be quite fanciful in the light of present knowledge of the subject. As for the Celts, they may or may not have possessed so high a degree of physical uniformity as to be regarded as racially distinctive. That problem is quite irrelevant, however, for the term properly denotes a group of peoples who spoke languages which were variants of a discernible linguistic stock, and about whom there has clustered, owing to the contingencies of historic circumstance, certain cultural traits which, by association with particular peoples and the languages which they spoke, have also become commonly identified as Celtic. It is clear from the context that Professor Trevelyan does not employ the term "Celtic blood" figuratively to mean culture in accordance with common usage, but is speculating as to the reality of the biological transmission of mental and emotional characteristics throughout long periods of time. Such speculation is without scientific foundation.

Professor Toynbee does not appear to have taken the same view in his search for the origins of Egyptian civilization. Having exposed the fallacy of concomitant variations in physical and psychical characteristics with masterful irony directed against modern western racists, in what must stand as one of the finest pieces of writing on the subject, he goes on to observe that the creative contributions of more than one racial stock are necessary to the geneses of civilizations.⁴ The unwary reader might suppose that what Professor Toynbee is asserting is that the mental and emotional endowment required for cultural advancement must derive from a mingling of racial stocks through miscegenation and the consequent production of a superior biological type. A closer reading, however, surely will reveal that what he intends is that there must be a mingling, not necessarily of races, but of the cultural features that they bear with them in migration, and that these cultures become creative in the moment of contact through interaction and mutual stimulation. Although the fusion of cultural strains into a richer and more vital amalgam would no doubt be hastened by the greater intimacy resulting from intermarriage between members of the converging peoples, yet the production of a hybrid physical type is incidental and irrelevant, since the association of a particular racial structure with a particular mentality is fortuitous and does not stand in the relation of cause and effect. For, as Dr. Jenness argued so convincingly some years ago,

²G. M. Trevelyan, *History of England* (London, New York, 1932), 45.

³J. S. Huxley and A. C. Haddon, *We Europeans, A Survey of "Racial" Problems* (New York and London, 1936), 100.

⁴Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London, 1934), I, 240.

the degree of cultural advancement of any given people, and the style and content of their culture, are not in any way related to their physique by virtue of its relative purity or as the product of racial mixture.⁵ Culture has its own dynamic, and cultural phenomena are sufficiently explained in their own terms. Advancement in the stages of civilization has been enjoyed by those people who have been situated at strategic crossroads and have thus been in a position to receive and react to the fertilizing waves of cultural influence that have flowed in upon them from several quarters, shattering the pattern of use and wont, setting old attitudes and old techniques at naught, issuing successive challenges to their ingenuity and at the same time augmenting and refining their capacity to respond creatively and effect novel integrations on ever and ever higher levels as long as the process remains undisturbed. There comes a time when such people become a "world in themselves," when, as it were, the pot "comes to a boil" and they begin to give back more than they receive. It seems likely that in some such way as this, cultural nuclei were often formed from which subsequently emanations have been carried outwards to peripheral areas. By contrast those peoples whose lot has been cast in isolated places have remained backward. These processes, as well as the type of culture existing in any area, are to be defined and explained in terms of the complex interactions within the cultural environment, and between it and the physical environment, and are entirely irrespective of the racial features of the people involved, except in so far as people may be influenced to approve or disapprove of certain physical types in their social relations in which case cultural processes will be modified thereby.

The foregoing observations may serve as a sketch of the larger setting within which the question of the nature of the distinction between the French and the English in Canada may be considered. We have been speaking of culture in the sense in which it was defined by Tylor, as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." We have employed the term "race" in its biological sense as a hereditary subdivision of the species *homo sapiens*, corresponding to a breed in domestic animals, or, in Professor Ginsberg's words as "a group of individuals who, within given limits of variation, possess in common a combination of hereditary traits sufficient to mark them off from other groups."⁶ He adds that if they are to be used as criteria of race, traits must be hereditary and remain relatively constant despite changes in the environment, and that they must be common to a fairly large group. It is to be inferred that he is referring to physical and not to mental traits.

We are now in a position to apply our criteria to the problem in hand, as to the terms in which the two major Canadian peoples are to be distinguished from each other. Our submission is simply that the differences between them as French and as English are not differences of racial inheritance but of cultural acquisition, have not arisen as a result of a biological diversity, are not in any way a reflection of unlike blood, but on the contrary are no more and no less than very limited differences between the cultural traits and configurations that they have acquired through the

⁵Diamond Jenness, *The Indian Background of Canadian History* (Bull. no. 86, Anthropological Series no. 21, National Museum of Canada, Ottawa, 1937).

⁶Morris Ginsberg, *Sociology* (London, 1934), 56.

social interaction of mind and mind, and through which their common psychic endowment as human beings finds a degree of expression and fulfilment. This means that the terms French and English denote acquired mental variations, and do not denote, either significant or relevant variations in physique, or inherited differences in mentality. One man is not born to think in a certain way because his headshape is dolichocephalic, and another man differently because he is brachycephalic. No man is born to think in a particular way at all, or if he is, that way may not be labelled either French or English; and no man ever had or ever will have dolichocephalic thoughts. A man may think in a way that can be described as English; but if he does he has learned to think that way through his social contacts with persons of English culture in some of its various manifestations. His doing so is thus a cultural and not a biological phenomenon.

One would anticipate an inquiry at this point as to whether it is here contended that the average of the physique of people of French culture was exactly similar to the norm about which persons of English culture vary with respect to racial traits. An answer to this question as to whether the English and French Canadians are racially diverse may be approached first by making some observations on the racial composition of European peoples.

It is a well-known fact that there is a greater physical resemblance between the Germans of the Rhineland and the neighbouring French than there is between those same Germans and their fellow nationals in eastern Germany who resemble the Poles more closely than they resemble the western Germans. In addition to this racial diversity between east and west in Germany, it is also a well-known fact that the racial composition of Europe is characterized roughly by broad belts running east and west so that the dominant variation is between north and south. Consequently the people in the southern part of France resemble those of south Germany more than they do their own compatriots in northern France. There is considerable racial diversity in France and it is quite inaccurate to speak of a French race. The same thing may be said of England.

The populations of both places are racially mixed as are all populations, but is the same mixture to be found in France as in England? We are told that of the three so-called basic races of Europe the English exhibit more Mediterranean and Nordic traits whereas the populations of France appear to have more of the Alpine ingredient than do those of England.

It is perhaps premature to speculate on the significance of Boas's investigations into the alleged changes wrought in the anatomical structure of certain European stocks resulting from their migration to the new environment of the United States, and on the implications of the possible racial variations in the behaviour of the endocrine glands or as a result of them, which may also, if true, be reactive to environmental conditions and changes. But if there is anything in these contentions it would simply mean that racial characteristics are less stable than ethnologists have hitherto supposed. It might also add weight to the supposition that the so-called primary European races, the Alpine, Mediterranean, and Nordic, are not and never have been races at all, but are simply ideal types invented by man in his attempt to establish frames of reference with which to gauge variations in physique. If this were so we might still seek for a comparison between the norms for England and France, but we would now

employ such a label as Alpine not with the idea that it designates a race that once inhabited a part of France, but only as a convenient way of describing a tendency towards stockiness in combination with dark-hairedness and round-headedness. We might thus be no nearer than we were before to determining the historic affinity between the peoples of England and France whether in Europe or in North America.

Even if we shift our attention for a moment from racial groupings to those identifiable by tribal and linguistic designations, we may not be in a much better position to determine precise distinctions. But we can be reasonably sure that the affinity between Gaul and Britain, Saxon and Frank, Dane and Norman was not remote, racially mixed as these peoples must have been. The prehistoric peoples in these areas were not as distinct as night is from day,⁷ and later migrations brought Huguenots into England and Celts to Brittany, to mention only two noteworthy movements of peoples. It is therefore not surprising that there are many individuals in France who resemble individuals in England far more closely in physique than they do their own compatriots. The same statement can be made with confidence about French and English Canada, in spite of the selective process involved in migration to North America.

If there are any racial differences as between the English-speaking and the French-speaking populations they are very slight. It may be that certain physical types are more commonly found in the area where English is spoken than where French is the prevailing language, or that the average tendencies towards certain types of physique are not exactly the same in the two populations. They are not exactly alike in any two selected populations. They are not alike as between Rivière du Loup and Chicoutimi, or as between Moose Jaw and Regina. And yet these facts, even if recognized by the people themselves, would not make the people of Rivière du Loup regard themselves as any more or any less truly French than the people of Chicoutimi, nor would they develop a sense of distinctive nationality on the bases of such recognition. If it were claimed that the English exhibited a stronger tendency towards blondness than the French, the same might conceivably be said of Hamilton as compared with Toronto, but we could only add that the difference, if such exists, would be totally lacking in significance. If all other marks of identification were lacking how could a pathologist decide from the physical characteristics alone whether a body recovered from the St. Lawrence River at Montreal were that of an English or a French person? What, one might well ask, does an English Canadian look like? We cannot answer that question. Many varieties are found among English Canadians, and much the same varieties are found in French Canada. If there were a general notion among the English that the French Canadians were overwhelmingly brunette, how would they account for the frequency with which blue-eyed and flaxen-haired children may be observed on the roadways of Les Escoumins, Baie Milles Vaches, and the Saguenay villages, to mention only a remote and isolated part of the Province of Quebec. We may conclude therefore that much the same range of variation is found among both peoples, that it is impossible to identify an individual with absolute certainty from his racial features alone as belonging to either one or the other group, while admitting at the same time that certain physical types may be found more frequently among the

⁷R. Munro, *Prehistoric Britain* (London, n.d.), 228.

English than among the French, or that the tendency towards certain physical characteristics may be found more pronounced and more widely diffused in the one than in the other.

But when we have said this we have said very little, for we cannot claim that any very slight differences in average tendency that there may be are of any greater significance as a basis for distinction between French and English than are the slight racial differences between any two English-Canadian communities, which means that they are no real bases at all. Such differences as there are between the French and the English are national, not racial, cultural and acquired, not inherited. It is conceivable that there might be a people possessing a high degree of racial uniformity, as among themselves, and a considerable divergence in appearance between themselves and their neighbours, the recognition of which might form an ingredient of their sense of distinctive nationality. But no such uniformity within, nor marked divergence between, the French and the English may be said to exist. Such differences as exist are popularly exaggerated and are generally misconstrued as meaning an inherited difference in mentality as between the two. There is no predisposition of a child born to English-speaking parents to speak English also. The child could as easily acquire any other language as English, in the way that all languages are acquired. That child could be taken at birth and reared in a French-Canadian household, and it would be just as truly a French Canadian as any other child, because it would acquire from its social environment those traits which would make it a French Canadian in the way in which all French Canadians come to be what they are. The reverse procedure would be exactly the same.

The complete lack of significance of the racial factor as a mark of distinctiveness between the French-Canadian and English-Canadian nationalities may be accepted more readily than the view that these groups are not to be divided from each other on the basis of hereditary temperamental differences. The question of the nature and method of transmission of temperament is an important but vexing one, since much scientific investigation remains to be carried out before positive statements can be made. Nevertheless what seem to the writer to be rational inferences may be drawn from what is now known or hypothetical, and we may profitably apply our surmises to the question which we have here been considering.

We should mention also the claims that have been made in recent years for what is in fact a new kind of climatic determinism and which must be received with definite and specific reservations. Even if we accepted the view that temperament varies between groups for physiological reasons derived from the character of diet, and in the last analysis because of climatically determined soil constituents, we should still be inclined to reject Lieutenant Commander J. R. de la H. Marett's explanation in physiological terms of such cultural differences as may distinguish one nationality from another.⁸ At best the theory would require that the given population, whose temperament was to be explained, should be socially undifferentiated, immobile over a long period of time, uniform in its dietary habits, completely dependent for its subsistence upon its immediate environment, and

⁸J. R. de la H. Marett, *Race, Sex and Environment, A Study of Mineral Deficiency in Human Evolution* (London, 1936). The theory is summarized by T. K. Penniman in *A Hundred Years of Anthropology* (New York, 1936), 258-63.

entirely cut off from cultural contacts. If any people were ever so situated they must have lived out their narrow lives in a time not far removed from the dawn of the human race. Their area of distribution would conceivably have been in a large measure ecological, and their culture closely conditioned by the ecological factor. But not completely so, for the status of humanity postulates social communication (that is to say, the interaction of minds through the medium of language) and thus the existence of primary diffusion within the group, making for cultural elaboration transcending the dictates of the physical environment. The operation of physiological determinants would thus be limited on even the most primitive cultural levels. As the transcendence of such dictates by modern advanced cultures, with their technological mastery of the physical world, is so much the greater, no such conditions as those adumbrated by the climatic determinists can be accepted in explanation of the difference in temperament between modern nationalities. Even if these conditions were applicable to modern populations there would be no reason to suppose that the ecological area of a distinctive temperament would at all coincide with the area inhabited by a particular nationality. Furthermore the cultural distinction between modern nationalities is uninfluenced by the fact that they sometimes live in practically identical climatic conditions. A further objection is grounded in the fact that, with rapid and efficient transportation, large numbers of people now vary their habitat, and even if they remain where they are most of the time, they draw the constituents of their diet from many different climatic regions. The French and English Canadians of Montreal or Ottawa will both habitually eat oranges from California, drink coffee from Brazil, and even sometimes consume butter from New Zealand.

Before raising the most serious objection to this climatic theory, it might be well to dispose of the idea that the French and English Canadians are distinguished, as such, by inherited temperamental differences. We may begin by admitting that individual differences in intelligence and temperament obviously exist, and that to a limited extent they are certainly transmitted in family lines. But it is a far cry from this to the contention that whole nations have norms of inherited temperamental factors that diverge from each other.⁹ A moment's reflection will reveal that such inherited mental differences cannot be attributed to a numerous population, whether that population constitutes a nationality or not. Instead of one nationality being, metaphorically, all of one colour, and the other being all of another colour, we would suggest that many and similar colours pepper each of the national areas in about equal measure. Just as there are fat men and thin men, in varying degrees, everywhere, so temperamental types probably have much the same frequency in every population, as far as the inherited element is concerned. The merging of lineages through intermarriage would certainly occur with greater frequency within one than between two nationalities, and with the passage of time the hereditary element in temperament might be expected to become more uniformly distributed throughout the population of a particular nationality, but to use this as an argument for a distinctive national temperament stemming from hereditary factors would be dangerous in view of the probability that the range of variations in temperament as between the two nationalities would appear to be much the same, with the types occurring with equal frequency in both peoples.

⁹Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (London, 1935), 15.

Our argument is here hypothetical but we are not indulging in sheer speculation since the results of research appear to point towards the conclusion we have suggested. For although we have been speaking of temperamental or, more broadly, personality types as though they existed in fact, they are really abstractions in the sense that a pure racial type is an abstraction. No individual is truly representative of any of the ideal types, and there is support for the inference that the same assortment of hereditary elements possess the same frequency regardless of differences in language and social tradition. The concomitant variation of temperament with racial traits remains to be proved. The attempt to link Kretschmer's constitutional types with particular races has not succeeded, and it is thought that all of them are found in every population.¹⁰ Hence it may be said that nationalities, even if one allows for a possible clumping in some localities, would also appear to possess them all in much the same measure. Finally we cannot surmise what effects the blending of lineages through intermarriage would have upon temperament. There appears to be no evidence that it produces a levelling out in the population, since the characters may react in such a way as to produce perpetual differences as marked and varied as were the originals.

We may now state the most serious objection to both the environmentalist theory and that purporting to explain such temperamental characteristics as rapidity and intensity of response to stimuli, aggressiveness, sense of humour, and the like in physiological terms. If carried too far they leave little or no room for the operations of the cultural environment. Temperament is actually compounded of the interaction of physiological and cultural processes, and that the latter are not negligible could be proved from a host of examples, among which is the fact that worry sometimes causes gastric ulcers. The cultural processes react upon the physiological, and temperament is in large part a product of the social environment. It is itself to some extent an aspect of culture played upon and developed by other cultural aspects. It is acquired by man in the course of his responses, not to the physical environment alone but also to the cultural configuration of the group in which he becomes a member. Although generalizations are difficult to make in such cases, we would expect temperamental differences to be more marked as between occupational groups in the highly differentiated society of modern Canada than we would between the French and English inhabitants of the country. In so far as temperament is an aspect of culture we are ready to agree that temperamental differences may exist as a cultural diversity exists, but this is no more than saying that the French and English represent partially diverse variants of the Western European cultural complex as modified by habituation to new world conditions. The difference between them is acquired and not inherited.

The disentanglement and clarification of the basic human categories of race, language, and culture is one of the major contributions of the science of anthropology. There was a time when it was thought that there was an organic relationship between the shape of a man's skull and the language he spoke, instead, as is now clearly realized, of an association which is really fortuitous. It was like saying that a green apple tastes green when there is no such thing as a green taste. Although language is replete with such metaphors it is essentially the language of poetry, not the language of

¹⁰Ginsberg, *Sociology*, 75; Otto Klineberg, *Race Differences* (New York, 1935), 61.

science. As Confucius said, only social confusion and disorder can be expected to result from not calling things by their right names. To speak of an English race is to employ a cultural adjective to describe a physical noun. The effect is almost as meaningless as to reverse the order and use a physical adjective to qualify a cultural noun. The absurdity of speaking of a blue-eyed language or of a dolichocephalic religion is evident enough. As Professor Kroeber wrote a quarter of a century ago, it represents a confusion between the organic and the superorganic, between inherited and acquired characteristics.¹¹ Nor is it a harmless confusion, for it attributes to nature what is in reality a product of society. The widespread belief that the French and the English in Canada are distinguished from each other as are two breeds of domestic animals imposes a barrier where none in reality exists. From attributing to nature the distinction between the two peoples, it is only a step to the belief that intimacy between them is contrary to divine ordinance. The eradication of such notions should lead to an improvement of the mutual relations of the French and the English in Canada. It would represent a victory of science and rational inference from ascertained facts over the prejudice to which selfishness and ignorance give rise. One could go further than the Spanish ambassador to the court of Louis XIV, and say that, as far as a barrier in nature is concerned, the Pyrenees never did exist.

DISCUSSION

Mr. Lower asked whether the smallness of the group, say 5,000 only, from which the French Canadians had all descended, could have limited the characteristics of the present French Canadians.

Mr. Spragge suggested that the original group of French Canadians were pretty diverse in types. *Mr. Wade* agreed with this statement.

Mr. Brebner also supported the same view and added the suggestion that a sufficient variety of genes would be present in the original 5,000 to cause great diversity today.

Mr. Tucker asked whether any physical and mental measurements had been taken of French-Canadian and English-Canadian groups.

Mr. Bailey replied that as far as he knew none had been taken.

Mr. Trotter asked about the information supplied by the Canadian census on various races. Had there been any investigation on the basis of the statistics given there?

Mr. Lower said that "race" was used spuriously by the government, for instance what did "Irish" and "Scottish" mean?

Mr. Wade said that Canadian immigration officials were very race-conscious but refused to admit "American" as a race. Similarly the United States authorities did not recognize "Canadian" as a race, only English or French.

Mr. Spragge asked *Mr. Bailey* whether he believed that Canada could be unified by a national system of education.

Mr. Bailey replied that that was a very big question which he would not like to answer on the spur of the moment as there were so many factors involved. Cultural traits could be affected by education but there were two

¹¹A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (New York, 1923), 57.

very different cultural traditions in Canada, and it had to be borne in mind that although culture was by definition acquired, and not inherited, cultural traits were sometimes very resistant to change, and might easily become more so in reacting to an attempt to change them.

Mr. Talman suggested that *Mr. Bailey* had really given the answer to *Mr. Spragge's* question in his paper. The formation of characteristics starts much earlier in the life of an individual than is reached by any systematical education.

NATIONAL HISTORIC PARKS AND SITES

BY THE NATIONAL PARKS BUREAU, LANDS, PARKS AND FORESTS BRANCH,
DEPARTMENT OF MINES AND RESOURCES

THE restoration, preservation, and administration of National Historic Parks and Sites and the commemoration of the public services of outstanding characters in Canadian history is carried out by the National Parks Bureau. In this phase of its work the Bureau is advised by the Historic Sites and Monuments Board of Canada, an honorary body composed of recognized historians representing the various parts of the Dominion.

The personnel of the Board is as follows: Chairman, Dr. J. Clarence Webster, Shediac, New Brunswick; Professor Fred Landon, London, Ontario; Professor D. C. Harvey, Halifax, Nova Scotia; the Honourable E. Fabre-Surveyer, Montreal, Quebec; J. A. Gregory, North Battleford, Saskatchewan; the Reverend Antoine d'Eschambault, St. Boniface, Manitoba; Major G. Lanctot, Dominion Archivist, Ottawa, Ontario; Professor M. H. Long, Edmonton, Alberta; Professor Walter N. Sage, Vancouver, British Columbia; W. D. Cromarty, National Parks Bureau, Ottawa, Ontario.

A general meeting of the Board was held in Ottawa, May 15-17, 1946, when a wide variety of matters relating to the historic background of the Dominion were reviewed and a selection made of sites to be marked at a later date. Of the many sites that have been considered by the Board to date, 337 have been marked or acquired and 216 recommended for attention at a later date.

NATIONAL HISTORIC PARKS

Fort Anne National Historic Park is situated in Annapolis Royal, Nova Scotia. The museum building, restored in 1935, was originally the Officers' Quarters and was built in 1797-8 under the supervision of Edward, Duke of Kent, the father of Queen Victoria, when he was Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces in North America with headquarters at Halifax, Nova Scotia.

The east side and north end of the museum building and all wood-work downstairs in the north and south halls were painted, together with the library, cannon and cannon balls around the building, the chain fence, well-sweep, and sign posts; the roads were repaired, magazines cleaned, moat drained, a new floor laid in the band stand and repairs made to the bases of the columns at the entrance to the museum; the hedges around the memorials were trimmed and the hay cut and removed from the fort grounds facing the highway.

Additional articles of historical interest were obtained for the museum and a four page leaflet was published containing a condensed version of the history of the fort.

A total of 8,754 persons signed the museum register during the year.

Port Royal National Historic Park is situated at Lower Granville, Nova Scotia. A replica of the group of buildings which sheltered the first European settlers in Canada has been erected on the exact site where the Port Royal Habitation stood nearly three and a half centuries ago. The original Habitation was the headquarters for about two years of Samuel de

Champlain, famous explorer and chief geographer to Henry IV of France, who chose the location and drew up the plan of settlement.

Preserving fluid was applied to all shingled roofs and to the cannon platform, palisade and new built-in bunks; additional furnishings, including four baby harbour seal skins, were obtained for the various rooms; all iron work was cleaned and oiled, bridges repaired, cannon painted and the lawns rolled and fertilized.

Vistors registered in the park during the year numbered 6,025.

Fortress of Louisbourg National Historic Park is situated about three miles from the town of Louisburg, Cape Breton Island, Nova Scotia. Here were enacted the early stages of the long struggle which culminated in the possession of Canada for the British Crown.

Erected more than two centuries ago by the French, who had named the stettlement in honour of Louis XIV, King of France, Louisbourg was captured by the British forces in 1745, but was subsequently handed back to the French. The fortress was again besieged by the English and finally captured by them in 1758. It is interesting to recall that one of the brigades of infantry engaged in the recapture of Louisbourg was commanded by General Wolfe, who was later to die heroically at Quebec.

A section of the breast-work near the main entrance was dismantled and rebuilt; the cairn near the west gate, marking the Dauphin's Bastion was taken down and the tablet affixed to the remains of the Bastion which has been partly restored; repairs were made to the northwest walls of the casemates, the doorway in the citadel was rebuilt and concrete bases made for the cannon; the main entrance gate, the fence enclosing the Society of Colonial Wars memorial, and all windows in the museum building and caretaker's quarters were painted and also the cannon and anchors in front of the museum; the bridge across the moat at the Citadel was repaired, part of the entrance road was re-surfaced and the lawns and paths kept in good condition.

A total of 4,256 persons signed the visitor's register.

Fort Beausejour National Historic Park is situated near Sackville, New Brunswick. Built by the French, the fort was intended to be an Acadian stronghold against the undefined claims of the English to Acadia. Around the fort the Acadians had their homes and farms. It was captured by the British, under Monckton, in 1755, when the fort was strengthened and its defences extended by a system of entrenchments, traces of which still remain.

The stonework of the museum building was caulked and made waterproof; the caretaker's residence, rest lodge and cannon were painted; the pavilion provided for the convenience of visitors was moved to a more suitable location; repairs were made to one of the stone pillars at the main entrance gate; all road signs were re-lettered and the grounds maintained in good condition.

Visitors registered at the museum during the year numbered 12,023.

Fort Chambly National Historic Park is situated about twenty miles south-east of Montreal, on a conspicuous headland on the Richelieu River. The first fort, built by the French in 1665 as a protection against the Iroquois, was of wooden construction. After many vicissitudes, it was rebuilt of stone, this work being completed in 1711. In 1760 the fort was surrendered to the British, who, with a small armed force, held it until

1775. In that year the Americans captured the fort; they evacuated in the following year, but burned everything that was combustible, leaving only the four walls standing. The fort was later repaired and garrisoned by Sir Guy Carleton and played an important part in the War of 1812.

Flagstone walks were laid in the picnic grounds; the iron fence around the cemetery and in front of the fort, together with the picnic tables, storm doors, etc., were painted; the trees and shrubs were trimmed and the grounds kept in good condition.

During the year 22,546 persons signed the museum register.

Fort Lennox National Historic Park is located on Ile-aux Noix in the Richelieu River, about thirteen miles south of St. Johns, Quebec. The present fort, which stands on the site of one previously erected by the French, was built by the Imperial authorities in the period from 1812 to 1827. The island, comprising an area of 150 acres, was acquired by the National Parks Bureau in 1921, and extensive works have since been carried out on the buildings and grounds.

Permission was granted to the Jeunesse Etudiante Catholique Organization to use a portion of the park property during the summer months as a youth training centre; the metal roof on the Powder Magazine was painted, the roof of the Officer's Quarters was repaired and the entrance to the latter building repaired and painted; a new floor was laid in the Men's Barracks, a temporary landing dock was constructed on the east side of the island and a cement platform built around the well; repairs were made to the entrance bridge and to the windows in the various buildings; the parade ground was levelled, casemates and picnic grounds cleaned, brush and dead trees along the embankment were cut and removed and the grounds kept in good condition.

Visitors registered in the park during the year numbered 1,248.

Fort Wellington National Historic Park is situated at the east end of the town of Prescott, Ontario, and adjacent to Highway No. 2. The fort, named after the Duke of Wellington, was erected when the British authorities decided to fortify Prescott as one of the most vulnerable points of attack in the war of 1812, and as the main base for the defence of communications between Kingston and Montreal. It remains as it was when finally completed in 1838, an impressive landmark.

The old fence around the fort property was taken down; new palisades were erected to replace those in poor condition; all fort buildings and cannon painted; repairs made to the entrance gates; new signs made and placed in position; trees and shrubs planted and the grounds kept in good condition.

A total of 5,699 persons signed the museum register during the year.

Fort Malden National Historic Park is situated in Amherstburg, Ontario. The fort was built in 1797-9 by the Second Battalion Royal Canadian Volunteers. It was strengthened in 1812 as the principal military station on the western frontier and dismantled and abandoned in September, 1813. Only slight evidences of the original fortifications remain.

The top floor of "The Fort" residence was converted into living quarters for the park custodian and arrangements made with the Provincial Government for one of their Police Constables to occupy the dwelling known as "The Cottage" to give additional protection to the property.

A small bronze plate was attached to the "Tecumseh Stone" donated to the park; the existing tile drain was extended into the sunken garden; repairs were made to the plumbing of the "Fort" and several sections of the rain conductor pipe on this building replaced; additional fire extinguishers were obtained, lawns and hedges trimmed and many articles of interest, including a large anchor, were presented to the park.

During the year 17,355 persons signed the museum register.

Fort Prince of Wales National Historic Park is situated at the mouth of Churchill River, Churchill, Manitoba, and comprises an area of approximately fifty acres. The fort was built from plans drawn by English military engineers, to secure control of Hudson Bay for the Hudson's Bay Company and England. Construction was commenced in 1733 and completed in 1771. It was surrendered to, and partially destroyed by, a French naval force under La Perouse in 1782. Its ruins, which are among the most interesting military remains on this continent, have been partly restored and over forty cannon have been unearthed. Those suitable have been mounted on the walls of the fort.

General supervision was continued throughout the year.

NATIONAL HISTORIC SITES

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Welshpool, Campobello Island, N. B. A. cut-stone monument with tablet was erected near the library building to the memory of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 1882-1945, statesman and humanitarian, who, during many years of his eventful life, found in that tranquil island, rest, refreshment, and freedom from care. To him it was always the "beloved island". The monument was unveiled on August 1, 1946, in the presence of a distinguished gathering including Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt.

Father Jacques Marquette, Boucherville, P.Q. A cut-stone monument with tablet was erected in the small park lying between Highway No. 3 and the St. Lawrence River to commemorate the public services of Father Jacques Marquette, who was born in France on June 10, 1637. With Louis Jolliet, he discovered the Mississippi River on June 17, 1673. He visited the seigniorship in which the monument stands in May, 1668, and died in Michigan on May 18, 1675.

William Wilfred Campbell, Kitchener, Ont. A bronze tablet was erected in the Kitchener and Waterloo Collegiate building to William Wilfred Campbell, the Canadian Poet, who was born in Berlin, (Kitchener) on June 1, 1858, and died near Ottawa on January 1, 1918. His verses revealed the beauty of the Great Lakes, "the magic region of blue waters". The tablet was unveiled on November 25, 1946.

Sir James Douglas, K.C.B., Victoria, B.C. A bronze tablet was erected at the entrance to the Legislative Chamber in the Parliament Buildings to commemorate the public services of Sir James Douglas 1803 - 1877, "The Father of British Columbia". In his early life he was associated first with the North West Company and later with the Hudson's Bay Company. He founded Fort Victoria in 1843. By his firm and wise rule as Governor

of Vancouver Island, 1851 - 1864, and Governor of British Columbia, 1858 - 1864, he laid the foundations of that province. The tablet was unveiled on November 19, 1946.

Frederic William Howay, New Westminster, B.C. A bronze tablet was affixed to the Court House, to Frederic William Howay, historian of British Columbia and Judge of the County Court of Westminster, 1907 - 37. He was a member of the Historic Sites and Monuments Board of Canada, 1923 - 41 and chairman, 1941 - 43. President of the Royal Society of Canada, 1941. Born near London, Ontario, November 25, 1867, and died in New Westminster, October 4, 1943. The tablet was unveiled on November 25, 1946.

During the year all the sites which have been marked on the advice of the Board were suitably maintained. These include Indian earthworks, forts, and villages; French forts, trading posts, and mission enterprises; sites connected with British exploration and naval and military operations in the long struggle for the possession of Canada; posts of the Hudson's Bay Company and sites related to the social, economic, and industrial development of the country.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY*

CANADIAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION ANNUAL MEETING

THE annual meeting of the Canadian Historical Association was held at Laval University, Quebec, on May 29-30, concurrently with the meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association. The following papers were read—the first two at a joint session of the two associations: "Civil Liberties and Emergency Powers" by H. McD. Clokie; "Two Ways of Life—the Essence of Our Traditions" by A. R. M. Lower; "Recent Views of the Italian Renaissance" by K. M. Setton; "La conception de l'histoire chez les historiens contemporains, 1923-1946" by Marcel Trudel; "The Early Editorial Policy of the Montreal Witness, 1846-1856" by J. I. Cooper; "Le Canadien 1806-1810, ou Le journalisme de défense" by Albert Faucher; "On the Nature of the Distinction between the French and the English in Canada: An Anthropological Inquiry" by Alfred G. Bailey; "Royal Commissions and Canadian Agricultural Policy" by V. C. Fowke; "The Liberal Party in Alberta, 1905-1921" by L. G. Thomas.

It was a matter of great regret that Professor H. N. Fieldhouse was prevented by illness from being present and from preparing a presidential address. In his absence Professor F. H. Soward, the vice-president, presided.

The members who were present greatly appreciated the opportunity of meeting in Quebec, and the hospitality which was extended in a variety of ways by the Rector, Mgr Ferdinand Vandry, and the staff of Laval University. A special word of thanks should be recorded for Professor J.-C. Falardeau who was in charge of local arrangements.

The following officers were elected by the Association: President, F. H. Soward, University of British Columbia; vice-president, A. Maheux, Laval University; English secretary-treasurer, Norman Fee, the public Archives, Ottawa; French secretary, Séraphin Marion, the public Archives, Ottawa; editor of the *Annual Report*, R. A. Preston, University of Toronto; associate editor and chairman of the Programme Committee, G. F. G. Stanley, University of British Columbia; members of council to replace those retiring, J.-C. Bonenfant, Quebec; James A. Gibson, Carleton College, Ottawa; D. G. Kerr, Mount Allison University; K. M. Setton, University of Manitoba.

A decision was made that the meeting next year would be held in Vancouver. The Royal Society and the Political Science Associations also made the same decision so that the pattern of meetings which has developed in recent years seems likely to be maintained. It is to be hoped that ways and means will be found for assisting as many as possible to attend, and a joint committee of the societies is being formed to consider possibilities. It is highly desirable that these meetings should from time to time be held elsewhere than in Central Canada.

In this connexion it may be noted that the Council of the Association appointed Dr. George W. Spragge of Toronto chairman of a committee on local history. Dr. Spragge is treasurer of the Ontario Historical Society. It is the intention to appoint provincial or regional members so that contacts may be established, and means found of keeping the Association more

*This Report has already appeared in the *Canadian Historical Review*, June, 1947.

effectively in touch with the activities of provincial and local societies. Through its notes on historical societies the *Canadian Historical Review* has attempted for a number of years to provide a record of these activities. This will be continued, but something more is needed and we hope that Dr. Spragge's committee will prove to be the answer.

During the meeting considerable discussion was given to the financial problem of the Association. The rising price of printing has substantially increased the cost of publishing the *Annual Report*, which is the Association's principal item of expense. In spite of present difficulties, however, the feeling of the meeting was against the elimination of the *Report* or a radical alteration of policy at the present time. It was therefore left to the incoming Council to explore ways and means of carrying on, and if possible of improving the situation, during the next year.

It is appropriate to mention here that, following the meeting steps were taken to institute a more active campaign for both regular and life members. Professor James A. Gibson, who has been appointed head of the history department in Carleton College, Ottawa, has consented to act as chairman of a membership and financial committee, of which Professors Fieldhouse of McGill, Lower of Queen's, Sage of British Columbia, and Underhill of Toronto, who are all past presidents of the Association, will also be members.

The Association, which has now passed its first quarter century, has gone through many vicissitudes and had to face at all times the serious difficulties resulting from the comparatively small number of people actively interested in historical work and the great distances separating the various parts of the country. The resources of the Association have been very limited. In spite of this it has not at any point in the last twenty years shown signs of collapse, and in fact has displayed a persistent vitality. Without the annual meetings, which have brought people together, historical studies in Canada would today be in a much worse condition than they are. The success of the Association has been limited, but it has been very real, and there is now much to build on. There is at present an expansion of university staffs, archives, and local and provincial societies. The potential membership of the Association is increasing, and full advantage should now be taken of this opportunity. The Council solicits for Professor Gibson and his committee the active support of the Association's members.

NORMAN FEE

UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION

THE Canadian Historical Association was represented on July 29, 1947, at a meeting called by the United Nations Association in Canada, at the instance of the Department of External Affairs, to discuss and create an organization to arrange for Canadian contributions to the relief work of UNESCO. About 105 Canadian organizations and institutions with educational, cultural, and scientific interests were invited and over fifty succeeded in sending delegates despite the fact that the meeting was held at short notice in the middle of summer.

The meeting was informed of the desperate lack in many devastated countries of the materials essential for educational effort of all kinds and at all levels, from pencils for school-children to text-books and apparatus for advanced technical training. These needs are estimated at \$100 million for 1947 alone.

It was decided to implement Canadian participation in UNESCO by organizing the efforts of the voluntary associations and of departments of education represented at the meeting and of others not so represented but willing to co-operate.

There was established a council consisting of the delegates from all participating organizations and an executive committee of fifteen members. It was tentatively suggested that the objective for 1947 should be at least \$2 million in cash and an indefinite amount of goods. It was also decided that an approach should be made to the Dominion and provincial governments for grants toward clerical assistance.

The Executive Committee was directed to proceed at once to discuss ways and means, to communicate with the various member organizations and to solicit their aid as appropriate, and to organize a national campaign for UNESCO relief by the collection of money and materials for despatch to the countries in need.

R. A. PRESTON

REPORT OF THE TREASURER

STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED APRIL 30, 1947

RECEIPTS

Balance on hand May 1, 1946			\$ 3.03
Bank Interest	\$ 1.77		
Membership fees and sale of <i>Reports</i>	\$1,268.00		
Less amount collected for joint membership and remitted to Canadian Political Science Association	150.00	1,118.00	
		<u>1,119.77</u>	
Deficit, paid by loans from Reserve Account.....		378.53	1,498.30
			<u>\$1,501.33</u>

DISBURSEMENTS

Audit Fee, Cunningham & Co.	\$ 10.00		
Exchange	2.08		
Expenses of representative on delegation <i>Re</i> Na- tional Library		13.35	
University of Toronto Press—			
Printing <i>Report</i>	\$ 729.00		
<i>Canadian Historical Review</i>	491.00	1,220.00	
<i>Bulletin des Recherches Historiques</i>		80.00	
Administration—			
Clerical assistance	40.00		
Leclerc Printers	45.90		
Expenses of Secretary-Treasurer	30.00		
Petty cash, including postage	60.00	175.90	1,501.33
			<u>\$1,501.33</u>

Examined and found correct,
CUNNINGHAM & Co.,
Auditors

NORMAN FEE,
Secretary-Treasurer

Ottawa, May 21, 1947

RESERVE ACCOUNT

Balance 1st May, 1946—			
In bank	\$ 496.07		
Dominion of Canada Bonds	1,000.00		\$1,496.07
			<u></u>
<i>Receipts</i> —			
Bank interest	4.87		
Bond interest	35.00	39.87	
			<u></u>
Life membership fees		310.32	350.19
			<u>\$1,846.26</u>
Balance—			
On deposit in Bank of Montreal	467.73		
Loan to Revenue Account	378.53	846.26	
			<u></u>
Dominion of Canada Bonds			
Due 1963 3%	500.00		
Due 1966 3%	500.00	1,000.00	1,846.26
			<u>\$1,846.26</u>

Examined and found correct,
CUNNINGHAM & Co.,
Auditors

NORMAN FEE
Secretary-Treasurer

Ottawa, May 21, 1947

MEMBERSHIP OF THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

(A) AFFILIATED SOCIETIES AND ORGANIZATIONS

- Acadia University Library*, Wolfville, N.S. Mrs. Mary K. Ingraham, Librarian.
- American Antiquarian Society*. Clifford K. Shipton, Librarian, Worcester, Mass.
- Antiquarian and Numismatic Society of Montreal*, Château de Ramezay, 290 Notre-Dame St. E., Montreal. Victor Morin, LL.D., President, 57 rue Sainte-Jacques ouest, Montréal; Pemberton Smith, Treasurer, 414 St. James St. W., Montreal.
- British Columbia Historical Association*. Rev. J. C. Goodfellow, President, Victoria, B.C.; W. E. Ireland, Hon. Treasurer, Victoria, B.C.; Miss H. R. Boutilier, Hon. Secretary, Vancouver, B.C.
- British Museum*, Dept. of Printed Books, London, W.C. 1, England.
- Canadian Military Institute*, 426 University Ave., Toronto, Ont. Col. F. S. McPherson, President; T. J. Jackson, Secretary-Treasurer.
- Chicoutimi, Séminaire de*, Chicoutimi, P.Q.
- Clark University Library*, Worcester, Mass., U.S.A. Louis N. Wilson, Librarian.
- Cleveland Public Library*, 325 Superior Ave., N.E., Cleveland, Ohio, U.S.A. Miss Leta E. Adams, Order Librarian.
- Columbia University Library*, New York, N.Y., U.S.A. D. B. Hepburn, Supervisor, Acquisition Department.
- Dalhousie University Library*. Miss Ivy, M. Prikler, Assistant Librarian, Halifax, N.S.
- Dartmouth College Library*, Hanover, New Hampshire, U.S.A.
- Geology and Topography Library*, Dept. of Mines and Resources, Ottawa.
- Hamilton Public Library*. Miss Freda F. Waldon, Librarian, Hamilton, Ont.
- Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery*, San Marino, Calif. Leslie E. Bliss, Librarian; Max Farrand, Director of Research.
- Historical Society of Alberta*. W. Everard Edmonds, Secretary, 11146-91st Ave., Edmonton, Alta.; M. H. Long, Treasurer.
- Hudson's Bay Company*, Canadian Committee Office, Winnipeg.
- Indiana State Library*, 140 N. Senate Ave., Indianapolis, Indiana. Kenneth R. Shaffer, Order Librarian.
- Institute of Historical Research*, University of London, London, England.
- Kingston Historical Society*. R. G. Trotter, President; Ronald L. Way, Secretary-Treasurer, Kingston.
- Legislative Library of Ontario*, Toronto, Ont. Legislative Librarian (Miss Edith King.)
- Library of Congress*, Washington, D.C.
- Library of Parliament*, Ottawa, Ont. F. A. Hardy, Librarian; Félix Desrochers, General Librarian, Ottawa.
- Literary and Historical Society of Quebec*. Col. Wm. Wood, President; D. S. Scott, Recording Secretary; Baron d'Avray, Corresponding Secretary; G. Henshaw, Treasurer.
- London and Middlesex Historical Society*. Hubert J. Trumper, President; Fred Landon, Treasurer, University of Western Ontario, London; H. Orlo Miller, Secretary, Box 571, London, Ont.
- London Public Library*. Richard E. Crouch, Librarian, London, Ont.; James S. Bell, Treasurer.
- McGill University Library*. Gerhard H. Lomer, M.A., Ph.D., F.L.A., Librarian, Montreal, P.Q.
- McMaster University Library*, Hamilton, Ont.
- MacNab Historical Association*. Wm. MacNab Box, President, P.O. Box 155, Foleyet, Ont.
- Manitoba, Historical and Scientific Society of*. J. E. Ridd, Secretary, 1445 Wellington Crescent, Winnipeg, Man.
- Montréal, Collège de*, 1931 rue Sherbrooke ouest, Montréal, P.Q.
- Mount Royal High School*, Town of Mount Royal, P.Q.
- National Liberal Federation of Canada*, c/o Clive S. Thomas, 172 Wellington Street, Ottawa.
- National Parks Bureau*, Dept. of Mines and Resources, Ottawa, Ont.
- Norman Fee, Public Archives of Canada*, Ottawa.
- Norwich Pioneers' Society*. T. H. Pobdon, President; A. L. Bushell, Secretary, Norwich, Ont.
- Nouvel-Ontario*, La Société Historique du, Collège du Sacré-Cœur, Sudbury, Ont., Rév. F. Lorenzo Cadieux, S. J., Director.

- Nova Scotia Historical Society.* B. E. Paterson, President, c/o Halifax Club, Halifax, N.S.; F. A. Lane, Box 38, Secretary.
- Ohio State University, University Library,* Columbus, 10, Ohio, U.S.A.
- Ontario Historical Society,* Dr. J. J. Talman, President; Geo. W. Spragge, Treasurer, 84 Gormley Avenue, Toronto 12, Ont.
- Peterborough Public Library,* Peterborough, Ont. (Wm. L. Graff, Librarian.)
- Princeton University Library,* Princeton, N.J., U.S.A. Lawrence Heyl, Acting Librarian.
- Provincial Library of Alberta.* Mrs. Frank Gostick, Librarian, Edmonton, Alta.
- Provincial Library of British Columbia.* Dr. W. Kaye Lamb, Provincial Librarian and Archivist, Parliament Buildings, Victoria, B.C.
- Provincial Library of Manitoba.* J. L. Johnston, Provincial Librarian, Winnipeg, Man.
- Provincial Library of Saskatchewan.* Mrs. Austin Bothwell, Librarian, Regina, Sask.
- Public Archives of Canada,* Ottawa.
- Québec, Département de l'Instruction Publique,* Québec.
- Québec, Ministère des Terres et Forêts,* Québec.
- Queen's University Library.* E. C. Kyte, Librarian, Kingston, Ont.
- Royal Institute of International Affairs,* St. James's Sq., London, S. W. 1, England.
- Saguenay, La Société Historique du,* Abbé Victor Tremblay, Président; André Lemieux, Secrétaire, Séminaire de Chicoutimi, Chicoutimi, P.Q.
- St-Alexandre, Collège de,* R 1, Pointe Gatineau, P.Q.
- Ste-Anne de la Pocatière, Collège de,* Ste-Anne de la Pocatière, P.Q.
- Saint-Joseph Université, Le Bibliothécaire,* Saint-Joseph, N.B.
- Ste-Marie, Collège de,* 1180 rue Bleury, Montréal, P.Q.
- Ste-Thérèse, Séminaire de,* Ste-Thérèse, P.Q.
- St-Hyacinthe, Séminaire de,* St-Hyacinthe, P.Q.
- Saskatchewan Historical Society.* J. A. Gregory, President; A. T. Hunter, Secretary, 403 McCallum Hill Bldg., Regina, Sask.
- School of Higher Commercial Studies,* 535 Viger Avenue, Montreal.
- Thunder Bay Historical Society.* J. P. Bertrand, President; D. G. Dewar, Secretary-Treasurer, The Public Library, Fort William, Ont.
- Toronto Public Library.* Charles R. Sanderson, Chief Librarian, College and St. George Sts., Toronto, Ont.
- Trois-Rivières, Séminaire des,* Trois-Rivières, P.Q.
- Trois-Rivières, Société d'Histoire Régionale de,* Séminaire des Trois-Rivières, P.Q.
- United College Library.* E. M. Graham, Librarian, Winnipeg, Man.
- University of British Columbia Library.* R. J. Lanning, Librarian, Vancouver, B.C.
- University of California Library,* Berkeley, Calif., U.S.A. Harold L. Leupp, Librarian.
- University of Cincinnati Library,* Burnet Woods Park, Cincinnati, Ohio, U.S.A. Edward A. Henry, Director of Libraries.
- University of Manitoba Library.* Miss Elizabeth Dafoe, Librarian, Winnipeg, Man.
- University of Western Ontario, University Library,* London, Ont.
- Victoria University Library.* Miss Emily Keeley, Library Assistant, Toronto, Ont.
- Webster Canadiana Library,* New Brunswick Museum, Saint John, N.B.
- Wellesley College Library.* Lois E. Engleman, Assistant Librarian, Wellesley 81, Mass., U.S.A.
- Wisconsin State Historical Society.* 816 State Street, Madison 6, Wisc., U.S.A.
- Women's Canadian Historical Society of Ottawa.* Mrs. J. R. Dickson, President, 2 Thornton Ave., Ottawa; Mrs. D. Roy Cameron, Recording Secretary, 54 Park Road, Rockcliffe, Ont.; Mrs. Beath Morden, Recording Secretary, 4 Frank St., Ottawa; Miss Dorothy Barber, Treasurer, 223 Somerset St. W., Ottawa.
- Women's Canadian Historical Society of Toronto.* Miss C. Roberts, President, 20 Earl St., Toronto; Miss Kate Symon, Corresponding Secretary, 68 Avenue Rd., Toronto; Mrs. C. L. Corless, Treasurer.
- Women's Wentworth Historical Society.* Mrs. George Wood Brown, President, 159 Aberdeen Ave., Hamilton, Ont.; Mrs. Bertie D. Smith, Secretary, 284 Hess St. S., Hamilton; Mrs. W. H. Magill, Treasurer.
- Yale University Library.* Donald G. Wing, Accessions Department, New Haven, Conn., U.S.A.
- York-Sunbury Historical Society.* Sterling Brannen, Treasurer, P.O. Box 568, Fredericton, N.B.

(B) LIFE MEMBERS

- Bell, Dr. Winthrop, Chester, N.S.
- Brebner, J. Bartlet, Dept. of History, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
- Brown, Dr. George W., Baldwin House, University of Toronto, Toronto 5

- Burt, A. L., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
 Eames, Frank, Box 180 Gananoque, Ont.
 Ellis, Ralph, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, U.S.A.
 Graham, Major Gerald S., 2 Cockspur Street, London, S.W. 1, England.
 Grant-Suttie, Col. G. L. P., 110 St. George St., Toronto
 Hardy, Mrs. A. C., Brockville, Ont.
 Helstrom, C. T. E., Box 27, Gray, Sask.
 Hudson's Bay Company, Hudson's Bay House, Winnipeg
 Hyde, James H., Hotel Savoy-Plaza, 5th Avenue, New York, N.Y., U.S.A.
 Lanctot, Dr. Gustave, Dominion Archives, Ottawa
 Landon, Fred, University of Western Ontario, London, Ont.
 Leonard, Col. Ibbotson, 782 Wellington St., London, Ont.
 Long, Morden H., University of Alberta, Edmonton
 Lower, Dr. A. R. M., Queen's University, Kingston
 Macdonald, Norman, Department of History, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ont.
 Mackenzie, Donald R., 273 Powell Avenue, Ottawa, Ont.
 Morgan, F. Cleveland, 1455 Union Avenue, Montreal, P.Q.
 Morse, Dr. W. Inglis, 17 Fresh Pond Parkway, Cambridge, Mass.
 Musson, Charles J., 480 University Ave., Toronto
 Myers, Leslie P., 89 Durie St., Toronto 3
 Raymond, Hon. D., The Senate, Ottawa, Ont.
 Rimouski, Evêque de, Rimouski, P.Q.
 Riordon, Carl, 374 Cote-des-Neiges Rd., Montreal
 Ross, J. K. L., 270 Cote-des-Neiges Rd., Montreal
 Sage, Dr. Walter N., University of British Columbia, Vancouver
 Saunders, Richard M., Baldwin House, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ont.
 Scott, S. Morley, Dept. of External Affairs, Ottawa, Ont.
 Sifton, Victor, *Winnipeg Free Press*, Winnipeg
 Smith, Pemberton, 414 St. James St. W., Montreal
 Somerville, Mrs. J. M., 355 B. Kenniston Apts., Elgin Street, Ottawa
 Stacey, Col. C. P., Dept. of National Defence, (Army) Ottawa, Ont.
 Tombs, Guy, 1111 Beaver Hall Hill, Montreal
 Tweed, T. W., 9 Burlington Cres., Toronto 10
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